Amid repeated assertions by US President Donald Trump that he may send American troops to seize control of Iran’s key oil export terminal at Kharg Island, experts are divided about whether this military manoeuvre would indeed work out, especially given the defiance and doggedness of the Iranian regime. There is a precedent. And that ended in disaster.

Nearly four years ago, and still early into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Snake Island, or Zmiinyi Island, was seen as a vital asset in the war. Quite like Kharg, this rocky outcrop held by Ukraine was categorised as strategic in the control of the western Black Sea. The island was seized by Russia in February 2022, only to be abandoned in end-June 2022, following relentless Ukrainian attacks. Holding on to the small, exposed island was a tactical challenge, and Russia’s humiliating retreat came after it lost soldiers, air defences and supply vessels.

Quite like Snake Island, Kharg — a small 8-km-long coral outcrop in the Persian Gulf around 50 km off the Iranian mainland — is strategic, given that it is arguably Iran’s most sensitive economic target through which most of Iran’s oil exports flow. On an average, around 1.5 million barrels of oil pass through Kharg every day, though Iran had sharply ramped up volumes to 3 million barrels a day since mid-February in anticipation of a US-led attack. A further 18 million barrels are stored on Kharg as a backup, JP Morgan said in a note.

There are three problems in Trump’s plans to cut off Kharg. One, capturing the site would likely trigger a sustained increase to already surging oil prices, as this would amount to neutralising almost all of Iran’s daily crude exports. That could end up impacting Trump more than the administration in Tehran at this point in time.

Two, for America to utilise the infrastructure on the island for its own benefit, oil has to flow from the Iranian mainland to Kharg. Tehran can simply turn the valves off, rendering the entire operation into an exercise in futility.

Third, just like the Russian struggled to hold on to Snake Island, the Americans could find it difficult to hold on to it, given that troops could take fire from the Iranian mainland, or from Iranian vessels in the Gulf.

More significantly, in geographic terms, Kharg is pretty upstream in the water channel and does not offer any serious control over the Strait of Hormuz, which is way downstream. So, unlike Snake Island, which did have a big strategic relevance in the control over the Black Sea, Kharg is only strategic to the limited extent of the infrastructure it houses, and not really beyond that, a shipping expert with experience of the region said.

Holding on

Trump’s plans to dispatch troops to the region is still up in the air, but statements from him and others in his cabinet suggest that nearly 5,000 US Marines and around 2,000 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division are reportedly on standby.

Theoretically, paratroopers could attempt an airborne assault and the Marines would be deployed through ships or amphibious vessels. For that, though, those ships would have to sail upstream through the Iranian-controlled Strait of Hormuz under enemy fire. Landing by air could be met with artillery fire from both troops stationed on Kharg, those on the mainland and Iranian vessels. Even if they were to weather that, the US troops would then have to hold the island while subject to firing and bombardment from the Iranian mainland.

That would not be such a good idea, as the Russians can testify.