Like the suicide bombers who terrified Israelis during the Palestinian uprising, Hizbollah’s unguided and relatively unsophisticated missiles have left one of the world’s best-equipped armies unable to defend its citizens. Military analysts say Israel believed, perhaps mistakenly, that it could wage a Kosovo-style air war to eliminate most of Hizbollah’s launchers.

They also fault the military’s over-reliance on high technology in an era of guerrilla-style threats, and a political strategy of trying to keep military deaths low by using minimal ground forces. ‘‘I don’t think anybody had any way to really grasp the implications of this kind of war,’’ said Gerald Steinberg, head of the conflict management program at Bar-Ilan University.

The relentless and indiscriminate rocket attacks—which increased despite Israeli air and ground wars against Hizbollah in Lebanon—have undermined the country’s faith in both military and political leaders and are likely to force major shifts in Israeli military strategy and tactics, according to many analysts. ‘‘This war will be studied in all military academies in the world as a new kind of war which requires new and unprecedented definitions of how to fight it and how to win it,’’ said Yaron Ezrahi, a professor at Hebrew University who is one of Israel’s leading political scientists.

One of the most significant military debates spawned by the conflict is over the investment in a state-of-the-art military that appears to be ill-equipped to combat weaponry such as Hizbollah’s rockets. ‘‘Technology has taken a blow in this war,’’ said Hillel Frisch, a senior researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. ‘‘The Israeli air force is going to come under tremendous criticism.’’

The United States and Israel invested in developing a multibillion-dollar missile defence system after Saddam Hussein fired Scud missiles at Israeli cities in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. But the Arrow-2 system is incapable of hitting Hizbollah’s long- or short-range rockets, which are launched too close to Israel and land too quickly.

The Israeli military scuttled a programme several years ago to develop defences against primitive rocketry, deciding the effort was too expensive and might not work, according to Frisch. Instead, Israel Defence Forces aircraft, drones and surveillance systems have been trying to spot the elusive rocket launchers, usually after the rockets have been fired and the portable launchers have been driven away by Hezbollah fighters.

Just as suicide bombers packed their explosive devices with pieces of shrapnel and ball bearings to increase their potency, many of Hizbollah warheads have been filled with bullets and tiny metal balls that augment their destructive power when they hit humans, buildings or automobiles, according to police investigators who have examined the rocket debris. ‘‘These missiles are very inaccurate,’’ said Martin Van Creveld, a prominent Israeli military historian who teaches at Hebrew University. The deaths of 12 reserve soldiers lounging in a parking lot in the border town of Kfar Giladi on Sunday ‘‘was a pure accident,’’ he said. ‘‘It might have landed anywhere else.’’ Molly Moore