¹ Legitimacy refers to the acceptance of the Court by the parties, the citizens and society at large. It justifies public trust in the Court on the basis of various factors, such as the selection of judges, their independence and the reasoning supporting the Court’s judgments, see Soeharno, JE, ‘From Rechtsstaat to Ruler in the Rule of Law: An Inquiry into the Increased Role of the Judiciary’ in van Hoek, A et al (eds), Multilevel Governance in Enforcement and Adjudication (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2006) 157 Google Scholar.

² A concurring opinion reaches the same outcome as the majority judgment but it follows a distinct reasoning from the majority judgment. A dissenting opinion states a differing reasoning and outcome. The distinction between the two does not matter for the purpose of this article.

³ Fundamental rights are understood as the civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural rights protected under the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, the common constitutional traditions of Member States and international human rights treaties, such as the European Convention of Human Rights.

⁴ See generally Rasmussen, H, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice. A Comparative Study in Judicial Policy-Making (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1986)Google Scholar; Neill, P, The European Court of Justice: A Case Study in Judicial Activism (London, European Policy Forum, 1995)Google Scholar, Hartley, TC, ‘The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the European Union’ (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 95 Google Scholar; Arnull, A, ‘The European Court and Judicial Objectivity: A Reply to Professor Hartley’ (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 411 Google Scholar; Weiler, JHH, ‘The Court of Justice On Trial’ (1987) 24 Common Market Law Review 555 Google Scholar; Tridimas, T, ‘The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism’ (1996) 21 European Law Review 199 Google Scholar.

⁵ Constitutional matters are only one part of the Court’s caseload, as the Court also functions as an ordinary civil, administrative and criminal court under the Treaty provisions. We focus on how far the analytical process of reasoning is conducive of dialogue with national courts.

⁶ Art 27 of the Rules of Procedures of the Court of Justice postulates a unanimous decision.

⁷ Hohmann, H, ‘The Nature of the Common Law and the Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning’ (1990) 38 American Journal of Comparative Law 143 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ J Mance, ‘The Composition of the European Court of Justice’, talk given to the UK Association for European Law, 19 October 2011; ‘The Common Law and Europe: Differences of Style Or Substance and Do They Matter?’, Presidential Address to the Holdsworth Club of the University of Birmingham, 26 November 2006.

⁹ See the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States.

¹⁰ See the critical report by the UK non-governmental organisation, Fair Trials International, The European Arrest Warrant Seven Years On: The Case For Reform, May 2011.

¹¹ Art 6 TEU.

¹² C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld [2007] ECR I-3633.

¹³ Advocaten (n 12) para 57.

¹⁴ Advocaten (n 12) paras 49–50 and 52–54.

¹⁵ Advocaten (n 12) para 46. Under Art 6 TEU, fundamental rights, as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and, since the Lisbon Treaty, as guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Rights constitute general principles of the Union’s law.

¹⁶ See the Polish Constitutional Court’s ruling of 27 April 2005 (P 1/05); the German Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling of 18 July 2005 (2236/04) and the Cyprus Supreme Court’s ruling of 7 November 2005 (294/2005); note also the Czech Constitutional Court ruling on this matter, ruling of 3 May 2006 (Pl. US 66/04).

¹⁷ Third Commission Report on the implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, COM (2011) 175.

¹⁸ The AG’s Opinion is not binding on judges. Only its persuasive authority defines its effectiveness.

¹⁹ Mance, ‘The Common Law and Europe’ (n 8).

²⁰ Lasser, M de S-o L’E, Judicial Deliberations. A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004)Google Scholar.

²¹ Mance, ‘The Common Law and Europe?’ (n 8) 8.

²² Mance, ‘The Composition of the European Court of Justice’ (n 8) 18.

²³ When the Court was founded, all participating States had civil law legal systems in which public minority judgments were generally not allowed.

²⁴ Lasser, Judicial Deliberations (n 20) 300.

²⁵ Prechal, S and van Roermund, B (eds), The Coherence of EU Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) 28 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁶ Lasser, , Judicial Deliberations (n 20) 359 Google Scholar.

²⁷ For a discussion of democratic accountability, see, eg, P Russell’s Conclusions in Malleson, K. and Russell, PH, Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power. Critical Perspectives from around the World (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2006) 420 Google Scholar, 431.

²⁸ See below section V.

²⁹ Bengoextea, J, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice: Towards a European Jurisprudence (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993)Google Scholar.

³⁰ Shapiro, M, ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Politics’ (1980) 53 Southern Californian Law Review 537 Google Scholar.

³¹ Consensus may be difficult in a ruling that would be too ambitious, too deep and wide in scope. By comparison, the narrow ground will form an overlapping consensus between judges, see Sunstein, C, ‘Trimming’ (2009) 122 Harvard Law Review 1049 Google Scholar, 1081.

³² Fletcher, G, ‘Two Modes of Legal Thought’ (1981) 90 Yale Law Journal 970 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 978.

³³ Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981.

³⁴ See AG Geelhoed’s Opinion in C-13/05 Chacón Navas [2006] ECR I-06467, paras 55, 59, 67–68.

³⁵ Prechal, S et al, ‘Experiences from Professional Practice: Some Steps towards Empirical Research’ in Prechal, S and van Roermund, B (eds), The Coherence of EU Law (n 25) 32 Google Scholar; Bengoetxea, J, ‘A Case of Multidirectional Constitutional Transplant in the EU: Infra-state Law and Regionalism’ in Prechal, S and van Roermund, B (eds), The Coherence of EU Law (n 25) 428 Google Scholar.

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³⁷ Arts 6 (2) and 6 (3) TEU.

³⁸ See Williams, A, EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004)Google Scholar, though Arts 19 and 157 TFEU in particular have bolstered the Court’s substantive protection of the principles of, respectively, non-discrimination and the principle of equality between men and women within the economic system as a whole. In addition, the creation of a highly competitive ‘social market economy’, one of the objectives of the European Union under Art 3(3) TEU, could steer the interpretation of other provisions in the Treaties, see AG Cruz Villalón’s Opinion in C-515/08 Criminal Proceedings against Santos Palhota and Others [2011] 1 CMLR 34, paras 51–53; and Barnard, C, ‘A Proportionate Response to Proportionality in the Field of Collective Action’ (2012) 37 European Law Review 117 Google Scholar, 134.

³⁹ Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659 para 77.

⁴⁰ See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, para 4, stating that the protection of fundamental rights ‘must be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the Community’.

⁴¹ Schmidberger (n 39) paras 81–94.

⁴² Edwards, D, ‘The Community Constitution—Rigid or Flexible? The Contemporary Relevance of Thinking of James Bryce’ in Curtin, D and Heukels, T (eds), Institutional Dynamics of European Integration. Essays in Honour of G. Schermers (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994) 57–78 Google Scholar.

⁴³ Gerards, J, ‘Judicial Deliberations in the ECtHR’ in Huls, N, Adams, M and Bomhoff, J (eds), The Legitimacy of Highest Courts’ Ruling. Judicial Deliberations and Beyond (The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2009) 407 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁴ Case C-438/05 Viking Line ABP [2007] ECR I-000.

⁴⁵ See further Barnard, ‘A Proportionate Response to Proportionality’ (n 38) 121–24; Barak, A, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012) 528-39CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁶ Sunstein, ‘Trimming’ (n 31) 1084.

⁴⁷ Resnik, J, ‘Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1564 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁸ Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR 1–9609.

⁴⁹ Omega (n 48) para 34.

⁵⁰ Omega (n 48) paras 82–91. Human dignity was first recognised as a general principle of Community law in Netherlands v Parliament and Council, Case 377/98 (2001) ECR I-7079, para 70; AG Jacobs in his Opinion for this case grounded that principle upon Art 1 of the Charter.

⁵¹ Omega (n 48) para 37. The Court refers to Case C-275/92 HMCE v Schindler [1994] ECR I-01039 para 61, where it held that the EC Treaty leaves a margin to discretion to Member States to ban certain economic services based on ‘social policy’ concerns raised by the ‘moral, religious or cultural aspects’ of the services; see, for a similar line, Placanica, Joined Cases C-338/04 and C-359/04. Though the Court did not address fundamental rights, the German courts in Omega followed the Schindler doctrine.

⁵² United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 580–81 (1995) (Kennedy J, concurring); Grimm, D, ‘Domestic Courts and International Courts’ in Muller, AS and Loth, MA (eds), Highest Courts and the Internationalisation of Law. Challenges and Changes (The Hague, Hague Academic Press, 2009) 127 Google Scholar.

⁵³ See AG Slynn’s remarks on the use of comparative law at the Court in Case 155/79 AM and S v Commission [1982] ECR 1575, 1649. For similar observations, see Y Galmot, ‘Réflexions sur le recours au droit comparé par la Cour de justice des communautés européennes’ (1990) Revue Française de Droit Administratif 255–62.

⁵⁴ Schiemann, K, ‘Response to The Judge as Comparatist’ (2005-2006) 80 Tulane Law Review 281 Google Scholar, 287; see generally Teubner, G, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 12 Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ See above, section II.

⁵⁶ Under Art 252 TFEU, ‘it shall be the duty of the Advocate-General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, require his involvement’; see also Gori, P, ‘L’avocat général à la Cour de justice des Communautées Européennes’ (1976) Cahiers de Droit Européen 375 Google Scholar; Borgsmidt, K, ‘The Advocate General at the European Court of Justice: A Comparative Study’ (1988) European Law Review 106 Google Scholar.

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⁵⁸ In 2008, the accelerated procedure (‘PPU’) was introduced to hear cases covering Title V of Part Three of the TFEU, see Arts 104a and b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (OJ L176 of 4 July 1991, p 7 as amended and consolidated, OJ L162 of 22 June 2011, p 17). In those cases, the Advocate General is no longer required to make a submission but instead gives a prise de position.

⁵⁹ Haltern, U, ‘On Finality’ in von Bogdandy, A and Bast, J (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2nd rev edn (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009) 225-26Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ Mitchell Lasser offers various illustrations, Lasser, Judicial Deliberations (n 20) 115–41.

⁶¹ W Van Gerven, ‘The Role and Structure of the European Judiciary Now and in the Future’ (1996) European Law Review 211, 222; see Francis Jacobs suggesting that the institution of the AG introduces some of the advantages of separate opinions, Jacobs, F, ‘Advocates General and Judges in the European Court of Justice: Some Personal Reflections’ in O’Keeffe, D (ed), Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn Hadley. Vol 1: Judicial Review in European Union Law (Alphen aan der Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2000) 17 Google Scholar, 21–22.

⁶² 1998/39594 Kress v France, judgment of 7 June 2001, ECHR 2001-VI 409.

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⁶⁵ Greaves, and Burrows, , The Advocate General (n 63) 169 Google Scholar.

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⁶⁷ Advocaten (n 12).

⁶⁸ Advocaten (n 12) para 80.

⁶⁹ Advocaten (n 12) para 79.

⁷⁰ Laffranque, J, ‘Dissenting Opinion in the ECJ: Estonia’s Possible Contribution to the Democratisation of the European Union Judicial System’ (2004) XIV Juridica International 14 Google Scholar.

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⁷³ Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel (Dossier: Débat sur les opinions dissidentes) no 8 (2000).

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⁷⁶ Erik Voeten cites the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), the WTO’s appellate body and the European Court of Human Right, in ‘The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights’ (2007) 61 International Organisation 669.

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⁸⁰ D Neuberger, ‘Open Justice Unbound?’ Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture, 16 March 2011, paras 24–26.

⁸¹ Sunstein, ‘Trimming’ (n 31) 1082.

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⁸⁹ See the panel operating rules, the Council Decisions of 25 February 2010 (2010/125/EU) and (2010/124/EU).

⁹⁰ Though merit is a slippery notion, a focus on merit limits political considerations, see Limbach, J et al, Judicial Independence: Law and Practice of Appointments to the European Court of Human Rights (London, Interights, 2003)Google Scholar.

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⁹² Bruinsma, ‘A Socio-Legal Analysis’ (n 91).

⁹³ Voeten, ‘The Politics of International Judicial Appointments’ (n 76).

⁹⁴ D Edward giving evidence to the House Lords, The Treaty of Lisbon: an Impact Assessment, 10th Report of Session 2007–2008; HL Paper 62-II, Vol II Evidence, Q132.

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