Toplines

The following two paragraphs appeared in the China & Taiwan Update, March 13, 2026.

North Korea likely seeks to expand its economic development through rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which in turn aims to maintain its long-standing ties with North Korea amid greater North Korean-Russian alignment. The PRC and North Korea resumed passenger train operations between Beijing and Pyongyang on March 12.[1] North Korea suspended passenger railway services in January 2020 due to COVID-19 but resumed freight train services in 2022.[2] Air China also announced that it will resume flight operations between Beijing and Pyongyang on March 30, marking the first service in six years.[3] North Korea likely intends to diversify its revenue streams through international tourism. Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) General Secretary Kim Jong Un emphasized tourism development at North Korea’s recent 9th Party Congress.[4] Pyongyang very likely seeks to bolster its revenue generation by expanding economic relations with Beijing. North Korea extended an unprecedented invitation to PRC Ambassador Wang Yajun to the newly opened Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Area on February 15 to discuss bilateral tourism cooperation.[5] The PRC Embassy in Pyongyang featured the Wonsan-Kalma Area in a post on March 4, likely in response to the invitation.[6] North Korean state media highlighted on March 10 that Kim sent a reply to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping’s congratulatory letter for Kim’s re-election as WPK General Secretary.[7] Kim’s reply marks a notable shift from Pyongyang’s omission of Xi’s name in the report on New Year’s greetings exchanges in January.[8] ISW-CDOT assessed in February that North Korea may be changing its stance to allow greater PRC tourism.[9] Pyongyang could secure over 175 million US dollars annually if PRC tourism returns to pre-pandemic levels.[10]

Beijing likely aims to regain some of its leverage over Pyongyang, which has pivoted toward Moscow in recent years. PRC-North Korean relations have cooled since North Korea decided to deploy troops to Russia in 2024.[11] The PRC may seek to mitigate North Korea’s over-reliance on Russia and exert control over Pyongyang. Kim will likely attempt to balance Xi’s and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s interests to maximize the benefits for Pyongyang. Kim called for “developing the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation with neighboring countries” without indicating specific nations at the 9th Party Congress, possibly to preserve diplomatic flexibility.[12]

US Forces Korea (USFK) redeployed both Patriot PAC-3 and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile systems to the Middle East, which may extend air defense gaps over South Korea. South Korean media reported on March 13 that one THAAD launcher vehicle returned to the Seongju Base after its March 3 relocation, contradicting earlier reports that all six launchers had returned to the base after unloading only the interceptor missiles for redeployment.[13] The relocation of interceptor missiles allows the system to remain operational using spare missiles reportedly stored at another base, while the relocation of launcher vehicles could suspend the system’s operations entirely. South Korea currently does not field an indigenous high-altitude missile interceptor and has relied on one THAAD battery, which includes six launcher vehicles, since 2017 to provide coverage at altitudes between 40 and 150 kilometers.[14] The status of the five other THAAD launch vehicles is unclear. The demand for THAAD interceptor missiles and launcher vehicles remains high in the Middle East, as Gulf states are reportedly running low on missile interceptors against Iranian drone and missile attacks, and requested the United States expedite new supplies on March 5.[15]

The THAAD relocation follows the USFK’s March 5 transport of an unspecified number of Patriot PAC-3 missile interceptors and launchers to the Middle East.[16] South Korea’s integrated air missile defense (IAMD) architecture uses South Korea’s M-SAM-I, M-SAM-II, and Patriot PAC-3 interceptors for the lower-altitude layer below 40 kilometers. The reduction of operational Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD batteries could therefore temporarily compromise South Korea’s multi-layered coverage against potential North Korean missile strikes. North Korea currently has little incentive to conduct direct missile strikes to exploit this gap. Temporary gaps in South Korea’s IAMD could weaken US extended deterrence signaling and reduce the operational readiness of US-South Korean combined forces.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung said on March 10 that South Korea opposed the USFK’s relocation of some air defense weapons without success.[17] South Korea likely sees the relocation as part of the US’s broader efforts to shift USFK’s operational role from primarily deterring North Korean attacks to countering broader regional threats beyond the Korean Peninsula. The United States temporarily redeployed two Patriot PAC-3 batteries to the Middle East from South Korea in April 2025 while conducting a military operation against Iran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen, reflecting the US expectation that US assets overseas are flexible for cross-theater contingencies.[18] A sudden relocation of USFK assets that South Korean defense capabilities cannot yet replace may heighten the risk of North Korean miscalculation, however.

North Korea may be attempting to bolster its efforts to create a green-water navy by developing larger guided missile destroyers (DDG) and increasing the number of missiles its surface combatants will carry. Kim Jong Un’s emphasis on missile armaments for North Korea’s DDGs suggests they will act primarily as a launch platform for North Korea’s deterrence complex rather than as traditional multi-role surface combatants. North Korean DDG Choe Hyon (the lead ship of the Choe Hyon-class DDG) conducted a cruise missile firing test on March 11 against land-based targets in the Yellow Sea.[19] Kim oversaw the test through a live video feed. North Korean state media claimed the launch tested the Korean People’s Army Navy’s (KPAN) remote command and control networks.[20] The test coincided with combined US-South Korea military exercises and was likely a response to Seoul-Washington military cooperation.[21]

Kim stated, following the missile launch, that the KPAN should consider replacing the ship-mounted automatic gun system on the vessel’s bow with a “supersonic” weapon system.[22] Kim’s decision to expand the missile armament of KPAN DDGs at the expense of its gun system suggests he intends to deploy DDGs primarily as a missile launching platform to further disperse North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, a goal he outlined during the 9th Party Congress in February.[23] A deeper missile magazine would also allow Choe Hyon to carry a large land-attack missile armament without sacrificing significant anti-ship firepower. The loss of the gun system will limit the roles Choe Hyon can undertake and may render it vulnerable to small attack craft, such as unmanned surface vessels (USV).[24]

Kim’s statement mentioned an 8,000-ton DDG, larger than the Choe-Hyon class, suggesting the KPAN will expand its fleet of large surface combatants to enhance its ability to operate beyond its coastal waters.[25] ISW-CDOT has assessed that Kim Jong Un intends to transform the KPAN into a green-water navy that retains coastal defense assets while developing a surface fleet capable of longer-range deployments.[26] The increased space for armaments on an 8,000-ton vessel could allow the KPAN to take on anti-submarine, anti-air, and anti-surface roles and increase the survivability of a KPAN deployment beyond its coastal waters. North Korea will likely require significant technological and design support from its allies to develop and deploy an 8,000-ton DDG during the present five-year plan, however. Russian technological support evident on the Choe Hyon suggests North Korea could look to Russian naval technology to accelerate its development of a larger surface combatant.[27]

North Korean Domestic Politics

Nothing significant to report.

North Korean Military Developments

North Korea launched twelve 600mm Short-range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) on March 14, the third North Korean ballistic missile test in 2026.[28] This launch was likely in response to US-South Korean military activity. North Korean state media announced that a long-range artillery unit launched the missiles towards a target approximately 364.4km (226.2 miles) away in the East Sea/Sea of Japan.[29] North Korea launched cruise missiles from a 5,000-ton Choe Hyon-class destroyer on March 4 and March 10.[30] North Korean state media announced that the launches would continue to occur regularly to ensure defense readiness and deterrence capabilities.[31] WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un claimed the system would cause “unease” for countries within a 420 km radius.[32] This SRBM could strike the entire central region of the Korean Peninsula. The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Japanese Ministry of Defense reported that the missile flew 350km and 340km, respectively.[33] The Japanese Foreign Ministry confirmed that officials from the United States, South Korea, and Japan held discussions regarding North Korean missile provocation on March 16.[34]

North Korea missile launches may be, in part, protests against the US-South Korea combined military exercise Freedom Shield (FS) held from March 9 to 19.[35] ISW-CDOT previously assessed that the widespread development and testing of the 600mm MLRS and SRBMs aim to showcase Pyongyang’s military proficiency and its ability to scale production. Pyongyang deploys 600mm MLRS to deliver SRBMs. North Korean launches may also serve an equipment testing function for future exports of the system to Russia. The South Korean JCS noted in May 2025 that North Korea had already supplied 600mm SRBMs to Russia, and the JCS evaluated these missile tests as “flight stability assessments for export purposes.”[36]

North Korean laborers may be arriving at Russian drone factories soon, based on recent construction of residential facilities. US-based think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reported on March 9 on ongoing infrastructure expansion at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ).[37] The ASEZ hosts manufacturing facilities that assemble unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with technological assistance from Iran.[38] The ASEZ produces roughly 5,000 Geran drones, a Russian variant of the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 drones, a month to support Russian war efforts in Ukraine. CSIS reported that satellite imagery analysis showed construction on ASEZ buildings from 2022 to 2026, including two large housing projects.[39] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported in November 2025 that Russia planned to attract approximately 12,000 North Korean laborers to work at the ASEZ by end of 2025.[40]  The status of North Korean labor involvement in the ASEZ remains unknown, however.

North Korea has accelerated efforts to expand its domestic UAV programs since November 2024.[41] GUR Commander Kyrylo Budanov said in June 2025 that Russia agreed to transfer the technology necessary to produce Geran-type drones in North Korea.[42] Seoul-based media outlet NK Pro reported in September 2025 that North Korea is conducting ongoing tests at its Panghyon Airbase to advance its military drone development.[43] Kim Jong Un in February 2026 added artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled unmanned systems development to North Korea’s five-year military modernization plan at the 9th Party Congress.[44] The extent of Russia-North Korea cooperation on drone technology remains unclear.

Microsoft reported on March 6 that North Korean-affiliated organizations are using AI to gain employment at Western IT companies.[45] North Korea is increasingly weaponizing AI to optimize its cyber operations and maximize illicit revenue generation. Microsoft stated that North Korean-affiliated organizations are using AI for voice modulation, sophisticated email generation, and facial synthesis to fabricate fake identities.[46] North Korean IT workers leverage these tools to infiltrate Western IT companies offering remote work using these fake identities.[47] The IT workers also reportedly use VPNs to conceal their actual locations.[48] North Korea primarily dispatched these individuals to conduct their operations in the PRC, Russia, and Africa to evade international sanctions and for easier access to the internet, according to a former North Korean IT worker’s testimony.[49] The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on March 12 against six individuals and two entities linked to North Korea’s cyber operations.[50] OFAC revealed that North Korea generated nearly 800 million US dollars in revenue in 2024 through fake employment cyber operations.[51] US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent stated that North Korea was targeting US companies to gain access to sensitive data and extort targeted companies.[52] North Korea is continuously expanding its hacking operations against South Korean and US civilian targets.[53]

North Korea appears to be rapidly weaponizing emerging technologies like AI to maximize cryptocurrency revenue and extort funds by compromising systems or stealing data.[54] ISW-CDOT assessed that exploiting cryptocurrency exchanges is a primary revenue stream for Pyongyang.[55] North Korea generated nearly 2 billion US dollars in 2025 through hacking, approximately 7 percent of its 2025 GDP.[56] North Korea has prioritized using cyber warfare to overcome economic crises and international sanctions since the 1990s.[57]

North Korean Foreign Relations

North Korea’s foreign ministry condemned US and Israeli strikes on Iran. North Korea said it “respects” Iran’s selection of a new Supreme Leader without directly mentioning the killing of Iran’s previous leader. A North Korean foreign ministry spokesperson on March 11 “strongly denounce[d] the acts of aggression by the United States and Israel” against Iran and denounced any “rhetorical threats and military action” that furthered overthrowing another country’s political and social system.[58] The statement resembled Pyongyang’s earlier condemnation of US and Israeli strikes on Iran as well as its condemnation of the US strikes and operation targeting former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.[59] North Korea still has not mentioned the killing of Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, despite conveying its respect for Iran’s selection of a new supreme leader. Pyongyang has likely avoided mentioning recent decapitation operations against Iran and Venezuela to avoid spreading the idea that Kim Jong Un could similarly be abducted or killed, and to avoid contradicting its propaganda that the United States is weak.

North Korea and Iran have maintained diplomatic relations since 1973, and North Korea has provided Iran with military equipment and training since the 1980s. The US Defense Intelligence Agency stated in 2019 that Iran developed its Shahab-3 ballistic missile based on North Korea’s Rodong missile and assessed ongoing cooperation in missile production.[60]  Iranian Ambassador to North Korea Abbas Talebifar took office on January 29 after a five-year vacancy.[61] North Korea is likely to continue supporting Iran rhetorically but is unlikely to be capable of providing substantive material support to Iran as long as US-Israeli war operations continue.

North Korean Influence Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Inter-Korean Relations

WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong denounced the US-South Korea combined military exercise Freedom Shield (FS) on March 10.[62] Pyongyang justifies bolstering its nuclear and advanced military capabilities by blaming Washington and Seoul for increasing regional tensions. Kim Yo Jong condemned the FS exercise, which began on March 9, as a “provocative and aggressive war rehearsal.”[63] Seoul and Washington agreed on February 27 to scale back the FS’s Field Training Exercises (FTXs) to 22 sessions, half of 2025’s FTXs.[64] Kim Yo Jong claimed that the FS simulated a confrontation with the North, and is unacceptable regardless of changes to its scale.[65] Kim Yo Jong also added that North Korea must suppress US-South Korean “provocations” with overwhelming offensive actions.[66]

Kim Yo Jong’s condemnation is in-line with typical for North Korean reactions to US-South Korea combined military exercises.[67] North Korea conducted two strategic cruise missile launches from its Choe Hyon-class destroyer on March 4 and 10. likely to coincide with the FS.[68]ISW-CDOT previously assessed that reducing FS and similar exercises was part of the Lee Jae Myung administration’s efforts to facilitate dialogue with Pyongyang.[69] Pyongyang’s response to the 2026 FS indicates that scaling back exercises is not enough to resume inter-Korean dialogue. North Korea shifts the blame for regional arms proliferation onto the United States and South Korea and uses combined exercises as a pretext to justify its own military development. [70] Kim Yo Jong also notably mentioned the integration of nuclear elements, modern tactics, information warfare, and AI into the FS.[71] Kim Yo Jong’s mention of these military capabilities may suggest that North Korea closely monitors allied capabilities and intends to adapt its own military development in these advanced fields to counter the US-South Korean alliance.

South Korean Domestic Politics

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung achieved his highest approval ratings since his June 2025 inauguration. Gallup reported that Lee’s approval ratings increased by one percent, reaching 66 percent in the second week of March, a new record high for Lee.[72] The ruling Democratic Party (DP) also maintains a steady increase in its approval ratings, while the conservative People Power Party has seen a decline in its approval ratings over the last four weeks.[73] Gallup stated that nearly 90 percent of DP supporting respondents approved of Lee, along with 75 percent of moderate respondents.[74] Respondents cited the Lee administration’s economic policies as the most significant factor influencing their support.[75] Realmeter also reported an increase in Lee’s approval ratings. Realmeter stated that Lee received 60.3 percent approval, a 2.1 percent increase from the first week of March.[76] Realmeter attributed this rise to the administration’s preemptive measures to mitigate oil shortages caused by conflicts in the Middle East.[77]

Counter-North Korean Coalition Building Efforts

See toplines.