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On its 28th flight, Columbia left Earth for the last time on Jan. 16, 2003. At the time, the shuttle program was focused on building the International Space Station. However, Columbia’s final mission, known as STS-107, emphasized pure research.
On Saturday Feb. 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia was lost and seven NASA astronauts perished. They were Rick Husband, Mission Commander; William McCool, Pilot; Michael Anderson, Payload Commander; Kalpana Chawla, Mission Specialist; Laurel Clark, Mission Specialist; David Brown, Mission Specialist and the Israeli astronaut Ilan Ramon, Payload Specialist.
The Orbiter was flying over Texas, about 15 minutes from landing and at about 18 times the speed of sound. It was at an altitude of 63 km, about 1400 km from the landing site at KSC.
Did the Columbia astronauts have any idea that something was seriously wrong during their mission, and how did they respond in those final moments?
Andy Burns, Student of Space History and Flight Officer / Aviator at United States Navy (USN), explains on Quora;
‘They knew something was seriously wrong, but most likely not that it was an impending catastrophe, until the final seconds. Insulating foam shed from the External Tank on launch had punched a hole in the left wing’s leading edge.
‘During reentry, as hot plasma began entering the wing’s internal structure through the hole, the increased drag prompted Columbia’s flight control computers to yaw to compensate, but at least at first neither Mission Control nor the crew noticed.
‘At just under five minutes after entry interface (ie, when the orbiter was encountering enough atmosphere to matter), the left landing gear wheel well sensors indicated increasing temperatures. Not long after, the landing gear’s hydraulic and tire pressure sensors showed off scale-low indications, followed by an Unknown left main gear status (normally it would show Up, Down, or In Transit). These all probably occurred as the sensors themselves were destroyed by the entering plasma. At the same time, the flight control surfaces could no longer compensate and the Reaction Control System (RCS) thrusters began firing to try and keep the ship on course.
‘Mission Control registered Loss of Signal (LOS) about 45 seconds later. The recovered flight data recorders showed that a Master Alarm went off in the cockpit registering hydraulic system failure. The Orbiter, traveling at about Mach 15, entered a flat spin, and the pilots switched from automatic to manual flight control and back to automatic, then began trying to restore the hydraulic system. Breakup of the Orbiter occurred less than 15 seconds later, with loss of all electrical power, and the crew cabin depressurized within ten seconds.’
Burns concludes;
‘The ACES crew suits worn by the astronauts were not space suits as such. The idea was in the event of a failure on launch or reentry such that a safe landing could not be made, the suits would protect the crew during a controlled bailout at high altitude – the ACES suit was derived from those used by SR-71 and U-2 pilots. However, the vehicle still had to be under control and at a low-slow enough area of flight to be survivable. The suits did nothing for the crew of Columbia.’
Photo credit: NASA and U.S. Air Force
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