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A community-developed list of SW & HW weaknesses that can become vulnerabilities
CWE-1007: Insufficient Visual Distinction of Homoglyphs Presented to User
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Description The product displays information or identifiers to a user, but the display mechanism does not make it easy for the user to distinguish between visually similar or identical glyphs (homoglyphs), which may cause the user to misinterpret a glyph and perform an unintended, insecure action.
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Extended Description Some glyphs, pictures, or icons can be semantically distinct to a program, while appearing very similar or identical to a human user. These are referred to as homoglyphs. For example, the lowercase "l" (ell) and uppercase "I" (eye) have different character codes, but these characters can be displayed in exactly the same way to a user, depending on the font. This can also occur between different character sets. For example, the Latin capital letter "A" and the Greek capital letter "ฮ" (Alpha) are treated as distinct by programs, but may be displayed in exactly the same way to a user. Accent marks may also cause letters to appear very similar, such as the Latin capital letter grave mark "ร" and its equivalent "ร" with the acute accent. Adversaries can exploit this visual similarity for attacks such as phishing, e.g. by providing a link to an attacker-controlled hostname that looks like a hostname that the victim trusts. In a different use of homoglyphs, an adversary may create a back door username that is visually similar to the username of a regular user, which then makes it more difficult for a system administrator to detect the malicious username while reviewing logs.
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Alternate Terms
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Common Consequences ๐ Section Help
This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
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Potential Mitigations
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Relationships
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This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
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Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
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Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
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Modes Of Introduction ๐ Section Help
The different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
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Applicable Platforms ๐ Section Help
This listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
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Likelihood Of Exploit Medium
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Demonstrative Examples Example 1 The following looks like a simple, trusted URL that a user may frequently access. (attack code)
http://www.ะตxะฐmัlะต.ัะพm
However, the URL above is comprised of Cyrillic characters that look identical to the expected ASCII characters. This results in most users not being able to distinguish between the two and assuming that the above URL is trusted and safe. The "e" is actually the "CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IE" which is represented in HTML as the character е, while the "a" is actually the "CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A" which is represented in HTML as the character а. The "p", "c", and "o" are also Cyrillic characters in this example. Viewing the source reveals a URL of "http://www.еxаmрlе.соm". An adversary can utilize this approach to perform an attack such as a phishing attack in order to drive traffic to a malicious website. Example 2 The following displays an example of how creating usernames containing homoglyphs can lead to log forgery. Assume an adversary visits a legitimate, trusted domain and creates an account named "admin", except the 'a' and 'i' characters are Cyrillic characters instead of the expected ASCII. Any actions the adversary performs will be saved to the log file and look like they came from a legitimate administrator account. (result)
123.123.123.123 ะฐdmัn [17/Jul/2017:09:05:49 -0400] "GET /example/users/userlist HTTP/1.1" 401 12846
123.123.123.123 ะฐdmัn [17/Jul/2017:09:06:51 -0400] "GET /example/users/userlist HTTP/1.1" 200 4523 123.123.123.123 admin [17/Jul/2017:09:10:02 -0400] "GET /example/users/editusers HTTP/1.1" 200 6291 123.123.123.123 ะฐdmัn [17/Jul/2017:09:10:02 -0400] "GET /example/users/editusers HTTP/1.1" 200 6291 Upon closer inspection, the account that generated three of these log entries is "аdmіn". Only the third log entry is by the legitimate admin account. This makes it more difficult to determine which actions were performed by the adversary and which actions were executed by the legitimate "admin" account. ๐ +
Selected Observed Examples Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
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Weakness Ordinalities
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Detection Methods
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Memberships
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This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
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Vulnerability Mapping Notes
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Related Attack Patterns
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References
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Content History
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