Indispensable Yet Unacknowledged: Türkiye and the Future of Europe’s Defence Order
Strategic Argument and Areas of Debate
The European Union faces an unsustainable geopolitical contradiction by structurally depending on Türkiye as an indispensable net security provider for continental defence, migration control, and energy supply, while simultaneously marginalising Ankara from core governance mechanisms due to entrenched identity-based securitisation. This rigid political gatekeeping actively undermines Europe’s overarching strategic autonomy, forcing the emergence of a fragmented, de facto Euro-Turkish Defence Complex that exposes the bloc’s profound vulnerabilities ahead of anticipated NATO burden-shifting.
Executive Summary
The European Union confronts an escalating capability crisis as it attempts to modernise its continental security architecture while formally excluding Türkiye from critical financing and planning frameworks like the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). Despite institutional blockades championed by Greece and Cyprus, deep transnational interdependence continues to grow, anchored by NATO interoperability and joint industrial programmes such as the Baykar–Leonardo partnership. As the United States demands that Europe assume primary conventional deterrence responsibilities by 2027, Brussels remains fundamentally reliant on Turkish advanced drone manufacturing, Black Sea maritime stability, and border management mechanisms. Resolving this systemic vulnerability requires policymakers to decouple vital defence cooperation from the stalled EU accession process and establish a dedicated third-country security partnership.
Analytical Framework and Key Drivers
Identity-Based Securitisation: The European Union constructs its security posture around restrictive cultural boundaries that actively frame Türkiye as a peripheral other, superseding empirical threat assessments and institutionalising Ankara’s exclusion from the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) mechanism.
Peripheral Defence Autonomy: Catalysed by historical vulnerabilities such as the 1964 Johnson Letter and the subsequent 1974 American arms embargo, Türkiye strategically mandated an indigenous defence-industrial base to eliminate external reliance, structurally transforming the nation into a primary global security producer.
Euro-Turkish Defence Complex: Despite political isolation from initiatives like Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), profound functional interdependence thrives via transnational supply chains, forcing European aerospace and naval sectors to covertly integrate with highly scaled Turkish manufacturing capabilities.
Institutional Polycentrism: The overlapping and often disjointed layers of continental security architecture—spanning the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Weimar Triangle, and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)—generate systemic fragmentation that severely complicates joint capability development under the Readiness 2030 framework.
Strategic Assessment & Empirical Findings
- Turkish defence exports experienced explosive growth, surging from 2.3 billion USD in 2020 to over 7.1 billion USD in 2024, with projections reaching nearly 8 billion USD by 2025 across more than 185 overseas markets.
- The nation’s share of global arms exports more than doubled from 0.8 percent between 2015 and 2019 to 1.7 percent in the 2020 to 2024 period, officially cementing its position as the world’s 11th largest arms exporter.
- Bilateral economic integration hit unprecedented levels under the EU–Türkiye Customs Union, with trade volumes reaching a record 210 billion EUR in 2024, encompassing 41 percent of Turkish exports and 32 percent of European exports to Türkiye.
- Energy corridors, predominantly the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and TurkStream, successfully expanded regional transit capacity to more than 97 billion cubic metres per year by 2023, acting as a critical pillar for European diversification away from Russian pipelines.
- Functional border stabilisation under the 2016 EU-Türkiye Statement drove irregular maritime arrivals down by 80 percent to roughly 123,000 in 2019, while Turkish operations successfully intercepted over 250,000 irregular crossings in 2023 alone.
- Political blockades from member states actively undermine pan-European operational readiness, explicitly demonstrated by the exclusion of Turkish forces from PESCO Military Mobility and veto threats against Ankara’s integration into the Security Action for Europe (SAFE).
Geopolitical Trajectories & Policy Risks
- The European Union confronts severe logistical paralysis and degraded deterrence by maintaining the exclusion of Türkiye from PESCO Military Mobility, which legally prevents critical troop transits across European territory during potential Russian escalations.
- Systematic obstruction by Greece and Cyprus within the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) generates profound supply chain vulnerabilities, forcing European Union member states to forfeit rapid procurement of combat-proven Turkish unmanned systems and degrading the overarching resilience of the European defence-industrial base.
- As the European Union hesitates to institutionalise a structured partnership, Türkiye will likely accelerate its multi-vector diplomacy, elevating the risk of strategic decoupling as Ankara leverages its monopoly over Black Sea transit to secure autonomous interests outside traditional Western frameworks.
Critical Policy Questions & Responses
Question 1 Why does the institutional exclusion of Türkiye from the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) mechanism undermine the European Union’s Readiness 2030 objectives?
Answer: The European Union relies heavily on the Readiness 2030 framework to rapidly replenish depleted military stockpiles, yet excluding Türkiye artificially cuts Europe off from the world’s 11th largest arms exporter and its vast manufacturing capacity. By permitting member states like Greece and Cyprus to veto Turkish participation in SAFE, Brussels fundamentally sabotages its own ability to swiftly procure cost-effective precision munitions, forcing aerospace networks to navigate fragmented supply chains. This political gatekeeping actively weakens the continent’s strategic resilience at the exact moment the United States is demanding significantly higher operational burden-sharing.
Question 2 How do historical armaments embargoes continue to shape Türkiye’s modern defence-industrial strategy and its interactions with the European Defence Fund (EDF)?
Answer: The 1964 Johnson Letter and the subsequent arms embargo implemented after the 1974 Cyprus intervention installed a deep structural aversion to external reliance within Türkiye, accelerating its drive toward absolute peripheral autonomy. Consequently, Ankara views restrictive modern mechanisms like the European Defence Fund (EDF) not simply as commercial hurdles, but as direct extensions of the political conditionality that historically crippled its sovereign military readiness. This entrenched memory compels Türkiye to heavily prioritise indigenous champions such as ASELSAN and ROKETSAN, ensuring technological independence rather than subordinating its defence sector to EU-governed mandates.
Question 3 What are the strategic consequences of the European Union framing the 2016 EU-Türkiye Statement as a transactional arrangement rather than an institutional partnership?
Answer: By refusing to institutionalise comprehensive border cooperation, the European Union perpetually relies on fragile diplomatic goodwill rather than binding systemic obligations to secure its volatile southern flank against immense migratory pressures. This transactional approach obscures the immense reality that Türkiye absorbs overwhelming humanitarian burdens, currently hosting over 3.5 million Syrian refugees and intercepting more than 250,000 irregular crossings in 2023 alone. Ultimately, this discursive marginalisation breeds deep mistrust, preventing the EU from translating its critical functional dependency on Ankara into a durable and cohesive geopolitical architecture.
Question 4 How does the Baykar–Leonardo joint venture expose the contradictions within current European Union defence procurement policies?
Answer: The establishment of LBA Systems, an equal joint venture between Türkiye’s Baykar and Italy’s Leonardo, demonstrates that European industrial actors are functionally required to integrate with Turkish technological expertise to remain globally competitive. This transnational commercial alignment stands in direct contradiction to the official political posture of the European Union, which legally prohibits Turkish firms from accessing SAFE financing for co-produced defence projects. The operational success of this venture exposes the strategic incoherence of Brussels’ regulatory frameworks, which actively penalise the specific cross-border industrial synergies required to genuinely achieve European strategic autonomy.
Key Actors and Systemic Dynamics
- European Union → Depends on → Türkiye
- Identity-Based Securitisation → Constrains → European Defence Fund (EDF)
- Türkiye → Shapes → Black Sea
- Greece → Challenges → Security Action for Europe (SAFE)
- Baykar → Coordinates with → Leonardo
- 1964 Johnson Letter → Accelerates → Turkish Peripheral Defence Autonomy
- Institutional Polycentrism → Weakens → European Union
- Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) → Strengthens → European Union
- United States → Influences → NATO
- Readiness 2030 → Requires → Euro-Turkish Defence Complex
