VOOZH about

URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002/

⇱ Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection, Sub-technique T1055.002 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®


ATT&CKcon 7.0 is coming October 27-28, 2026. Learn more about ATT&CKcon 7.0 and submit your proposal.
  1. Home
  2. Techniques
  3. Enterprise
  4. Process Injection
  5. Portable Executable Injection

Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection

Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

PE injection is commonly performed by copying code (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address space of the target process before invoking it via a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of the injected code does introduce the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. [1]

Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.

ID: T1055.002
Sub-technique of:  T1055
Platforms: Windows
Version: 2.0
Created: 14 January 2020
Last Modified: 12 May 2026

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
C0057 3CX Supply Chain Attack

During the 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus uses the SigFlip tool to inject arbitrary code without affecting or breaking the file's signature.[2][3]

S1063 Brute Ratel C4

Brute Ratel C4 has injected Latrodectus into the Explorer.exe process on comrpomised hosts.[4]

S0030 Carbanak

Carbanak downloads an executable and injects it directly into a new process.[5]

S1158 DUSTPAN

DUSTPAN can inject its decrypted payload into another process.[6]

S1138 Gootloader

Gootloader can use its own PE loader to execute payloads in memory.[7]

G0078 Gorgon Group

Gorgon Group malware can download a remote access tool, ShiftyBug, and inject into another process.[8]

S0342 GreyEnergy

GreyEnergy has a module to inject a PE binary into a remote process.[9]

S1229 Havoc

Havoc has itself injected into C:\\Windows\\System32\\Werfault.exe on targeted systems.[10]

S0260 InvisiMole

InvisiMole can inject its backdoor as a portable executable into a target process.[11]

S0681 Lizar

Lizar can execute PE files in the address space of the specified process.[12]

S1145 Pikabot

Pikabot, following payload decryption, creates a process hard-coded into the dropped (e.g., WerFault.exe) and injects the decrypted core modules into it.[13]

G0106 Rocke

Rocke's miner, "TermsHost.exe", evaded defenses by injecting itself into Windows processes, including Notepad.exe.[14]

S9037 RustyWater

RustyWater has injected its shellcode into explorer.exe by allocating memory via VirtualAllocEx, then by writing the payload via WriteProcessMemory.[15]      

S9024 SPAWNCHIMERA

SPAWNCHIMERA has executed only in memory and hooked itself into existing processes on the victim device to include the web process.[16][17][18]

S0330 Zeus Panda

Zeus Panda checks processes on the system and if they meet the necessary requirements, it injects into that process.[19]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1040 Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process.

Detection Strategy

ID Name Analytic ID Analytic Description
DET0106 Behavioral Detection of PE Injection via Remote Memory Mapping AN0297

Detects PE injection through a behavioral sequence where one process opens (OpenProcess) a handle to another, allocates remote memory (VirtualAllocEx), writes a PE header (MZ) or shellcode (WriteProcessMemory), then initiates a new thread (CreateRemoteThread or NtCreateThreadEx) in that process—executing injected code in memory without touching disk. Optional: injects a trampoline or shellcode that unpacks/reflectively maps the payload.

References

  1. Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.
  2. Mohamed El Azaar (med0x2e), TimWhite (timwhitez). (2023, August 28). GitHub SigFlip. Retrieved September 30, 2025.
  3. Jeff Johnson, Fred Plan, Adrian Sanchez, Renato Fontana, Jake Nicastro, Dimiter Andonov, Marius Fodoreanu, Daniel Scott. (2023, April 20). 3CX Software Supply Chain Compromise Initiated by a Prior Software Supply Chain Compromise; Suspected North Korean Actor Responsible. Retrieved August 25, 2025.
  4. Elkins, T. (2024, July 24). Malware Campaign Lures Users With Fake W2 Form. Retrieved September 13, 2024.
  5. Bennett, J., Vengerik, B. (2017, June 12). Behind the CARBANAK Backdoor. Retrieved June 11, 2018.
  6. Mike Stokkel et al. (2024, July 18). APT41 Has Arisen From the DUST. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
  7. Szappanos, G. & Brandt, A. (2021, March 1). “Gootloader” expands its payload delivery options. Retrieved September 30, 2022.
  8. Falcone, R., et al. (2018, August 02). The Gorgon Group: Slithering Between Nation State and Cybercrime. Retrieved August 7, 2018.
  9. Cherepanov, A. (2018, October). GREYENERGY A successor to BlackEnergy. Retrieved November 15, 2018.
  10. Ungur, P. (n.d.). HAVOC. Retrieved August 4, 2025.
  1. Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.
  2. BI.ZONE Cyber Threats Research Team. (2021, May 13). From pentest to APT attack: cybercriminal group FIN7 disguises its malware as an ethical hacker’s toolkit. Retrieved February 2, 2022.
  3. Brett Stone-Gross & Nikolaos Pantazopoulos. (2023, May 24). Technical Analysis of Pikabot. Retrieved July 12, 2024.
  4. Liebenberg, D.. (2018, August 30). Rocke: The Champion of Monero Miners. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
  5. Awasthi, P. (2026, January 8). Reborn in Rust: Muddy Water Evolves Tooling with RustyWater Implant. Retrieved March 19, 2026.
  6. DHS/CISA. (2026, February 26). MAR-25993211-r1.v2 Ivanti Connect Secure (RESURGE): AR25-087A. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
  7. Matt Lin, Austin Larsen, John Wolfram, Ashley Pearson, Josh Murchie, Lukasz Lamparski, Joseph Pisano, Ryan Hall, Ron Craft, Shawn Crew, Billy Wong, Tyler McLellan. (2024, April 4). Cutting Edge, Part 4: Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Post-Exploitation Lateral Movement Case Studies. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
  8. Yuma Masubuchi. (2025, February 20). SPAWNCHIMERA Malware: The Chimera Spawning from Ivanti Connect Secure Vulnerability. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
  9. Ebach, L. (2017, June 22). Analysis Results of Zeus.Variant.Panda. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
×