Toplines

The combined force campaign targeting Iranian commanders is likely impeding their ability to conduct sizable and coordinated attacks. Officials familiar with US and Western intelligence assessments speaking to The New York Times on March 30 said that the deaths of local Iranian commanders have degraded the ability of local Iranian commanders to communicate to launch large and coordinated attacks.[1] The targeted killing of local commanders has immediate practical effects by removing key commanders who give orders. Decapitation also creates a pervasive fear that can cause targeted commanders to take precautions to survive that impede their ability to execute their assigned mission.[2] US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated on March 31 that combined force airstrikes have degraded the Iranian military’s morale and even led to “widespread desertions, key personnel shortages and causing frustrations amongst senior leaders.”[3] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are evidently facing recruitment struggles as they lowered the recruitment age to 12 to support patrols, checkpoints, and logistics.[4]

Iran launched only three missile barrages at Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff at 2:00 PM ET on March 30, marking its lowest barrage rate of the war to date.[5] These salvoes also contain only a small number of missiles, which may be a byproduct of Iranian command-and-control challenges highlighted previously. Iran has been firing only a few missiles per salvo at Israel since March 20.[6] The three waves only consisted of one missile in two of the waves and a “small” number of missiles in the third wave.[7] Smaller salvoes are relatively easier for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s air defense systems to intercept, as demonstrated by their performance against small Houthi salvoes between 2023 and 2025.[8] Iran has only been launching one missile per salvo and three to seven salvoes per day at Israel for the past four days.[9] This is considerably less compared to what Iran fired at the start of the war.[10] The IDF also assessed that Iran’s missile fire targeting Israel has slowed to around 10-15 missiles a day over the past two weeks.[11] The low salvo and missile-per-salvo rate targeting Israel does not necessarily imply Iran is suffering the same challenges when it comes to its short-range ballistic missiles that target the Gulf states, though March 31 saw a lower number of missiles targeting the Gulf states than the average.[12] Hegseth separately confirmed on March 31 that Iran launched its lowest number of missiles and drones in general in the past 24 hours.[13]

The combined force’s extensive airstrikes targeting Iranian missile bases and production sites have also degraded Iran’s ability to launch missile strikes against Israel. CTP-ISW recorded that the combined force has struck over 20 missile bases since the start of the war.[14] The Washington Post on March 29 identified ”severe damage” on satellite imagery to Iran’s four major missile production sites, including Khojir, Shahroud, Parchin, and Hakimiyeh.[15] The IDF announced on March 31 that the Israeli Air Force (IAF) has struck 70 percent of Iran’s defense industrial sites, which are essential to reconstituting Iran’s missile capabilities.[16]

Iran is asserting sovereignty over international waterways by demanding payment from ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian Parliament National Security Commission passed a bill on March 30 titled the “Strait of Hormuz Management Plan,” which outlines a series of policies that assert that Iran has sovereignty over international waterways in the Strait of Hormuz.[17] The plan forces other countries to negotiate with Iran for safe passage through the strait and for some vessels to pay to transit through the strait, which is an international waterway. It also bans US and Israeli shipping or any ships from countries that sanction Iran.

Iran’s parliament has little real power but its decision to pass this bill represents a desire in Tehran to continue to impede international shipping around the Strait after the war. Senior Iranian officials, including Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, have warned in recent weeks that the situation in the Strait of Hormuz “won’t return to its pre-war status” following the war.[18] Expediency Discernment Council member Mohammad Mokhber stated on March 19 that Iran can use its position along the strait to “sanction [the West] and prevent their ships from passing through this waterway” even after the war ends.[19] Daily oil exports from the Middle East have fallen by at least 60 percent since the start of the war.[20] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) has received 25 reports of attacks or incidents affecting civilian vessels transiting the strait since the war began.[21] Efforts to impede shipping around the strait could take a number of forms and would include efforts to threaten, disrupt, and selectively control traffic through the strait at any time or for any reason. Iran could use these threats to coerce concessions from the United States or its partners or deter them. Iran may be especially incentivized to leverage its control around the strait if it concludes that such actions are an effective means of coercing the United States and its partners.Iran has continued attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf. An Iranian drone struck the Kuwaiti oil tanker al Salmi northwest of Dubai on March 30.[22] The attack did not injure any crew members aboard the vessel. This oil tanker is the first vessel that Iran has struck since March 18.[23] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy inaccurately claimed that it targeted the Singaporean-flagged Haiphong Express, which it probably mistook for the al Salmi.[24]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah almost certainly executed the kidnapping of US freelance journalist Shelly Kittleson in Baghdad City, Iraq, on March 31.[25] The US government had reportedly warned Kittleson that Kataib Hezbollah planned to kidnap her, according to one source familiar with the warning speaking to CNN.[26] The Iraqi Interior Ministry stated on March 31 that they arrested one Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated suspect.[27]

Hezbollah conducted four first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against IDF armored vehicles in southern Lebanon on March 31.[28] Hezbollah claimed that it struck an IDF Merkava Tank at an IDF position in Ainata, southern Lebanon, on March 31.[29] Hezbollah later released a video on March 31 showing three FPV drone strikes on IDF armored vehicles in Biyyadah, Tyre District.[30] The first FPV drone strike targeted an IDF armored personnel carrier (APC).[31] The Hezbollah video appears to show an FPV drone targeting the APC’s tracks, likely to immobilize the APC.[32] The second FPV drone strike targeted an IDF HMMWV (Humvee).[33]  The Hezbollah video appears to show an FPV drone targeting the HMMWV’s roof.[34] The third FPV drone strike targeted a separate IDF APC near the HMMWV.  Hezbollah video shows an FPV drone targeting the APC’s frontal armor, but at the beginning of the video, the HMMWV that was previously struck is visible burning nearby, which indicates Hezbollah launched at least the second and third FPV strikes consecutively.[35] Hezbollah used an FPV drone to strike an IDF Merkava Tank in southern Lebanon for the first time on March 26.[36] None of the IDF’s armored vehicles that Hezbollah struck with FPV drones appeared to be equipped with improvised top-mounted slat armor to protect the vehicles against FPV drone attacks or anti-tank munitions. The IDF previously deployed some vehicles equipped with top-mounted slat armor in Gaza in 2023.[37]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force continued to target missile sites and facilities in Iran. Strikes on these sites have likely degraded Iran’s ability to produce missiles. The combined force has targeted the following missile sites and munition depots since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff:

•   Esfahan munitions depot in Esfahan Province.[38]US President Donald Trump shared footage on Truth Social showing multiple explosions illuminating the night sky in Esfahan City.[39] An unspecified US official told The Wall Street Journal on March 31 that US forces used a high volume of bunker-buster munitions, indicating an effort to target hardened infrastructure.[40] The IDF said on March 20 that it has seen more Iranian ballistic missile launches from central Iran, including Esfahan, after combined force strikes degraded Iran’s launch capabilities in western Iran.[41]
• Parchin Military Complex in eastern Tehran Province.[42] The IDF struck a warhead casting factory and a missile components research, development, and production site in Parchin.[43] The complex is controlled by the Defense Industries Organization and is used to produce advanced munitions, including drones and missiles.[44] Multiple reports indicate that Iranian activities at Parchin are also relevant to nuclear weapons development.[45]
• Khojir missile production site in southeastern Tehran Province.[46] The IDF struck a ballistic missile engine component production site and a ballistic missile engine testing site in Khojir.[47] An OSINT source reported that the two facilities likely support liquid-propellant production and liquid-propellant engine testing.[48] Khojir is one of Iran’s most important ballistic missile complexes and serves as a central hub for missile production, storage, and research.[49]
• Shahid Kharrazi barracks munitions depot. Satellite imagery from March 27 shows that the combined force struck the Shahid Kharrazi barracks munitions depot in Shahin Shahr, Esfahan Province.[50] It is unclear what munitions Iran stores at this facility, but it is located next to a missile base.

The combined force continued to target defense industrial sites in Iran. Satellite imagery from March 30 shows extensive damage at the Iran Shipbuilding and Offshore Industries Complex (ISOICO) west of Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[51] ISOICO is a subsidiary of Iran’s Industrial Development and Renovation Organization (IDRO), which the United States sanctioned in November 2018 for being an entity of the Government of Iran.[52] The combined force also struck the IRGC Navy Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization on March 31.[53] The United States sanctioned the IRGC Navy Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization in 2017 for providing support to the IRGC.[54] The organization is responsible for ballistic missile research and development and has supported IRGC efforts to advance missile and drone capabilities, including by providing assistance to regional partners such as Hezbollah and the Houthis.[55]

The combined force has continued to degrade Iranian air defense capabilities in order to maintain air dominance in Iran. The combined force struck an Artesh Air Defense radar system at Mount Magher in Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province.[56] The IDF separately struck an Anti-tank guided missile (ATGMs) and small surface-to-air missile (SAM) components research and production site in Tehran Province.[57]

New satellite imagery has confirmed previous combined force strikes on internal security targets.
Combined force strikes destroyed several buildings at the Shohada Unit Complex in Urmia, according to commercially available satellite imagery from March 7. Anti-regime media reported that the combined force struck the “Shohada base” on March 3, but it was unclear at the time whether the source was referring to the to the IRGC Ground Forces Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base or the IRGC Ground Forces Provincial Unit, which are both based in Urmia.[58] Combined force strikes also damaged several buildings at the IRGC 23rd Khatam ol Anbia Operational Division base in Tehran, according to commercially available satellite imagery from March 11. Anti-regime media reported strikes targeting the base’s Tohid Barracks on March 7.[59]

Iranian Response

Iran continues to launch strikes and publicly threaten future strikes against critical Gulf infrastructure in an effort to pressure Gulf states into pushing the United States and Israel to halt their ongoing campaign against Iran. The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that it intercepted 36 drones, eight ballistic missiles, and four cruise missiles on March 31.[60] An Iranian drone reportedly hit a telecommunications company’s administrative building in central Sharjah, but did not cause any casualties.[61] The Dubai Media Office also reported on March 31 that air defense systems intercepted an Iranian projectile over southern Dubai, with falling shrapnel lightly injuring four residents.[62] IRGC-affiliated media reported on March 31 that “informed sources” claimed Iran is prepared to target Fujairah Port and the UAE’s Habshan–Fujairah pipeline with a capacity of approximately 1.5 million barrels per day.[63] Emirati air defenses previously intercepted an Iranian missile targeting Habshan gas facility on March 18.[64] Iran continues to target energy infrastructure to drive up global energy prices as part of their broader effort to coerce the Gulf states to pressure the United States and Israel to halt their campaign against Iran.

The Saudi Defense Ministry announced it intercepted 12 drones from Iran on March 31.[65] The Kuwaiti Armed Forces detected seven Iranian drones and five missiles in Kuwaiti airspace on March 31.[66] The Bahrain Defense Ministry announced it intercepted two Iranian drones on March 31.[67]

The IRGC threatened on March 31 to target US‑linked information, communications, artificial intelligence, and advanced technology firms in retaliation for US and Israeli attacks.[68] The IRGC explicitly named a wide range of technology, defense, aerospace, finance, and industrial firms and accused these companies of supporting intelligence, surveillance, and targeting operations.

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response 

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 39 attacks targeting northern Israeli communities and Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 2:00 PM ET on March 30 and 2:00 PM ET on March 31.[69] The majority of Hezbollah’s claimed attacks targeted IDF soldiers, vehicles, and positions in southern Lebanon.[70] Hezbollah claimed it targeted four IDF military bases and one IDF barracks in northern Israel, however.[71] Hezbollah previously claimed it launched a rocket attack on the IDF’s Glilot Base near Tel Aviv on March 30.[72]

Hezbollah conducted a complex ambush on March 31 targeting an IDF armored column in Beit Lif, Bint Jbeil District, in which Hezbollah detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) while engaging the column with small arms, rocket fire, and mortars.[73] Hezbollah said it also targeted IDF reinforcements attempting to relieve the armored column in Beit Lif with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).[74] Hezbollah killed a 934th (Nahal) Infantry Brigade battalion commander in the ambush and three other officers and wounded two other IDF soldiers.[75] Hezbollah also claimed that it struck three IDF Merkava Tanks with ATGMs in Qouza, Ainata, and Qantara on March 30.[76] This follows a Hezbollah ATGM attack on March 29, which killed an IDF soldier.[77]

The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah sites and personnel throughout Lebanon. IDF spokesperson Brigadier General Effie Defrin said on March 31 that the Israeli Air Force has struck over 2,500 Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, killing at least 900 Hezbollah members.[78] The IDF issued new evacuation notices for neighborhoods in Beirut’s southern suburbs, including Haret Hreik, Ghubairi, Laylaki, Hadath, Bourj al Barajneh, Tahwitat al Ghadir, and Chiyah on March 31.[79] The IDF also issued an evacuation notice for a building in Ghubairi that the IDF identified as a “Hezbollah facility” on March 31 before striking it the same day.[80]

The IDF continued to conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon on March 31. IDF spokesperson Brigadier General Effie Defrin said on March 31 that the ground offensive against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon is pushing Hezbollah north.[81] The IDF said on March 31 that IDF artillery had fired over 700 shells at Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon in recent days.[82] IDF artillery fire reportedly killed a cell of Hezbollah members who launched a drone that wounded three IDF soldiers during operations in southern Lebanon on March 30.[83] The 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade (91st Division) separately killed six Hezbollah fighters with artillery fire in southern Lebanon.[84] The IDF 146th Division destroyed dozens of Hezbollah rocket launchers in southern Lebanon on March 31.[85] The IDF said it has destroyed more than 180 launchers across Lebanon since March 2.[86]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

The US-Israeli combined force continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets to prevent Iranian-backed militia attacks against US interests and Israel. The combined force struck Kataib Hezbollah facilities associated with the 45th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade, which is controlled by Kataib Hezbollah, in Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province, on March 30.[87] The combined force conducted three separate airstrikes in Anbar and Ninewa provinces on March 30 and March 31 targeting other PMF brigades.[88] The combined force struck an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Tayyar al Risali facility in Anbar on March 30, a Badr Organization PMF facility in Ninewa Province and a Saraya al Jihad-PMF facility in Anbar Province on March 31.[89] The combined force previously struck Kataib Tayyar al Risali on March 24 in Salah al Din Province.[90]

An unidentified senior official in Baghdad told a Kurdistan Democratic Party-affiliated journalist on March 30 that “more than a thousand” Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters are believed to have crossed into Iran.[91] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service but many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[92] This confirmation comes after anti-regime media previously reported on March 30 that PMF fighters have deployed to Basij bases in western Iran.[93] The Basij is a paramilitary force that is responsible for civil defense and social control.[94] CTP-ISW assessed on March 30 that the Iranian regime may be mobilizing PMF fighters, in part, to strengthen control over previous protest hotspots.[95] Large protests took place in both Khorramshahr and Abadan during the December 2025-January 2026 protests.[96]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and militia front groups continue to claim attacks against US targets in Iraq and the Middle East. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on March 30 it conducted 19 drone attacks against “enemy” bases in Iraq and the region.[97] Likely front group Saraya Awliya al Dam claimed it conducted five attacks against US bases in the region.[98]

Unspecified European officials told Bloomberg on March 30 that Iran is pushing the Houthis to launch a renewed campaign against international shipping in the Red Sea, contingent on any further US escalation.[99] The officials added that Houthi leadership is divided on how aggressive its actions should be. This report comes after an unspecified journalist in Yemen told Israeli media on March 29 that “additional IRGC experts” recently arrived in Sanaa to strengthen coordination between the Houthis and Iran.[100]

Iranian Internal Security

Iranian media reported that unspecified armed individuals killed a Law Enforcement Command officer in Mirjaveh, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on March 31.[101] No group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing. Sistan and Baluchistan Province is a hotbed for insurgent activity, including attacks by anti-regime groups that frequently target Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.[102]

Iranian internal security forces have reportedly deployed Russian-made Spartak Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) armored vehicles to checkpoints in Tehran.[103] An OSINT account identified that Iranian Counter Terror Special Forces (NOPO) deployed a Spartak MRAP under a bridge between Evin Prison and Enghelab Sports Complex in northern Tehran from a photo circulated by anti-regime media on March 31.[104] NOPO reportedly operates under the LEC Special Units 1st Amir ol Momenin Brigade and has participated in violent protest suppression.[105] A BBC Journalist provided footage in February 2026 of NOPO using Spartak MRAPs in several prominent protests over the years.[106]