It has been a year since a clash between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan alarmed the world. In the months since, while India has laid down a ‘new normal’ for Pakistan, it has also learnt some hard foreign policy lessons.

The punitive strikes that began on May 7 and ended on May 10 were followed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s address to the nation on May 12, where he said that after the surgical strike of 2016 and the air strike of 2019, now, “Operation Sindoor is India’s policy against terrorism”.

The three pillars of the ‘new normal’ have been spelt out — guaranteed response to future terrorist attacks; no differentiation between state or non-state actors behind terrorist attacks; and nuclear blackmail not to be treated as a hurdle in targeting terrorist infrastructure.

Outreach for perception

Immediately after Operation Sindoor, in a bid to shape public opinion in India’s favour, seven all-party delegations travelled to a total of 33 countries to convey India’s “strong national consensus and resolute approach to combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations”.

Each delegation comprised members of Parliament, senior leaders from different political parties, and also veteran diplomats. They held discussions with important and influential interlocutors in the executive and legislative branches, the media, in think-tanks and with the Indian community in these countries.

They briefed their audience on the Pahalgam terror attack and Operation Sindoor, as well as the long history of Pakistan-sponsored terror attacks in India.

India’s diplomatic efforts saw some success. The terrorist group The Resistance Front (TRF), responsible for the Pahalgam terror attack, has been mentioned in the latest report of the Monitoring Team of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 1267 Sanctions Committee, published on July 29, 2025. Moreover, on July 18, 2025, the TRF was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) by the US.

Trump troubles

However, there has also been a view in some sections that India could have received more support internationally after Operation Sindoor.

After the Pahalgam terror attack on April 22, almost the entire international community condemned it and expressed solidarity with India. But after the government started the military strikes under Operation Sindoor, the international community did not come out in whole-hearted support of Indian actions, with Pakistan portraying itself as a victim of Indian “aggression”.

Most European countries and the US counselled restraint and asked both sides to de-escalate and pursue dialogue and diplomacy. US President Donald Trump said, “They’ve gone for tit-for-tat, so hopefully they can stop now”.

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said that the UK is engaging “urgently with both countries, as well as other international partners, encouraging dialogue, de-escalation and the protection of civilians”.

More so, Trump announced a “full and immediate ceasefire” before Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri announced the “pause” in Operation Sindoor. Trump also said he would like to work with India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute — an anathema to the Indian establishment, which has always maintained this is a bilateral issue and doesn’t need third-party involvement.

Later, he claimed he had made India and Pakistan agree to a “ceasefire” by threatening to suspend trade with both of them. New Delhi rejected these claims, and PM Modi spelt out the Indian position in a tense phone call with Trump in June last year.

Disinformation war

Islamabad framed Operation Sindoor as India targeting civilians, including women and children, without having any proof of Pakistan’s involvement in the Pahalgam attack. This argument seems to have found some takers among Western countries.

Also, Pakistan started claiming it had downed Indian aircraft early on, and there was a perception internationally that India was not being fully transparent about its operations and losses.

Crucially, Pakistan’s messaging was made at a higher level than India’s —the Pakistan PM, Deputy PM, Foreign minister and the Army spokesperson all routinely spoke up to counter India’s statements and claim their own exaggerated victories.

On the Indian side, Foreign Secretary Misri was the senior-most official to brief the media, apart from military personnel. While Delhi produced some visual proof of its successes, Western countries were flooded with misinformation and disinformation from the Pakistani side.

Pakistan also played the US administration under Trump, knowing fully well that most western countries take their cue from Washington.

Pakistan PM Shehbaz Sharif and Army chief General Asim Munir immediately thanked Trump for brokering the ceasefire and engaged with him continuously. They appealed to all of Trump’s interests, from signing a crypto deal with US companies with ties to Trump’s family to offering a critical minerals deal in Pakistan, to recommending the US President for the Nobel peace prize.

India, in contrast, neither lined up to sign business deals with Trump nor nominated him for the peace Nobel.

The needle thus shifted in Pakistan’s favour, and as of now, the White House has hosted Munir several times. India was punished with a 50% tariff, which was later withdrawn after a trade deal with the US took shape. Today, Pakistan is enjoying a rare moment of diplomatic sunshine as the chief mediator in the Iran war, and India has learnt some lessons.

Hard realisations

Broadly, there are some hard realisations from Delhi’s perspective.

First, India needed to be better in its strategic communication and in amplifying its voice — from the profile of the spokespersons to the perceived “transparency” needed to be more credible in front of the international community.

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Second, Pakistan has not been isolated diplomatically since Trump has been unusually generous towards its leadership, including the military leadership. New Delhi did not read and anticipate this development at all. In this context, Field Marshal Munir has played his hand well in wooing the American President and the US establishment.

Third, India’s major concern remains that if another terrorist attack takes place now, Delhi will be in a diplomatic tight spot. Since it has claimed that Operation Sindoor has only been “paused” and has declared the “new normal”, it will be bound to respond through kinetic action. But given the external environment, if that happens, the international community and the US under Trump may not be favourable towards India.

With these factors in mind, the Indian establishment has to build its relationships with the US and the world, and communicate more effectively in the future.