Toplines

The Kremlin is setting conditions to imminently tighten restrictions on virtual private networks (VPNs) that allow Russians to bypass the Kremlin’s censorship measures. Forbes’ Russian service reported on March 31 that Russian Digital Development Minister Maksut Shadayev met with representatives of major Russian telecommunications providers and digital platforms and requested that telecommunications operators prevent Russians from circumventing blocks on Russian internet access.[1] A source in the IT market and another source at a major internet company told Forbes that Shadayev specifically requested that telecommunications companies make their services inaccessible to Russians through VPNs. Several sources close to the companies present confirmed to Russian outlet RBK on April 2 that Shadayev held this meeting and that representatives from over 20 Russian companies attended, including internet and telecommunication giants Yandex, Ozon, and Gazprom Media.[2] The sources stated that Shadayev instructed the companies to begin blocking VPNs by April 15, but one source noted that the April 15 deadline is more of a ”benchmark.” Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to these reports on April 2, claiming that he knows nothing about such a request.[3] The fact that the Kremlin felt compelled to respond to these reports is notable, and Russian media continue to report on other avenues the Kremlin is taking to pressure telecommunications companies into censoring Russians’ VPN usage. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on March 31, citing sources close to the Ministry of Digital Development, that the ministry may revoke the accreditation of IT companies that allow Russians to access their services while using a VPN.[4] Kommersant reviewed a draft resolution stipulating that IT companies out of compliance are also subject to the removal of their exemption from the value added tax (VAT), an increase in corporate income tax rate from five percent to 25 percent, the right to military deferment, and access to preferential mortgages. Two sources familiar with the relevant government officials told Russian state newspaper Izvestia on April 2 that the Ministry of Digital Development is considering revising the licensure requirements for Russian telecommunications operators in ways that make it easier for the ministry to revoke the licensure of operators it deems have committed “repeated, serious violations of operator license terms” without a court order.[5] The Kremlin has been attempting to restrict Russians’ access to VPNs as part of its intensified censorship campaign and is likely setting conditions to compel Russian telecommunication operators to concede to the Kremlin’s demands without significant pushback.[6]  

A law that took effect on April 1 allows the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) to legally access any Russian organization’s databases without additional authorization. Bloomberg reported on March 31 that a new Russian law grants the FSB the authority to obtain any organization’s databases without a court order, effectively giving the FSB access to corporate databases, telecommunications networks, financial communications, and even Russian scientists’ international contacts.[7] Russian New People party member Alexander Khurudzhi told Bloomberg that there is no oversight mechanism to ensure that the FSB deletes copies or parts of databases, even though the law stipulates that security service officials bear responsibility for unlawful use of copies or parts of databases. The law providing the Russian FSB access to Russians’ personal data through immediate access to databases located in Russian territory follows 2023 efforts to force Russian companies to store data about Russian citizens on servers physically located in Russian territory.[8] Russian officials may be attempting to create “legal” loopholes that allow the government to access mass quantities of data without a court order, as attempting to access such large quantities of data through individual court orders would likely be time-consuming or difficult. The Russian government likely aims to collect this data as part of condition-setting for more government control over different legal and financial systems within Russia.  

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to signal Ukraine’s willingness to offer concessions and to negotiate with Russia. Zelensky stated on April 1 that he discussed his proposal for a temporary ceasefire for the “Easter holidays” (likely the Orthodox Easter on April 12) during a phone call with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner, US Senator Lindsey Graham, and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.[9] Zelensky separately discussed the proposed ceasefire during a call with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer.[10] Russian officials have continuously rejected Ukrainian ceasefire proposals, including Zelensky’s recent proposal, and it is highly unlikely Russia will accept Zelensky’s Easter ceasefire offer.[11]

A Russian Northern Fleet Lieutenant General died in a recent plane crash in occupied Crimea. The BBC’s Russia Service reported on April 2 that the Russian commander of the Northern Fleet’s Mixed Aviation Corps Lieutenant General Alexander Otroshchenko died in an An-26 transport aircraft crash in occupied Crimea on March 31.[12] The BBC’s Russia Service reported that the plane crashed near occupied Kuybyshevo  (approximately 240 kilometers from the frontline), and a source at the site of the crash told Kremlin newswire TASS that the plane “crashed into a rock.”[13] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the aircraft did not suffer external damage and that a technical malfunction caused the plane crash.[14] The Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) opened an investigation into the crash on April 1.[15] The BBC’s Russia Service noted that Otroshchenko became the commander of the mixed aviation corps of the Northern Fleet in 2024 after heading the naval aviation of the Black Sea and Northern fleets and serving as a commander of the Northern Fleet’s 45th Air Force and Air Defense Army.[16] The BBC’s Russia Service reported that Otroshchenko is the 14th Russian general to die since the beginning of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Ukraine’s European allies continue to support Ukraine’s drone innovation efforts. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 2 that Ukraine and Romania are working to launch joint drone production projects with 200 million euros (roughly $230 million) in funding from the European Union’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program.[17] The Ukrainian MoD noted that the initiative will establish drone production in Romania. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s partners stand to benefit from continuing to aid the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) with joint production, as Ukraine’s experience in an accelerated offense-defense technological cycle will allow its partners to bolster their own defenses and domestic DIBs.[18]

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure overnight on April 1 to 2. Russian opposition outlet Astra geolocated footage published on April 2 and assessed that the footage shows fires burning near the Bashneft-Novoil Oil Refinery in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, after a reported Ukrainian drone strike.[19] Geolocated footage published on April 2 shows fires burning in the direction of the refinery.[20] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst assessed that the geolocated footage of fires at the refinery published on April 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces struck near the facility’s AVT-5 unit, a critical component of the oil refining process.[21] Republic of Bashkortostan Head Radiy Khabirov claimed on April 2 that Russian forces downed several Ukrainian drones approaching oil refineries in Ufa, and that drone debris fell in the industrial zone of Ufa and started a fire at an unspecified enterprise.[22]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on April 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Sumy Oblast, including northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka; north of Sumy City near Mala Korchakivka, Kindrativka, and Andriivka; and southeast of Sumy City near Novodmytrivka, on April 1 and 2.[23]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Veterynarne, Starytsya, Izbytske, and Dehtyarne on April 1 and 2.[24]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Zybyne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[25]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Kolodyazne on April 2, but ISW has not collected any evidence to assess that Russian forces made any advances.[26]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked within Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka, Novoosynove, Pishchane, and Kivsharivka on April 1 and 2.[27]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Radkivka (north of Kupyansk).[28]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced southwest of Nadiya (east of Borova) on a prior date.[29]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Nadiya during a motorized assault of an unspecified size.[30]

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; and south of Borova toward Korovii Yar on April 1 and 2.[31]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA) are reportedly operating near Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova).[32]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Stavky (north of Lyman) and north of Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk).[33]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on April 1 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position northwest of Ozerne (southeast of Lyman) – an area in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained positions.[34]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve and toward Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman near Stavky; east of Slovyansk near Yampil; and southeast of Slovyansk near Riznykivka, Kalenyky, and Lypivka and toward Kryva Luka and Rai-Oleksandrivka on April 1 and 2.[35] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Dibrova (south of Lyman), Ozerne (southeast of Lyman), and southern Yampil.[36]

Order of Battle: Artillery crews and first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 31st Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions southwest of Stavky.[37] Drone operators of the 6th Separate Hyperion Unmanned Systems Battalion (25th CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces northwest of Ozerne.[38]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 31 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka and on its southwestern outskirts, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in these areas.[39] Geolocated footage published on March 31 shows first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) striking Ukrainian positions and Ukrainian-occupied buildings in central Ivanopillya (south of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[40]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 1 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in southern Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA)

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Malynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Kleban-Byk, and Pleshchiivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka and Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka, Pavlivka, and Sofiivka on April 1 and 2.[41]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment and positions near Novohryhorivka (southwest of Druzhkivka), Dovha Balka (southeast of Druzhkivka), and in Druzhkivka.[42] Drone operators of the 1307th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian servicemembers near Kostyantynivka.[43] Drone operators of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[44]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Dobropillya near Vilne and southeast of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas on April 1 and 2, but ISW has not collected any evidence to assess that Russian forces made any advances.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne, Serhiivka, and Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne on April 1 and 2.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Hryshyne.[47]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are intercepting Ukrainian drones west of Malynivka.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Muravka; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Filiya on April 1 and 2, but did not advance.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on April 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Oleksandrivka itself; northeast of Oleksandrivka near Sichneve, Andriivka-Klevtsove, and Ivanivka; southeast of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad, Novohryhorivka, Berezove, Vorone, and Krasnohirske, and toward Sosnivka, Vyshneve, Verbove, and Stepove; and southwest of Oleksandrivka toward Nove Zaporizhzhia on April 1 and 2.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ternuvate (southwest of Oleksandrivka) and from Dobropasove (east of Oleksandrivka) toward Hai (south of Dobropasove).[51]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Tykhe (east of Oleksandrivka).[52]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on April 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Hulyaipole near Olenokostyantynivka, Zelene, Pryluky, Tsvitkove, and Svyatopetrivka and toward Verkhnya Tersa; north of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka; southwest of Hulyaipole near Hulyaipilske and Myrne; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and Hirke and toward Charivne on April 1 and 2.[53]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 1st Unmanned Systems Battalion (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kopani (northwest of Hulyaipole).[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Shcherbaky; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk and toward Lukyanivske on April 1 and 2.[55]

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that the Russian command deployed additional reserves to the Russian 58th CAA’s (Southern Military District [SMD]) area of responsibility (AoR) in western Zaporizhia Oblast to prevent an anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive. The milblogger added that Russian forces have also redeployed additional air defense elements and Yolka interceptor drones in this direction due to intensified Ukrainian drone strikes.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on April 2.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea overnight on April 1 to 2. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on April 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian An-72P transport aircraft, an Orion drone facility, and a P-37 Mech mobile radar station near occupied Krasnosilske (roughly 121 kilometers from the frontline).[56] Geolocated footage published on April 2 shows Ukrainian drone operators striking the An-72P, Orion drone facility, and the P-37 Mech mobile radar station near occupied Krasnosilske.[57]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 172 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones, of which about 120 were Shaheds, from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[58] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 147 drones, that 22 drones struck 12 locations, and that drone debris fell at eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian, port, commercial, and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv and Kharkiv cities and Odesa Oblast.[59] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure caused power outages in Kharkiv, Sumy, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Cherkasy, and Odesa oblasts on the morning of April 2.[60]

Significant Activity in Belarus 

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Belarusian and Russian representatives attended a defense secretariat meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Moscow on April 2. Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin attended the meeting, which Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov chaired.[61] Delegations from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan also attended the ministerial meeting.