The 14th summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana next month is bound to be dominated by anti-American rhetoric from the Latin Left, Israel-bashing by the Arabs, and Iran’s nuclear confrontation with the West. Instead of being bogged down by this predictable political fare in Cuba, the Indian delegation should be focusing on the more enduring impact of China on NAM.

Although it has never been a member of NAM, China has been participating in the summits since the early 1990s as an observer. The quiet Chinese presence in the NAM summits has steadily evolved into something much larger.

For many in the Third World, from East and Central Asia to Africa and Latin America, Beijing appears to be the only alternative to Washington. China’s rapid rise as a great power has made it an increasingly attractive and often indispensable economic partner to many developing countries.

While the Indian Foreign Office will tinker with tired old formulations at the NAM summit, the Prime Minister would want to skip the trivia and momentary passions to focus on the real prospect of China emerging as the leader of NAM. The big question is whether India has any “big ideas” on shared economic prosperity and political stability before the NAM summit.

Beijing Consensus

Since the end of the Cold War, the idea of a “Washington Consensus” – fiscal prudence, private investment and free trade – dominated the debate on globalisation. Although China has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of globalisation, it has offered a different take, the “Beijing Consensus” for economic prosperity: strong state intervention and investments and controlled markets.

The “Beijing Consensus” also differs fundamentally from the Western views on current international political challenges. Unlike the US, which calls for “pre-emptive” interventions in threatening states, and Europe “humanitarian interventions” in failed states, China is for undiluted political sovereignty of developing nations.

While the West in increasingly focused on the internal orientation of the developing states and insists on promoting human rights and democracy within the Third World, Beijing stands for non-intervention. Its neutrality on political values, a readiness to deal with whoever is in power, and the offer of valuable economic cooperation has made “Beijing Consensus” far more acceptable to the Third World than “Washington Consensus”.

Claiming Leadership

Besides an ideological orientation that is in tune with Third World political sentiment, the Chinese leadership’s willingness to take the lead in different parts of the world has positioned Beijing for a greater say in international politics. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, when many Third World leaders went to China asking it to take the leadership of the developing countries, the pragmatic Deng Xiaoping flatly refused. Focused on building a good relationship with Washington and on internal economic development, Deng believed it was best for China “not to take the lead” in global forums.

But his successors seem less afraid. Having taken the initiative on East Asian economic integration and created the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Beijing might now be poised to lead. Many in China continue to urge political caution. In the end though, rising great powers do what they must – balance the dominant power.