Navdeep Suri, former Indian envoy to the UAE and Egypt, spoke to The Indian Express about the ongoing conflict in West Asia and what it means for India’s foreign policy, trade and energy security, at an Explained Live event in March. Edited excerpts:

The attacks launched on February 28 are completely illegal, and it was also probably the wrong thing to do at a time when the US and Iran were engaged in Oman-brokered negotiations. The US representatives said they were making excellent progress as of February 25.

By February 26, the Omani Foreign Minister sensed something was amiss, with the US naval build-up in the region. The Omanis are careful mediators, but Minister Al Busaidi had to come out and say they were close to a deal. The Iranians had agreed to something unprecedented — that they would not stockpile enriched uranium and would give diplomacy a chance.

And yet, the attack happened. Since 1979, when the Islamic regime came to power, Iran has not recognised Israel and has criticised Arab states that made peace with it. It formed an axis of resistance by supporting groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran positioned itself as a steadfast defender of the Palestinian cause.

When Iran began developing its nuclear programme, Israel called it an existential threat. Iran insisted it was peaceful, but there were few buyers for that argument. As early as 1992, when current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was a young member of the Knesset, he said that Iran was three years away from acquiring a nuclear weapon, and something needed to be done.

He has repeated the point over time. When the 2015 nuclear deal was signed during the Obama administration, you had this unbelievable scenario of an Israeli prime minister using Israeli lobbying in Washington to address Congress to oppose an agreement that the president of the United States was supporting.

And so it brings you to last year, when you had Operation Midnight Hammer because Netanyahu was finally able to convince US President Donald Trump. They started making the same noise about the nuclear threat this January.

History of animosity

From Israel’s perspective, its stance is shaped by the Holocaust and perceived regional hostility, especially from Iran post-1979. The US position is more nuanced and goes back to 1951 when Mohammad Mossadegh became Iran’s Prime Minister.

Mossadegh campaigned that the petroleum royalty agreement they had with the British was extremely one-sided. This was clearly unacceptable to the Brits and the Americans. In 1953, they combined forces to bring him down and recall the Shah.

Among the things that Shah was doing was also a headlong rush into westernisation. In a conservative society, discomfort and backlash were building up. It led to Ayatollah Khamenei returning from exile in Paris and to a popular revolution that overthrew the Shah.

The new regime was strongly anti-American. Within weeks, the US embassy hostage crisis occurred, when a mob of students took 52 American personnel as hostages, marking a sharp decline in relations. After 9/11, Iran was labelled part of the “axis of evil,” while the US became the “great Satan” in Iranian rhetoric.

Israeli and American objectives of the war

Netanyahu has said very openly that for 40 years, he has dreamed of an Iran not ruled by the Revolutionary Guards. So, regime change is a clear objective for Israel. Nuclear was a handy facade to have, but each time you were coming to a nuclear agreement, Israel led the opposition to it.

For the Americans, the nuclear agreement was important. But with President Trump and his constant shifting of positions, his verbosity and his tendency to communicate via social media posts, it leaves everybody scrambling to find post facto explanations.

I think the mainstream American opinion, and I say that carefully, at least in the strategic community, would have said that we want to deny Iran the possibility of nuclear weapons, but not the destruction of Iran as a state. For them, a Venezuelan model of the regime continuing with a different leader was a preferred option. The reason is the fear of the unknown, of having seen what happened in Iraq, where Saddam was removed, and the vacuum gave birth to ISIS. This divergence may come up more significantly.

What happens to Iran

On one level, you have to admire the kind of intelligence that Israel possesses, the degree of infiltration of Iranian society that allowed it to take out so many top leaders.

Having said that, the Iranians seem to have been better prepared. Ayatollah Khamenei is said to have instructed four levels of succession to be readied for each part of government and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). But this has negative connotations. One, the people coming in may be even more hardline and defiant against a negotiated settlement. Second, to the extent that people like former Speaker Ali Larijani were experienced negotiators, it made them pragmatic as well.

Finally, Netanyahu has frequently urged the Iranian people to rise up. But it’s not a binary — many Iranians hate the regime and the Israeli actions with equal passion. With the severe bombing and damage to cultural institutions like the Golestan Palace, many will start rallying behind the flag.

Strait of Hormuz and impact on India

The war has led to reduced capacities of crucial refining and production facilities in West Asia, and it will take time to restore them even if the war ends tomorrow.

For India, the foremost impact is on fertilisers, which use LNG as a feedstock, with the sowing season beginning soon. Fertiliser prices will be higher. India will have to export to cover that current account deficit, adding to the pressure on the rupee. There will be inflationary pressures because oil is such a basic requirement for industries ranging from steel to cement to ceramics. We should be really angry and upset with the Israelis and the Americans for having started this war, because from being in that Goldilocks position that the RBI Governor and the Finance Minister used to keep talking about until a few weeks back, today we are facing real challenges.

It is also a real test for the diplomatic service. We are trying to square the circle with four corners, which are the US, Israel, Iran and the Gulf states, and we have close relationships with all of them. What has perhaps affected us negatively is the tilt that we have demonstrated towards Israel over the last several years. It is reflected in the optics of the Prime Minister being in Israel on the eve of the attacks.

That was compounded by the delay in condolences on Khamenei’s death and in criticising the Iranian aggression against the Gulf States, but not saying anything about the aggression against Iran. I think the government is trying to keep all its channels open. We seem to have had some success in getting some LNG tankers into India. But it’s one of those tough situations of balancing hardcore national interest with principles and morality. As usually happens in politics, here, national interest is taking precedence over principle, and you’re beginning to see that play out quite openly.

This debate, where the other view is that we were better respected when we were seen as pursuing our strategic autonomy through principled positions, will remain open for some time.

How Trump can end the war

By any objective criteria, the US is in a real bind. They chose to start this war and didn’t define a clear objective. It might be heading towards greater escalation, with reports about Marines being on the way, plans to take over Kharg Island, etc. All of those are bad ideas. But Trump does not meet any normal standards of objective behaviour. He can wake up tomorrow and say that I’m declaring victory. He can do that because he is one of the only leaders who can say two mutually contradictory things within the space of 24 hours and get away with it.

But even then, it matters whether Iran is willing and ready to provide an off-ramp. They may want to physically block the Strait of Hormuz and increase the cost. They might want guarantees that this does not get repeated.

Long-term consequences for the world

When we look back at this period, we might see 2025 as the beginning of the decline of American power, thanks to Trump’s high-handed actions. On one hand, you’re beginning to see the clear decline of American soft power, like when it decided to walk out of climate change negotiations. But you might also start seeing the decline of America in a larger sense.

This could be balanced by not just the rise of China, which seems inexorable, but also, hopefully, the rise of other middle powers with a greater voice on the global scene. Not just India, but potentially Brazil, Indonesia, Poland, and others. It is already the beginning of the rearmament of Europe after years of complacency. I think we are witnessing a major churn in the geopolitical order.