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In this article:
In Part 1, we reviewed background on the American air war in Vietnam, development of the F-4 Phantom, and navy fighter training. Now, Former TOPGUN instructor and F-14 RIO Dave “Bio” Baranek describes the action on 10 May 1972.
“I was in the pure vertical, with Frosty at 6 o’clock,” Randy “Duke” Cunningham recalled in a recent letter about how he learned to fight the F-4. Frosty was TOPGUN instructor and later Vice Admiral David Frost, who was flying an A-4 Skyhawk.
Cunningham goes on to describe how Frost basically talked him through the engagement: “Okay, Randy, roll and place your lift vector on me.” This was before Cunningham adopted his nom de guerre of Duke.
“Pull toward me! Go out my belly side. You’re arcing. Unload! Hold top rudder, your nose is too low and you’re giving me altitude advantage. Okay, two miles, now come back and get me! Maintain 500 knots.”
That fight took place off San Diego in 1969. Cunningham said that during the dogfight that led to his fifth kill, over North Vietnam on 10 May 1972, one of the thoughts that went through his mind was, “…Frosty.”
The opening chapter in Robert Wilcox’s Scream of Eagles has future TOPGUN instructors learning their craft in F4D Skyrays in 1958. Yes, some still yanked their fighters around the sky. The Navy, however, was seduced by the promise of technology, so when the F-4 training syllabus was designed and implemented in the late ’50s, dogfighting lost out to other requirements. The lackluster kill ratio through 1968 and the hard hitting Ault Report provided a wake-up call to all fighter pilots.
In response, a cadre of warriors saluted smartly, embraced the old school fierce mentality, picked up the gauntlet dropped by Captain Ault and took a new generation to a new school for fighter crews.
Cunningham was one of the benefactors of the renewed emphasis, and was the right person at the right time. After two years as a high school teacher and successful swimming coach, he was motivated to join the fight in Vietnam. He earned his Wings of Gold at the relatively late age of 26 and joined his Fleet squadron, VF-96, in July 1969. The squadron made a combat deployment aboard USS America (April-December 1970), then switched to USS Constellation and deployed again October 1971-July 1972.
“Fighter Pilots,” a phrase that appears to include only the Guy in Front, can be expanded to include the entire aircrew or the Guy in Back for fighters with two seats. Traditionally the term Fighter Pilot evokes an image of a swashbuckling bon vivant who was always ready for a fight, dog or otherwise. Although Fighter Crew lacks the sizzle of Fighter Pilot, the crew concept was key in the Phantom and true to the name, the “Fighter Pilots” who manned the dual cockpit Phantoms were always ready for a dogfight. This was true in World War I and remains true to this day.
Cunningham was joined on all five of his kills by RIO Willy “Irish” Driscoll, who “was very upset by the treatment of American POWs, and felt an obligation to get involved in the war.” Driscoll joined VF-96 in August 1971. He says candidly about his early days in a fighter squadron preparing for combat, “I had little idea what I was getting into,” and credits the Navy’s culture of mentoring and its “buddy system” with his success.
He recalls an energized atmosphere around Miramar, with constant discussion about fighting MiGs and avoiding SAMs. While he enjoyed the camaraderie of a fighter squadron, Driscoll quickly realized the seriousness of the fighter business and committed to succeeding.
Cunningham was known for his dedication to all things related to aerial combat. He studied accounts going back to World War I, as well as information related to the current threat. He tried to educate his squadronmates. “I would put twenty facts each day on the ready room board: MiG performance, missile envelopes, and cockpit discipline, including focusing your eyes.” This level of dedication sometimes irritated his squadronmates and set him up for ridicule, but you can’t argue with the results.
One squadronmate who appreciated it was Driscoll. “Duke was all about winning dogfights, 24/7, and he made me a better RIO.”
Frost agreed with the characterization. “I remember Duke very well. One of the things he had going for him was that he was relentless about studying air combat. Ruthless in preparing.”
The knowledge Cunningham gained from his studies gave him an advantage. He and Driscoll had two kills to their credit before 10 May when they found themselves engaged: four MiG-17s were closing from seven o’clock, with tracers coming from the lead. Cunningham initially considered a nose-low break turn, but that hadn’t worked so well on 8 May (he scored a kill anyway). He then realized the MiGs were at 450 knots or more. In a recent letter, he said, “I knew the lead couldn’t make a good turn since the MiG-17 did not have hydraulic-assisted controls (MiG facts). Even before he passed below me I reversed and put him in my gunsight.”
He had already adjusted the lead setting from 142 mils (air-to-ground setting) to 35 mils and knew they were at a good range for an AIM-9, so he squeezed the trigger and scored kill #3.
Improper cockpit switch settings had resulted in several aircrews missing a fleeting chance for a MiG kill. This wasn’t an issue for this pair of aces. Driscoll recalls that during the initial part of the deployment, Constellation conducted operations in South Vietnam, the typical warm-up before going north. There were no MiGs for hundreds of miles, but after delivering their bombs on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, they reset their switches for air-to-air. “Randy asked me to always remind him to switch air-to-air, but he never forgot.”
Another contributing factor was incredible eyesight. Retired Rear Admiral Pete “Viper” Pettigrew, who fought Cunningham near Miramar in 1969, recalls that the future ace’s “incredible vision gave him a powerful advantage in engagements, especially in the often confused combat environment over North Vietnam.” Pettigrew would know: he was not only a former TOPGUN instructor, but he downed a MiG-21 on 6 May 1969 while flying with RIO Mike “Wizard” McCabe.
Driscoll summed up reasons for his and Cunningham’s success. “Yes, some of it was luck, the opportunity to engage the enemy. But Randy had exceptional eyesight and exceptional fighter pilot motor skill. He saw the tactical situation in a nanosecond. And he had a highly-developed, controlled aggressiveness.”
The first kill of the day on May 10 was scored by Curt “Dozo” Dosé and RIO Jim McDevitt, assigned to VF-92, which deployed in Constellation with VF-96. Before joining the Fleet, Dosé had completed a tour as a “plowback,” a newly-winged pilot who returns as an instructor in the Training Command, where he learned how to handle tactical aircraft by flying the TF-9 Cougar and TA-4 Skyhawk.
Dosé started at VF-121 in December 1969 and, like Driscoll, recalls Miramar as “an amazing environment,” with combat veterans, the rivalry between F-4s and F-8s, and dedicated instructors. The Phantom community was undergoing its metamorphosis, but the syllabus was still crowded. In the RAG Dosé flew 84 sorties in the Phantom: 26 for field carrier landing practice and carrier qualification, 16 for day air-to-ground training, and 16 for day air-to-air, according to his logbook. The remainder included fundamentals such as formation and instrument flight, as well as night flying. These were important for an all-weather fighter, but they posed a challenge as the Navy tried to redress its Vietnam air-to-air record.
One area the RAG emphasized was properly flying combat spread formation and loose deuce tactics, which compensated for the maneuvering limitations of the F-4. “With these, we had tactics that worked extremely well, and it was a comfortable situation,” Dosé recalled.
Dosé had made his first combat flights only ten days after finishing the RAG, during VF-92’s America cruise in 1970. After that deployment he was selected to go through the TOPGUN class, and then made the deployment in Constellation.
“We were very much into V-n diagrams (plot of g versus airspeed) and comparing aircraft: F-8, MiG-17, MiG-21.” He said pilots and RIOs were aware of the F-4’s strengths and weaknesses, one of the strengths being the J79 engines. As a result, “an engagement would turn into a series of mini-fights. Turn and extend. Do that two, three, four times until you get separation and an advantage.”
Dosé remembers fondly that the F-4 provided great feedback to the pilot. “It told you a lot, if you just paid attention.” He later did a tour in the F-14 Tomcat, but the Phantom has a special place in his heart. “I guess you prefer the jet that took you to war.”
As for his kill, Dosé credits one of the new tools recommended by the Ault Report: the Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation (ACMI) range near Yuma, Arizona. Providing a detailed real-time image of multiple aircraft, the system supported in-depth debriefing, which was priceless for analysis and learning. As he pursued a MiG-21 near Kep Airfield, for Dosé “it was like I had been there before.” Fortunately the MiG pilot had not been there before.
STAY TUNED for part 3, where we’ll recap some of the lessons and show how TOPGUN became institutionalized.
Dave Bio Baranek: All articles
