China’s top legislative body on Thursday (March 12) adopted a law for securing “unity and harmony” among the country’s ethnic groups.

Outlawing discrimination and promoting inter-community marriages, the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law also seeks to punish “acts that undermine ethnic unity and create ethnic division”. It further advocates for Mandarin as the nation’s common language and script.

The law builds on certain existing policies and speaks to the state’s present view of China’s culture and diversity. Here is what to know.

The law lays out the Chinese government’s vision for relations among communities, and of China itself, across 65 Articles.

According to a translation from China Law Translate, a community translation project affiliated with the Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, its preamble makes several references to shared identity and unity.

It says, “All ethnic peoples of China have consistently adhered to the ideal of unity in which the nation’s territory must not be divided, the state must not descend into chaos… and the continuity of Chinese civilisation must not be broken.” It speaks of a common historical “heroic” struggle to save the nation and “jointly resisting foreign aggression,” referencing colonial control over parts of Imperial China in the 19th century.

It further recognises the Communist Party of China as “the vanguard” of the working class and of the Chinese people.

China Law Translate also told The Indian Express over email that, “The main thrust of the law is integration, emphasising that while ethnicities have their own valuable traditions and languages, there must be a common sense of identity as “Chinese People” and building this conception requires some assimilation.”

While integration is commonly understood as the practice of diverse parts coming together to form a cohesive unit, retaining what makes them unique, assimilation means groups mirroring the practices of the dominant group to blend in.

Some noteworthy provisions are:

*Article 10: “Matters of ethnic unity and progress are not to be interfered with by foreign forces… using excuses such as ethnicity, religion, or human rights…” This is likely a reference to the global criticisms of the Chinese state for human rights violations in the autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet.

*Article 15: “Schools and other educational institutions are to use the nation’s common language and script as the basic language and script for education…”

China Law Translate said that it effectively meant “Mandarin must be emphasised,” even when minority languages are used.

*Article 21: “The state is to support the Hong Kong and Macao special administrative regions in carrying out education on the history of the Chinese people, Chinese culture, and national conditions… The state is to…enhance Taiwan compatriots sense of belonging, identification, and pride in the Chinese people…”

*Article 40: “No organisation or individual may interfere with the freedom of marriage on grounds such as ethnic identity, customs, or religious beliefs.” China Law Translate said of its interpretation: “Exchanges between ethnic cultures are intended to break down (what are viewed as) insular communities in favour of a larger identity with the community of Chinese people.” Reports say the article may be covering objections by religious officials of minority communities.

*Article 62: “The organisation, planning, or carrying out of violent terrorist activities, ethnic division activities, or religious extremist activities constitutes a crime…”

Officially, China recognises 56 ethnic groups, including the Hans, the Uyghurs (primarily in the northwestern region of Xinjiang), the Tibetans, the Manchus and the Mongols. Today, the Han Chinese constitute over 90% of the total population.

The Hans are also the largest group in Taiwan, which China claims as its own region, and in Hong Kong, which is China’s Special Administrative Region.

Former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, in his book How China Sees India and the World, wrote, “Through most of its history, the main challenge faced by successive Chinese empires was the perennial attacks by fierce nomadic tribes ranging across its northern and western peripheries…In some cases, these tribes themselves became Sinicised and, in turn, assumed the attitudes and mores of the heartland Chinese. The homogeneity of the latter-day Chinese is more a cultural rather than ethnic homogeneity, reinforced by shared attitudes and a unified script.”

Since the inception of the modern Communist state in 1949, the state has sought to extend its control over frontier regions, including Xinjiang and Tibet.

It has laid historical claims to both, but advocates of Tibetan independence have contested them.

Xinjiang, too, witnessed initial resistance from Uyghur nationalists. Eventually, the state extended itself and imposed restrictions on Islamic religious displays, which were at odds with Communist ideas, and, as analysts have argued, competed with the party in terms of authority.

In the last two decades, the Chinese state has increasingly focused on the Uyghurs from a security perspective. This period saw several incidents, such as clashes between Uyghurs and the Han in Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi, in 2009 and attacks (including bomb blasts) in Kashgar in the early 2010s.

In the name of tackling terror, the state has instituted what it calls “re-education camps”, which placed large numbers of people under confinement (reportedly upto a million), with reports of torture and indoctrination. Many religious events and markers (such as domes atop mosques) have been removed — what has been called the “Sinicisation” of religion, to make it resemble Han Chinese culture.

The relative calm that has prevailed in recent years has been attributed to a carrot and stick approach, with the state both surveilling and punishing dissidents, and setting up large infrastructure projects to ensure some job creation and greater integration with the rest of China. But it is also feared by some critics that such methods, and a gradual in-migration of Han people in these areas, will fuel resentment among the locals.

Why has the law come about now?

The law is a continuation of policies and ideas propagated by the state, especially in recent years under Chinese President Xi Jinping. For instance, it frames solidifying “ethnic unity” as part of the goal of “rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation after what is seen as years of suppression under foreign rule. Xi has emphasised this term time and again, covering military capabilities, foreign relations, and ethnic relations.

A crucial part of the idea is China’s claims over Hong Kong, which enjoys some independence under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ scheme, and Taiwan, an island that functions independently, with a democratic government. China has not ruled out forcibly taking control of Taiwan, and has increased displays of military might around the island.

The law also comes after Xi undertook rare visits to Tibet and Xinjiang late last year, where he emphasised similar themes of unity and allegiance to the party.