Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a rare two-day visit to North Korea beginning Monday (June 8). The choice of Pyongyang as his first overseas destination this year highlighted the importance Beijing attaches to its close ally.

It also followed China hosting US President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin — leaders of countries with strategic stakes in the Korean Peninsula — in Beijing just weeks ago.

Xi’s visit came after a gap of seven years. Back then, the North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un was on a shaky wicket, reeling under UN sanctions. Cut to the present, and he is in a much stronger position, partially thanks to a deeper alliance with Russia.

In this context, Xi’s outreach was aimed at reinforcing their ties and keeping Pyongyang within Beijing’s fold. For Kim, the propaganda value of Xi’s visit is enormous, as it enhances Pyongyang’s standing on the world stage. Paradoxically, North Korea has turned out to be a neighbour that China can neither control nor afford to lose.

The two countries share a complex relationship, often described as ‘forged in blood’. It is a reference to the Korean War (1950-53), wherein the Mao Zedong-led China intervened militarily and took on the US-led UN forces to defend Kim Il Sung’s regime.

In 1961, the two countries signed the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which technically binds Beijing to assist Pyongyang in the event of aggression.

Despite periodic tensions, geopolitical compulsions have driven Beijing and Pyongyang towards strategic convergence. China remains North Korea’s economic lifeline and the largest trading partner. Beijing also acts as a security guarantor and diplomatic protector for North Korea. For China, North Korea serves as a crucial nuclear-armed buffer, deterring direct US military presence on its northeastern frontier.

Firstly, Xi’s visit comes at a time of rapidly changing geopolitical leanings. The Korean Peninsula has once again become a hotspot for global strategic competition. The United States has strengthened trilateral security cooperation with South Korea and Japan, and increased military deployment in the region. Beijing increasingly views these actions as part of a broader containment policy against itself.

Then there is Russia’s deepening partnership with North Korea. Around 2,300 North Korean soldiers died in the war with Ukraine. Besides, the country supplied missiles and artillery shells. In return, Moscow is suspected of offering technological and military assistance. Beijing is wary of being sidelined amid the growing bonhomie.

Thirdly, North Korea itself seeks greater leverage, with Kim having successfully exploited great power competition to enhance the nation’s technological capabilities, specifically its nuclear programme. He recently unveiled a supposedly new uranium enrichment facility and claimed that the country’s nuclear material production capacity has doubled.

Lastly, it is conjectured that Xi may change his stance on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and accept North Korea’s status as a de facto nuclear power. Incidentally, when Kim visited Beijing in September 2025 to attend a World War 2 anniversary military parade, references to denuclearisation were absent from his meeting with Xi, and from China’s latest non-proliferation policy papers.

Even Putin appeared to have tacitly approved North Korea’s nuclear programme after Moscow and Pyongyang signed a mutual defence pact in 2024.

Strategic rebalancing of the peninsula

The Korean Peninsula is entering a phase of rebalancing with three major shifts. First is the emergence of a de facto anti-Western bloc — an informal triangular alignment of China, Russia and North Korea is gradually taking shape.

While China provides economic depth, Russia complements it with military strength and defence technology, and North Korea lends disruptive geopolitical leverage. This will certainly complicate the American deterrence calculus.

Second, the intensified militarisation of northeast Asia is now a reality. It is the result of a bolstered nexus between both China-North Korea and South Korea-Japan, with the latter further scaling up their defence capabilities, and strengthening cooperation with the US. Although in both cases, it will not be a simple alignment, given the competition between Russia and China and the historical disagreements between South Korea and Japan.

Third, there is a risk of shrinking space for diplomacy, due to the widening trust deficit. Kim has formally abandoned the objective of peaceful reunification with South Korea. Further, US-China tensions reduce the possibility of a joint effort towards rapprochement between the two Koreas.

Ramifications for the region

Shortly after receiving a pomp-filled welcome on Monday, Xi called for deepening “strategic coordination and cooperation” and firmly safeguarding their sovereignty and security interests. During talks with Kim, Xi said that the two sides should inject ‘powerful momentum’ into their ties.

Kim emphasised that Xi’s visit “clearly demonstrated how unbreakable” the North Korea-China relationship was. Consolidating a new era of friendship was the “unchanging strategic choice” of North Korea, he said.

With China’s positioning, the post-Cold War assumption that economic integration would moderate strategic rivalry stands repudiated. Its implications extend well beyond northeast Asia, impacting the Indo-Pacific as a whole.

For India, with Pakistan increasingly part of the new Eurasia configuration, the pressure is bound to intensify both its land and maritime frontiers. The emerging strategic realignment may not lead to an immediate conflict, but the wider Asian security architecture certainly looks set for a significant makeover.

(The writer is a war veteran and served as Defence Attaché in China and North Korea. He is currently a professor, Strategic-IR, Lal Bahadur Shastri Institute of Management, New Delhi)