As the war with Iran enters its second month and a decisive military victory for the United States and Israel appears elusive, the focus has inevitably shifted to diplomacy. It is no surprise that the emerging diplomatic effort is centred on two issues — a ceasefire and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

It is even less surprising that the main combatants remain far apart on both.

For India, which sits next door to the Gulf, the stakes are immediate and enormous. A large share of India’s hydrocarbon imports passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Nearly nine million Indian citizens live and work across the Gulf states. India’s economic, energy and security interdependence with the region is now so deep that an early ceasefire and the restoration of freedom of navigation in the Strait are matters of the highest importance.

But India’s stakes are not merely economic. Delhi also has an interest in shaping the geopolitical order that will emerge in the Gulf once the war ends. That order may look very different from the one that existed before the war began.

One of the most consequential political signals came from Washington Wednesday. In his first prime-time address since ordering strikes on Iran on February 28, President Donald Trump told the American public on April 1 that the core US strategic objectives are nearing realisation and that US forces would “finish the job” with two to three more weeks of heavy strikes.

But there is less now of the supreme confidence with which Trump entered the war. The tone suggests a leader looking for a way out even as he escalates military pressure. Trump has reiterated that the United States would consider a ceasefire when Tehran opens the Strait of Hormuz.

Trump is redefining the nature of victory. He has claimed that “regime change” has already taken place in Iran, suggesting he is engaged with a section of the current leadership. He described President Masoud Pezeshkian as “much less radicalized and far more intelligent” than his predecessors. Tehran, however, has denied that any such structured dialogue is underway.

Yet Pezeshkian himself has said that Iran has the necessary will to reach a deal — provided it receives credible security guarantees. The gap between Washington and Tehran remains wide. But if one were inclined toward optimism, the current positions might be seen as opening bids in what could become serious negotiations.

Israel’s position is equally complex. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared that Israel’s war aims have been achieved “beyond the halfway point” and has claimed that US-Israeli strikes have destroyed Iran’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile production capacity — what he described as the removal of the two existential threats.

At the same time, the Israeli Defence Forces have announced plans for at least three more weeks of operations to further degrade Iran’s defence industry.

Netanyahu has argued that Israel is emerging from the war as a dominant regional power and that it will seek to build new regional alliances as part of constructing a new political architecture in the Middle East. Some in Tehran draw a similar conclusion about Iran’s position. In standing up to the United States and Israel and surviving as a state, Tehran sees itself as a rising power that has demonstrated resilience and strategic salience.

Despite the heavy military blows it has taken, Iran shows no sign of political capitulation. Even as Trump and Netanyahu appeal to the Iranian people to rise up against the regime, President Pezeshkian has chosen to address the American people directly. He has questioned whether the war serves Trump’s own “America First” agenda and has argued that a prolonged confrontation with Iran would impose heavy costs on the United States.

Meanwhile, Iran has been building leverage on the ground. Iran’s parliament has advanced legislation to formally assert the country’s sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz — reframing the waterway as “national” rather than “international”. Tehran is signalling that there will be no simple return to the status quo in Hormuz after the war.

Another important diplomatic development has come from Pakistan’s mediation effort — the visible entry of China into Gulf diplomacy. On March 31, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar released a five-point initiative calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities, peace talks at the earliest opportunity, protection of civilian and critical infrastructure, restoration of Hormuz shipping, and respect for the UN Charter and national sovereignty.

The five-point structure bears the unmistakable signature of Chinese diplomatic tradecraft: focused around a few points and designed to function as a framework that all sides can invoke without any party having to make the first visible concession.

In London, Prime Minister Keir Starmer — who has been at the receiving end of Trump’s relentless personal criticism — announced that Britain is convening a conference of 35 nations, including India, focused on restoring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Starmer was careful to emphasise that this was “not our war” and that Britain would not be dragged into direct military involvement, but the initiative underlines Europe’s growing concern about energy flows and maritime security.

At the United Nations, Bahrain — which holds the Security Council presidency for April — has been pressing a draft resolution authorising “all necessary means” to reopen the Strait. For many Gulf states, a ceasefire alone is not enough; they want long-term security guarantees against Iran and have no desire to see the Strait of Hormuz converted into de facto Iranian waters.

Russia and China, however, are pressing Gulf countries to dilute the language, as part of their own effort to expand their diplomatic role in the region.

As the war enters its second month, the battlefield and the negotiating table are now tightly intertwined.

Military pressure is being used to shape diplomatic outcomes, and diplomacy is increasingly focused on the single most important strategic chokepoint in the global energy system. The future of the Strait of Hormuz — who secures it, who controls it, and its rules of operation — is fast becoming the key question of the Gulf war. The answer to that question will also remain central to India’s own geopolitical calculus for long.

C Raja Mohan is a contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express