Following the Tarique Rahman-led Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s landslide victory in the country’s general election last week, reports emerged that among the top priorities of the newly elected government would be the renewal of the Ganga Water Sharing Treaty, which will expire in December 2026.

Humayun Kabir, a top aide of the BNP chief, told media outlets that the incoming government would keep the “interests of Bangladesh” in mind.

How did the treaty come to be, what are its provisions, and why are both countries keen on renegotiating the terms of engagement? We explain.

From friction to friendship

Tensions had brewed over sharing of the Ganga waters since the 1950s, when the Indian government proposed building a barrage at Farakka in West Bengal, some 18 km from what would become the international border between India and (then) East Pakistan. Construction began in 1961 and upon its completion in 1975, the Farakka barrage started diverting waters from the Ganga to the Hooghly river, flushing out the silt around the Kolkata port located on the latter and keeping it navigable for ships.

But throughout its construction, friction remained and reached a flashpoint in 1976 when Maulana Bhashani, an Awami League party legislator in (by then independent) Bangladesh, led the “Farakka Long March” against India’s water policies, demanding the demolition of the barrage, which he argued had resulted in the drying up of the Padma river (Ganga’s main distributary in Bangladesh) and subsequent desertification.

Although there were ad hoc agreements signed between the two countries throughout the next decade (1977, 1982, and 1985), none of them provided lasting solutions.

Finally, in December 1996, both countries under the leadership of Prime Ministers H D Deve Gowda and Sheikh Hasina signed the Ganga Water Sharing Treaty, instituting a 30-year framework for a flow-sharing mechanism during the annual dry season (January to May) and setting up a joint committee to monitor and implement the pact.

The treaty, hailed as a milestone in bilateral diplomacy at the time, established a three-tiered allocation system based on historical data of average flow during a 10-day period between 1949 and 1988. Under the agreement, if the flow of water falls to or below the lower threshold of 70,000 cusecs (cubic feet per second, the unit to measure flow), the two countries would share the water equally. If the flow is between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs, then Bangladesh would be entitled to 35,000 cusecs and India was to keep the remaining flow. In the event of the upper threshold of 75,000 cusecs or more, India would get 40,000 and Bangladesh would receive the balance.

The aforementioned terms were subject to an additional clause: between March 11 and May 10 each year, both countries would receive a guaranteed 35,000 cusecs of water in alternate three 10-day periods.

Although it lacks a minimum guarantee clause, the treaty has an emergency provision: Article II(iii) states that “in the event flow at Farakka falls below 50,000 cusecs in any 10-day period, the two Governments will enter into immediate consultations to make adjustments on an emergency basis, in accordance with the principles of equity, fair play and no harm to either party”.

For resolving disputes, the Joint Committee (consisting of an equal number of representatives nominated by both governments) would be primarily responsible, failing which it would be referred to the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC). The two countries had set up the JRC in 1972 as a bilateral mechanism to deliberate and manage water sharing for 54 shared rivers, of which only the Ganga is governed by a formal treaty as of today.

What happens next?

Over the years, the treaty has been criticised in both countries for not accounting for the future needs of rising populations in both countries, besides climate change-induced crises. Even though the treaty provides for renewal by mutual consent at the end of the 30-year period, both sides have indicated a willingness to revisit the agreement’s terms.

Media reports from May 2025 suggested India was seeking an additional 30,000 to 35,000 cusecs during the March 11-May 10 period to meet its growing needs, and that the new treaty could be relatively shorter in duration, that is, 10 to 15 years. A September 2025 PTI report said that during a JRC meeting, Bangladesh had asked for a guaranteed release of 40,000 cusecs of water between February and May, besides a longer treaty renewal period and enhanced flood data sharing.

All this has played out in the backdrop of tensions flaring up between India and Bangladesh over domestic political issues in the aftermath of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s ouster in August 2024 following mass protests. Hasina, who was perceived as friendly to India, has been living in New Delhi since then, and Bangladesh has formally requested her extradition on more than one occasion. Last November, a special tribunal in Bangladesh convicted her of crimes against humanity and sentenced her to death. Hasina had denounced the verdict as “biased and politically motivated”.

India’s decision to unilaterally put the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan in abeyance after the Pahalgam terror attack in April 2025 has also prompted caution in Bangladesh.

Another factor is the stance of the West Bengal state government. Last year, the Centre claimed that it had the support of the state’s ruling Trinamool Congress dispensation in renegotiating the treaty. But it is noteworthy that in 2011, a landmark agreement on water sharing of the Teesta — a major river both countries share — was shelved after stiff opposition from Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee.

A piece by Dhaka-based professor Sk. Tawfique M. Haque, published in April 2025, stressed the need for “balancing equitable distribution with ecological resilience” and incorporating “proactive flood management, guided by data-driven insights” into the renegotiated treaty. In December 2025, Singapore-based academic Amit Ranjan wrote in the Bangladeshi newspaper The Daily Star that the treaty’s fate was ultimately tied to the course of bilateral relations, which was heavily dependent on the “willingness of both countries to engage constructively, and listen, understand, and try to address each other’s genuine concerns”.