Deportation and Forcible Transfer of Ukrainian Citizens, Including Children

Nothing significant to report.

Sociocultural Control

Russia is facilitating admission of vulnerable Ukrainian youth from occupied territories to universities in Russia to Russify them and set conditions for the long-term integration of occupied Ukrainian territories into the Russian sphere of influence. Former pro-Russian separatist leader and self-proclaimed “People’s Governor of Donetsk Oblast” Pavel Gubarev stated on February 25 that Russian nonprofit organization Public Educational Initiative (PEI) facilitates enrollment of vulnerable Ukrainian children from occupied territories to Russian universities.[1] PEI helped facilitate admission of 19 children into Russian universities in 2025 and is currently assisting 50 more. Russia uses educational programs to help form lasting connections between youth from occupied areas and Russia and set multigenerational conditions for the integration of occupied Ukrainian territories into Russia. ISW has previously reported on Russia’s use of the “University Shifts” program, which temporarily places youth from occupied Ukraine in university classes in Russia, to accomplish similar objectives.[2] Gubarev’s role in advertising the PEI program is also noteworthy, given his Russian ultranationalist pro-war stance.[3]

Militarization of Occupied Areas

The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) occupation administration has operationalized the “Narodnaya Druzhina” youth organization to militarize and consolidate control over the security apparatus in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The DNR Narodnaya Druzhina brands itself as a “youth sports organization” that seeks to instill in youth Russian military-patriotic ideals while integrating them into public-facing social projects.[4] The DNR Narodnaya Druzhina reported on March 1 that in the seven years since its founding, it has succeeded in integrating its activists into security forces and worked with youth to hold sports and patriotic events.[5] DNR Head Denis Pushilin claimed that Narodnaya Druzhina has “united” over 4,500 youth in occupied Donetsk Oblast over the past seven years. Servicemembers of the Russian Pyatnashka International Volunteer Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) notably held tactical training sessions for the DNR Narodnaya Druzhina on February 27.[6] The Donetsk Oblast occupation administration is likely using Narodnaya Druzhina as a way to prepare youth for service in the highly militarized security apparatus operating in occupied Ukraine. The insertion of a curated class of Narodnaya Druzhina activists into security forces allows the occupation administration to maintain control over the security apparatus, which is widely used as a tool of violent repression against any dissent in occupied areas. Narodnaya Druzhina’s links with the Russian military are therefore noteworthy, indicating close cooperation and alignment between the armed forces and the security services in maintaining public order in occupied Ukraine.

Administrative and Bureaucratic Control

Occupation authorities are preparing for occupied Luhansk and Kherson Oblasts to participate in September State Duma elections for the first time as part of efforts to further integrate occupied Ukraine into the Russian political sphere. Kremlin newswire TASS claimed on March 1 that Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik instructed occupation authorities to begin preparations for State Duma elections during a meeting of the United Russia regional reporting forum.[7] Pasechnik stated that occupied Luhansk Oblast has two key tasks: to organize polling stations and to elect a patriotic Duma candidate who is loyal to the interests of Russia and occupied Luhansk Oblast.[8] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on March 4 that occupied Kherson Oblast will also participate in State Duma elections for the first time in September, and that the regional United Russia council approved an organizing committee for the party’s preliminary election.[9] Participation in State Duma elections is an important step in Russia’s plans to incorporate occupied Ukraine into the Russian political framework—solidifying the Kremlin’s control over political processes in occupied areas which lending a fabricated guise of legitimacy to the illegal occupation of Ukraine. LNR occupation senator Darya Lantratova claimed on March 1 that occupied Luhansk Oblast’s participation in the upcoming election marks a new stage in its integration into Russia’s political sphere, which is in line with ISW’s assessment that Russia uses elections in occupied territories as a mechanism for political integration.[10] ISW has previously reported on Russia’s use of staged elections as legal theater to create the impression of popular buy-in for occupation.[11]

Russia continues to staff occupation administrations with Russian officials and known regime loyalists. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin appointed on March 2 former Chuvash Republic Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Krasnov to the position of acting Minister of Economic Development for occupied Donetsk Oblast.[12] Krasnov is a native of Cherboksary, Chuvash Republic, and served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development and Property Relations of the Chuvash Republic from 2020 to 2025. Pushilin has been actively staffing the Donetsk Oblast occupation administration with Russians since 2014, and intensified efforts to recruit Russian officials to occupation positions following the 2022 full-scale invasion.[13] Russian opposition outlet Verstka found in 2023 that about half of the mid- and senior-level occupation officials in occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts were Russians.[14] The Kremlin is attempting to consolidate control over governance in occupied Ukraine by purposefully empowering Russian officials or Kremlin loyalists to take up government positions. The Kremlin’s Time of Heroes project, which seeks to install veterans of the war in Ukraine into a variety of government positions, as well as Pushilin’s efforts to employ Russian officials in his occupation administration, supports this wider objective.[15]

Occupation Administration Mismanagement and Internal Dynamics

Nothing significant to report.

Physical and Legal Repressions

Russian authorities continue to arbitrarily detain Crimean Tatars on fabricated terrorism charges related to their alleged links to the Hizb ut-Tahrir pan-Islamist organization. Crimean opposition news outlets Crimean Solidarity, Krym Realii, and the Crimean Tatar Resource Center (CTRC) reported on March 2 that Russian security forces detained Crimean Tatars Yunus Suleymanov and Nariman Seitaliev in occupied Bakhchisarai Raion on February 12.[16] Russian authorities accused both men of participating in the activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a pan-Islamist organization historically active in Crimea and Central Asia. Officers detained Suleymanov and Seitaliev after searching their respective homes and sent them to a pre-trial detention center in occupied Simferopol, where they will remain in custody until at least April 11. According to Seitaliev’s family’s testimony, security forces violently entered his home at four o’clock in the morning, wrestled Seitaliev to the ground, and searched all his belongings.[17] The family alleged that the security officers planted two “suspicious” books on Seitaliev to justify his arrest.[18] The story has not featured in Russian outlets. ISW has long assessed that the Russian occupation administration targets Crimean Tatars on tenuous extremism charges linked to alleged affiliation with Hizb ut-Tahrir to consolidate social control over Crimea.[19] Russian security services detained a group of six Crimean Tatar men on terrorist charges in January 2023, for example.[20] Human rights organizations that reviewed the case noted there was no such evidence of their affiliation with Hizb ut-Tahrir. Russian authorities recently fined academic Lenora Dyulber in January 2026 for producing “extremist materials,” an offense linked to her co-authored book “Crimean Tatars in the Context of the Transformation of the Political Space.”[21] The doctored threat of terror in Crimea serves as a convenient instrument of legal manipulation toward the persecution of Crimean Tatars, ultimately contiguous with a centuries-old Russian campaign of De-Tatarization (Детатаризация) in Crimea.[22] 

Economic and Financial Control

Russia continues to invest in agriculture in occupied Ukraine as part of an effort extract resources, maximize profits, and integrate occupied territories into the Russian economy. Acting Zaporizhia Oblast occupation Minister for Agriculture and Food Policy Gennady Podshivalov told Kremlin newswire TASS on February 27 that his administration plans to harvest 2.5 million tons of crops from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast in 2026.[23] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Agriculture Minister Yevgeny Sorokin told TASS on March 1 that the Luhansk Oblast occupation administration  is creating two grants totaling 15 million rubles ($191 million)  for the purchase of land, machinery, equipment, and animals and plans to allocate two billion rubles over the next two years to dairy farmers.[24] Sorokin also claimed that occupied Luhansk Oblast has received over 9.5 billion rubles ($121 million) for agriculture from the Russian government since 2023, and that Russia is trying to integrate occupied Luhansk Oblast’s agricultural sector into the Russian legal framework. Russia is very likely to export a significant portion of these agricultural resources for its own benefit, as ISW has previously noted.[25] Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported in January 2026, for example, that Russia had exported over 2 billion tons of stolen grain from occupied Ukraine in 2025 alone.[26] Russian grain export from occupied Ukraine is likely to increase in 2026 given the scale of federal investment in agricultural output.

Information Space Control

Nothing significant to report.

Infrastructure and Development Projects

Russian nuclear energy operator Rosenergoatom has officially taken control over information technology (IT) functions at the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP)—the latest in a series of steps to consolidate Russia’s control over ZNPP functions and prepare for its eventual integration into the Russian power grid. The ZNPP occupation authority reported on March 3 that the ZNPP officially transferred all IT functions to communications operator KONSIST-OS.[27] Rosenergoatom fully owns KONSIST-OS, which is an IT and information security (IS) “internal integrator and competence center.”[28] KONSIST-OS notably operates all of the data centers of Rosenergoatom’s Electric Power Division.[29]

KONSIST-OS will reportedly work to improve productivity and automate production processes at the ZNPP.[30] Rosenergoatom’s effective seizure of the IT and IS infrastructure of the ZNPP is a significant inflection in Russia’s ability to restart power generation at the plant and integrate the plant into the Russian power grid, on which ISW has previously reported.[31] KONSIST-OS will also likely enable the transfer of sensitive operational data to Rosenergoatom and enable Rosenergoatom to exercise even more control over the day-to-day operational processes at the plant.

The Russian federal United Institute for Spatial Planning (EIPP) is continuing to scale up its influence over reconstruction and development projects in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The EIPP, which is a subordinate entity to the Russian Ministry of Construction, announced on February 27 that it is working with the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) occupation Ministry of Construction to create a draft territorial planning scheme for the DNR’s self-proclaimed 12 municipal districts and development plans for occupied Bakhmut, Kurakhove, Dokuchaievsk, and Velyka Novosilka.[32] The settlement development plans focus primarily on manufacturing, energy, mining, and raw material exports to Russia.[33] EIPP Director Dina Sattarova stated on February 27 that the EIPP and the Donetsk Oblast occupation administration are prioritizing the development of manufacturing facilities that can create high-value-added final products for export, indicating Russia’s intention to use occupied Ukrainian territory as a productive hub for Russian economic benefit.[34] Sattarova and DNR occupation Internal Policy Head Artem Fomin claimed that the development plans are prioritizing salt mines in Bakhmut, the Kurakhove thermal power plant (TPP) and two dams across the Kurakhove Reservoir, a limestone extraction facility in Dokuchaievsk, and four road bridges in Velyka Novosilka.[35] DNR Chairman Andrey Chertkov stated that EIPP is using the reconstruction of Mariupol as an example of a “successful” development project. Chertkov noted the level of destruction in Mariupol, but did not acknowledge the fact that Russian forces destroyed the city during their campaign to seize it in 2022.[36] Sattarova told Donetsk Oblast occupation officials on February 26 that the EIPP intends to implement similar plans for 12 other occupied settlements by 2027.[37]  ISW has previously reported on previous EIPP development plans in occupied Ukraine that allow the Russian government to profit from occupation, including military and transport infrastructure, and “socio-economic development” projects.[38] ISW continues to assess that the EIPP’s growing influence over development projects in occupied Donetsk Oblast is part of a broader Russian government agenda that aims to reconstruct occupied Ukrainian cities according to Russian principles and profit off occupation.