US President Donald Trump on Sunday (May 17) threatened to attack Iran if it did not “get moving”, asserting that “time is of the essence”. On Monday, however, Trump announced that a planned US attack was being put on hold at the request of Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari leaders since “serious negotiations are now taking place”, but that the US military would remain prepared for a “full, large-scale assault on Iran”.

Tehran, expectedly, condemned Trump’s rhetoric and asserted its own readiness to retaliate against any American attack. Iranian state-affiliated media also outlined that the US had presented “no tangible proposals” and was instead looking “to obtain concessions that it failed to obtain during the war.”

During this period, Iran responded to an earlier US proposal with its own 14-point proposal, both via Pakistan. This second exchange of offers occurs as the ceasefire remains on “life-support” as the US President asserted last week.

The differences between Washington and Tehran remain the same as in April: over Iran’s nuclear enrichment rights, the fate of its existing enriched stockpile, its new control over the Strait of Hormuz, and its missile programme, among others.

How has the military landscape evolved?

Since the April 8 ceasefire, Iran has shown an ability to retain its punitive capacities. US intelligence assessments suggest that Iran has restored operational access to 30 of 33 missile sites along the Strait, retains significant numbers of mobile missile launchers across the country, and also retains 70% of its pre-war missile stockpile, The New York Times reported. This has proven Iran’s continued capacity to threaten shipping in Hormuz, a relatively low resource effort, while confirming that variations in Iran’s missile launch frequency during the March war were part of Tehran’s preparations to fight a prolonged conflict.

By contrast, the United States has been running critically low on key munitions. A CSIS report from late April showed that US regional forces had expended more than half of their pre-war munitions during the 39-day war, including Tomahawk, Patriot, PrSM, SM-3, and SM-4 missiles. Crucially, each of these munitions has months-long delivery timelines, even as Washington continues to redirect interceptor stockpiles from other theatres to the Middle East.

Despite the ceasefire, kinetic conflict has continued in the region, with the UAE being struck by multiple waves of drones and missiles since May 4. While Iran has formally denied carrying out these attacks, they began after the US’ failed attempt at removing the Iranian blockade on the Strait of Hormuz and entrenching Washington’s own blockade of Iranian ports, an operation the US President suspended on May 6 after the strikes on Fujairah. The US’ subsequent bombardment of Iran’s Qeshm Island and Bandar Abbas port resulted in retaliatory Iranian strikes on the UAE.

The most significant drone attack in recent days occurred against the UAE’s Barakah nuclear power plant (completed in 2024). Barakah always posed multiple risks to regional states, given their safety concerns following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. However, following the Houthi attacks on Saudi/Emirati targets in 2022, Barakah’s principal risk was as a large nuclear target just 60 km east of Saudi Arabia. This threat has now been driven home.

The single-most significant outcome of Washington’s March war is that it birthed new Iranian leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, which Tehran is determined to keep. It entrenched this determination by launching the Persian Gulf Strait Authority to regulate shipping through the channel on May 18. Thus, Washington has oscillated its approach between doubling down on its March gamble — gaining concessions through war — and a pre-March position — gaining concessions through negotiations.

For Arab states, this oscillation is dangerous when viewed against Iranian consistency, especially vis-à-vis Tehran’s need to ensure that Washington is both deterred against securing concessions through either approach and is pushed towards more equitable dealings with Tehran.

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Given Iran’s proven ability to direct retaliation against Arab states in response to US/Israeli attacks, as well as its Hormuz leverage, states such as Saudi Arabia cannot afford a resumption of conflict. This has led to Riyadh even floating a regional non-aggression pact with Iran, and possibly Israel, to ensure long-term stability.

Barring the reported limited Saudi/UAE strikes on Iran, the overall non-response by Arab states to Iranian strikes has also caused a maturation of the intra-Arab split between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The UAE, struck more than all other GCC states combined, has been Iran’s principal target, given its increasing integration with the US’ and Israel’s security architecture post-2020 when it became the first nation to sign the Abraham Accords (which Riyadh is yet to join). Both Iran’s explicit threats over the years to target the UAE in response to Israeli/American attacks, as well as the recent strikes on Fujairah and Barakah have led to a more assertive Emirati regional posture, which manifested most significantly in Abu Dhabi’s exit from OPEC on May 1. Saudi Arabia, which remains officially non-aligned with Israel and is now locked in a geo-economic contest with the UAE, evidently prefers a more non-escalatory approach presently.

What will the resumption of war achieve?

Evidently, the fundamentals of the Iranian position remain unchanged, as does Tehran’s need to keep them unchanged. This implies a readiness to negotiate the core aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, in return for the US lifting sanctions and unfreezing Iranian foreign assets. Hence, pathways to a deal continue to exist, some even in more mature forms than the 2015 nuclear deal. As recently as May 15, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also signalled openness to Tehran transferring its enriched stockpile to Russia. However, this openness is now accompanied by a realisation in Tehran that it cannot afford to dilute its economic deterrent in the Strait of Hormuz, which supplements its proven ability to strike regional energy targets.

Hence, Iran’s bargaining position has further strengthened while the American position has oscillated since the war broke out on February 28. The only durable outcome of this crisis is a negotiated settlement. It is this reality that Arab states look to highlight to Washington, as they incur the growing risks of the current ‘no war, no peace’ period and the continuing crisis in Hormuz. The latter also prevents Washington from unilaterally returning to status quo ante.

The US President began this crisis by giving in to a commitment trap. The advice of key military leaders and rational variables linked to Iran’s amenable negotiating position and its military capacity evidently did not guide the Trump White House’s decision-making on military action. This directly contributed to an expansion of Iranian leverage. Hence, if another round of hostilities occurs on the same terms as March, Iran’s bargaining position will likely improve further. While this possibility alone is insufficient to deter US military action, Washington will ultimately face a choice – concede to key Iranian demands in negotiations and exit the theatre (with a unilateral declaration of victory) or risk triggering greater damages to the global energy economy in pursuit of maximalist objectives that remain elusive.