Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 3, 2026
Toplines
Ukraine continues to generate leverage against Russia by accomplishing tactical, operational, and strategic battlespace effects. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 3 that Ukrainian and UK intelligence indicates that the frontline situation is the best that it has been for Ukraine in the last 10 months (since June 2025).[1] Zelensky also stated that Russian forces were previously leveraging poor visibility during foggy weather to conduct attacks and infiltration — a phenomenon which ISW has previously assessed hinders Ukrainian drone operations and allows Russian forces to conduct ground operations — but that the approaching spring weather, with sunny days, will make it difficult for Russian forces to move unnoticed.[2] Ukraine also achieved tactical and operational successes that may be increasingly generating strategic effects throughout late winter 2025 and early spring.[3] Ukrainian forces began making significant tactical gains in southern Ukraine in late January 2026 that created cascading operational effects on the front and forced Russian forces to choose between defending against the Ukrainian counterattacks or allocating manpower and resources to other sectors of the frontline.[4] ISW previously assessed that the Ukrainian counterattacks may have even disrupted Russian plans for the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive campaign plan.[5] Russian officials have repeatedly attempted to perpetuate a false narrative that the Ukrainian frontlines are on the verge of collapse in an effort to convince the West to capitulate to Russian demands that Russia cannot secure militarily.[6] Ukraine’s recent successes indicate that Ukraine is not at risk of collapse, however.
Ukraine’s technological innovation efforts appear to be increasingly generating operational effects against Russia. Zelensky reported on April 3 that Ukrainian drone strikes alone killed or seriously wounded 33,988 Russian servicemembers in March 2026 and that Ukrainian artillery and other strikes have eliminated another 1,363 Russian servicemembers.[7] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on March 31 that Russia’s recruitment rate in March 2026 was below its battlefield loss rate for the fourth month in a row (since December 2025).[8] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on April 1 that Ukrainian forces shot down or suppressed 89.9 percent of Russian missiles and drones in March 2026.[9] These drone innovations are increasing Ukraine’s lethality and complicating Russia’s manpower complications—all of which may generate long-term operational and even strategic impacts on Russian battlefield capabilities.
Swedish authorities boarded a Russian shadow fleet tanker on April 3 that was suspected of causing an oil spill in the Baltic Sea. The Swedish Coast Guard reported on April 3 that the Swedish Police Authority and the Swedish Coast Guard boarded the Flora 1 oil tanker east of Gotland, Sweden, under suspicion that the vessel caused an oil spill east of Gotland.[10] The Flora 1 is on the European Union (EU) sanctions list.[11] Swedish Minister for Civil Defense Carl-Oskar Bohlin stated on April 3 that Swedish authorities boarded the ship south of Ystad (on the southern tip of Sweden).[12] Bohlin implied that the vessel is part of the Russian shadow fleet. Data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that the Flora 1 was sailing under a Cameroonian flag and that the ship’s automatic identification systems (AIS) show the tanker arriving in St. Petersburg on March 15, at which point the ship turned off its AIS until it left the port on April 1. ISW has previously assessed that Russia’s ability to sell oil is partially a function of its ability to transport it, and continued EU efforts against the Russian shadow fleet will degrade Russia’s ability to transport oil.[13] European states have been increasingly seizing Russian shadow fleet tankers in recent months.[14]
Key Takeaways
- Ukraine continues to generate leverage against Russia by accomplishing tactical, operational, and strategic battlespace effects.
- Swedish authorities boarded a Russian shadow fleet tanker on April 3 that was suspected of causing an oil spill in the Baltic Sea.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- Russian forces launched 10 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, 25 Kh-101 cruise missiles, two Iskander-K cruise missiles, and 542 drones toward Ukraine on the night of April 2 to 3.
- Russian forces will likely shift their long-range strike campaign toward Ukrainian water supply and logistics targets in Spring and Summer 2026.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed the April 1 to 2 Ukrainian drone strike against an oil refinery in the Republic of Bashkortostan. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on April 3 that Ukrainian forces struck the Bashneft-Novoil oil refinery in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, overnight on April 1 to 2, starting a fire.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the refinery is located roughly 1,400 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Bashneft-Novoil refinery produces high-quality marine, hydraulic, and motor lubricants, and that the facility processes about seven million tons of oil per year. ISW previously reported on this strike on April 2, 2026.[16]
Reuters reported on April 2 that satellite imagery captured by US spatial intelligence company Vantor indicates that Ukrainian drone strikes destroyed at least 40 percent of storage facilities at Russia’s Primorsk port in Leningrad Oblast in March 2026.[17] Reuters noted that the satellite imagery shows damage to at least eight reservoirs with a capacity of 50,000 cubic meters each. Reuters reported that data from the Russian state-controlled petroleum company Transneft indicates that the Primorsk port has 14 crude oil reservoirs and four facilities to store diesel at its main oil depot and that the port can handle one million barrels of oil per day. Industry sources told Reuters that Russia used two of the eight seriously damaged tanks to handle diesel.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk and Sumy oblasts on April 3 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City near Sopych; north of Sumy City near Mala Korchakivka, Andriivka, and Kindrativka; northeast of Sumy City toward Myropillya; southeast of Sumy City near Novodmytrivka; and southeast of Glushkovo, Kursk Oblast near Kucherov, on April 2 and 3.[18]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in Sumy Oblast.[19]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 3 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Veterynarne and Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Hrafske, Symynivka, Starytsya, Tsehelne, Vilcha, Izbytske, Vovchanski Khutory, and Verkhnya Pysarivka on April 2 and 3.[20]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces on the southeastern outskirts of Vovchanski Khutory.[21] Drone operators of the pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[22]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Shevyakivka and Chuhunivka and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Kolodyazne on April 2 and 3, but ISW has not collected evidence to assess that Russian forces made any advances.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[24]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces attacked in Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka, Novoosynove, Pishchane, and Kivsharivka on April 2 and 3 but did not advance.[25]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 3 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka; east of Borova near Nadiya and Novoyehorivka; southeast of Borova toward Novoserhiivka; and south of Borova toward Korovii Yar on April 2 and 3.[26]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Hrekivka, Druzhelyubivka, and Olhivka (all southeast of Borova).[27]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast overnight on April 2 to 3. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on April 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M1 air defense system near occupied Liubymivka (roughly 132 kilometers from the frontline), fuel tanks near occupied Shchotove (roughly 107 kilometers from the frontline), and an equipment depot near occupied Valyanivske (roughly 137 kilometers from the frontline).[28] Geolocated footage published on April 3 shows Ukrainian drone operators striking a Russian Buk-M1 air defense system north of occupied Liubymivka.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 3 that Ukrainian forces also struck ammunition depots near occupied Rovenky (roughly 122 kilometers from the frontline) and occupied Shakhtarske (roughly 139 kilometers from the frontline) and a fuel and lubricants depot near occupied Kondryuche (roughly 144 kilometers from the frontline).[30] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on April 3 that Ukrainian drones struck railway infrastructure in occupied Antratsitovsky Okrug, damaging tanker trucks, and also struck in Rovenky.[31]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on April 3 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked toward Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve and Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman toward Stavky; east of Slovyansk near Platonivka; and southeast of Slovyansk toward Dibrova and Rai-Oleksandrivka on April 2 and 3.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Drobysheve, Svyatohirsk, and Yarova (northwest of Lyman).[33]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Slovyansk direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration in occupied Shandryholove (on the frontline northwest of Slovyansk) on the night of April 1 to 2.[34]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and equipment in the Lyman direction.[35]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on April 3 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; south of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Berestok, Illinivka, Kleban-Byk, and Pleshchiivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and toward Mykolaipillya; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on April 2 and 3.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Chasiv Yar.[37]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in Dovha Balka (southeast of Druzhkivka).[38] Artillery and other elements of the 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD), including Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky (KVN) fiber optic FPV drone operators of the 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment of its 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment, are striking Ukrainian servicemembers and positions in Kostyantynivka.[39] Howitzer crews of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA), in coordination with reconnaissance elements of the 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces), 77th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD), and the 1219th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are striking Ukrainian positions in Illinivka and Dovha Balka.[40] Elements of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating airstrikes against Ukrainian positions near Druzhkivka.[41] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drones in the Druzhkivka direction.[42] Artillery elements of the 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka direction.[43] Elements of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian equipment in Osykove (southeast of Druzhkivka).[44] Drone operators of the Zmey Gorynych detachment (Russian Federal Security Service’s [FSB] DNR Directorate) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction.[45] Drone operators of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[46]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Vilne and Toretske; and southeast of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas on April 3, but ISW has not collected evidence to assess that Russian forces made any advances.[47]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 177th Separate Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are striking Ukrainian positions near and within Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya).[48] FPV drone operators of the 57th Separate Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novofedorivka (southwest of Dobropillya).[49]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 3 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka, Vasylivka, and Serhiivka; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske and toward Shevchenko; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske on April 2 and 3.[50]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Pokrovsk direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration in occupied Kotlyne on the night of April 1 to 2.[51]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian equipment in southern Svitle (north of Pokrovsk).[52]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka and Novomykolaivka; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Filiya on April 2 and 3, but did not advance.[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on April 3 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Sichneve, Ivanivka, and Andriivka-Klevtsove and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Krasnohirske, Oleksandrohrad, Vorone, and Zlahoda and toward Stepove, Vyshneve, Verbove, and Sosnivka on April 2 and 3.[54]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against the Russian forces near rear in the Oleksandrivka direction overnight on April 1 to 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian troop concentration in Berezove (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[55]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Kolomiitsi (east of Oleksandrivka).[56] Drone operators of the 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian servicemembers near Nove Pole (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[57]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast overnight on April 2 to 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian equipment depot near occupied Staromlynivka (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline).[58]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on April 3 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Hulyaipole near Olenokostyantynivka, Varvarivka, Svyatopetrivka, Zelene, and Pryluky and toward Verkhnya Tersa and Vozdvyzhivka; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke; southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne and Charivne; and west of Hulyaipole near Hirke and toward Hulyaipilske, Zaliznychne, and Staroukrainka on April 2 and 3.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipilske and Vozdvyzhivka.[60]
The senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on April 3 that Russian forces are deploying relatively elite groups of naval infantry and airborne troops (VDV) to compensate for heavy losses and are continuing intensive combat engagements in the Hulyaipole direction.[61]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) southwest of Rizdvyanka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[62] Drone operators of the 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in Zaporizhia Oblast.[63]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot near occupied Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole) on the night of April 1 to 2.[64]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Stepnohirsk (northwest of Orikhiv).[65]
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Shcherbaky; and northwest of Orikhiv near Zapasne, Mahdalynivka, Prymorske, and Stepnohirsk and toward Lukyanivske on April 2 and 3.[66]
Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[67]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 3 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian equipment depots near occupied Chervone Pole (roughly 86 kilometers from the frontline) and Zoryane (roughly 62 kilometers from the frontline), a troop concentration near occupied Rozivka (roughly 64 kilometers from the frontline), and an oil depot near occupied Molochansk (roughly 33 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on April 2 to 3.[68] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 3 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Kulikovsky training ground near occupied Novopetrivka (roughly 98 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on April 1 to 2.[69]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kherson Oblast, including northeast of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge, on April 2 and 3, but did not advance.[70]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian communications equipment in the Kherson direction.[71]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 3 that a Russian Su-30 jet crashed in occupied Crimea during a training flight, but that the crew ejected safely before the crash.[72]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Nothing Significant To Report.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://suspilne dot media/1280488-nini-na-fronti-najkrasa-situacia-za-ostanni-10-misaciv-zelenskij-z-posilannam-na-dani-britanskoi-rozvidki/
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2025/
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-updates-3/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2026/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/
[7] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2040073322994540612; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18531
[8] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2152; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/
[9] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/15406
[10] https://www.kustbevakningen dot se/nyheter/fartyg-under-sanktioner-misstanks-ha-orsakat-utslapp-av-olja-i-ostersjon/
[11] https://eur-lex.europa dot eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32025R1494
[12] https://x.com/CarlOskar/status/2039964000801239446
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2026/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2026/
[15] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36859 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2026/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2026/
[17] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-primorsk-oil-terminal-lost-40-storage-drone-attacks-satellite-images-2026-04-02/
[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36838; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36833; https://t.me/uvkkursk/304; https://t.me/wargonzo/33301; https://t.me/severnnyi/7388
[19] https://t.me/mod_russia/62363
[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36861; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36838; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20376; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36833; https://t.me/severnnyi/7388; https://t.me/dva_majors/90648; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41473/; https://t.me/wargonzo/33301; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41464
[21] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2039735086862737669; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/16814; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41473
[22] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6470
[23] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41473/; https://t.me/wargonzo/33301; https://t.me/gvZapad/18214
[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/90648
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36838 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20376; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36833; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41464; https://t.me/gvZapad/18214; https://t.me/gvZapad/18214
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36861; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36838 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20376; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36833; https://t.me/wargonzo/33301; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41464
[27] https://t.me/gvZapad/18216
[28] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2166
[29] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2040007798352642400; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2166
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36858
[31] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/4890
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36861 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36838 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20376 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36833 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33301 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/18214 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41464
[33] https://t.me/gvZapad/18214
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36859
[35] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/1307 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/205367
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36861 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36838 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36833 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33301 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41459
[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41459
[38] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2039768860769804651; https://t.me/nm_dnr/15195
[39] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2039735535481086328 ; https://t.me/rusich13sho/1508 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2039779995363459470 ; https://t.me/shock3OA/6066
[40] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15196 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2039731421216911592 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2039731423796416896
[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/90658
[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/90657
[43] https://t.me/mod_russia/62387
[44] https://t.me/Osintpen/2745; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/1306
[45] https://t.me/tass_agency/369296
[46] https://t.me/dva_majors/90655
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36861; https://t.me/wargonzo/33301
[48] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2040034113051050315; https://t.me/red_army1/10470
[49] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15197
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36861; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36838; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36833; https://t.me/wargonzo/33301; https://t.me/dva_majors/90648; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41459
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36859
[52] https://t.me/Osintpen/2745; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/1306
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36861; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36838; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36833
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36861 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36838 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13629 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36833
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36859
[56] https://t.me/voin_dv/19166
[57] https://t.me/voin_dv/19171
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36858
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36861; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36838 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13629; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36833; https://t.me/dva_majors/90648; https://t.me/wargonzo/33301; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41459;
[60] https://t.me/voin_dv/19169
[61] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/03/v-hutirecz-zajshov-vanka-flagovtyk-na-gulyajpilskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-kydayut-sotni-svoyih-soldativ-na-ubij/
[62] https://t.me/voin_dv/19170
[63] https://t.me/voin_dv/19168
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36859
[65] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2039741326673981522; https://t.me/BatalionBratstvo/1614
[66] https://t.me/wargonzo/33301 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/90648 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36838 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13629 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36833
[67] https://t.me/mod_russia/62386
[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36858
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36859
[70] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13629 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36833 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36838 ;
[71] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41470
[72] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1081847
[73] https://t.me/kpszsu/59417
[74] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/28560; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1280146-bacimo-so-vorog-zduriv-u-harkovi-za-dobu-zafiksuvali-sonajmense-20-vlucan-rosijskih-bpla/; https://t.me/synegubov/20874; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/61042; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/03/poshkodzheni-bagatopoverhivky-ta-avto-ryatuvalnyky-pokazaly-naslidky-masovanogo-udaru-po-kyyivshhyni/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/61072 ; https://suspilne dot media/zhytomyr/1280362-u-korosteni-na-zitomirsini-cutno-vibuhi-so-vidomo/; https://t.me/zhytomyrskaODA/16524; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/03/naslidky-masovanoyi-ataky-na-zhytomyrshhyni-9-budynkiv-zrujnovano-ponad-100-poshkodzheno/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1279718-v-odesi-prolunav-vibuh-pid-cas-povitranoi-trivogi-3/ ; https://t.me/kpszsu/59294 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/59292
[75] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4836 ; https://suspilne dot media/1280294-rf-prodovzue-udari-po-energoinfrastrukturi-ukraini-u-sesti-oblastah-e-znestrumleni-spozivaci-ukrenergo/ ;
[76] https://suspilne dot media/1280416-zelenskij-za-danimi-rozvidki-rf-planue-udari-po-logistici-ta-vodopostacannu/
[77] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2026/
