Toplines

The Kremlin is likely setting informational conditions to expand Russian demands of Ukraine and NATO by making it clear that its current demands are no longer sufficient. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a question on March 11 about whether Russia remains committed to the 2022 Istanbul proposals, stating that “the whole reality has changed.”[1] Russian state media framed Peskov’s statement as saying that the 2022 Istanbul proposals no longer “correspond to the changed situation,” but did not define what reality Peskov is referring to.[2] Other Russian officials and information space voices amplified and agreed with Peskov, which may suggest that the Kremlin could be preparing to put forth new demands. Russian Federation Council International Affairs Committee Chairperson Grigory Karasin claimed that the 2022 Istanbul proposals and the “caravan of international relations” are now “irrelevant” as four years have passed and Ukraine’s leadership was and remains “unwilling to negotiate.”[3] Karasin called on Ukraine to “end this adventure,” likely meaning that Ukraine should capitulate to Russia’s demands. Presenter at Russian state-run television channel Perviy Kanal, Dmitry Simes, agreed with Peskov and claimed that the geopolitical realities in Europe became more threatening to Russia since the 2022 Istanbul proposals.[4] Peskov and others’ use of “realities” may also be referring to the phrase “battlefield reality,” which Kremlin officials have frequently used as part of their cognitive warfare effort aimed at falsely portraying the frontline as facing imminent collapse and Russia as advancing on all frontlines.[5] Recent Ukrainian counterattacks, particularly in the Kupyansk, Oleksandrivka, Hulyaipole, and Zaporizhia directions, disprove this cognitive warfare effort.[6]

The 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft document stipulated that Russia would be considered a neutral “guarantor state” of Ukraine even though Russia is the aggressor in the war; that Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would have veto power over a mechanism to respond to future aggression in Ukraine; and that Ukraine commit to neutrality, severe restrictions on military size and composition, and never accepting military assistance from its allies.[7] The Kremlin has frequently referred to the 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft document as the basis for an appropriate peace agreement to justify Russia’s rejection of meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine, but the Istanbul proposals are already more expansive than the reported draft peace agreements under consideration.[8] The Kremlin has consistently doubled down or expanded on its maximalist demands in Ukraine that amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation and has shown no willingness to compromise. The Kremlin may intend to use these statements to further push Ukraine and the United States into making large, rapid concessions in pursuit of Russia’s war aims.

Ukrainian forces conducted a Storm Shadow cruise missile strike against a critical Russian microchip manufacturing plant in Bryansk City on March 10. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on March 10 that Ukrainian forces conducted a Storm Shadow cruise missile strike against the Kremniy El microchip factory in Bryansk City on March 10 and reported that the strike significantly damaged the factory’s production facilities.[9] A Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) regiment reported that the strike marked the first Ukrainian strike against a strategic Russian defense industrial base (DIB) facility in which Ukrainian forces employed a drone to provide real-time fire correction, allowing Ukrainian forces to conduct an effective strike with a relatively small number of missiles.[10] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst reported on March 11 that satellite imagery taken after the strike indicates that five missiles struck the factory‘s Building No. 4 and assessed that the inflicted damage will likely force Russia to decommission the workshop inside.[11] The Kremniy El microchip factory claims that it is Russia’s second largest producer by volume of microchips for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[12] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported on March 10 that the plant supplies Russia’s state defense conglomerate Almaz-Antey, which produces air defense systems, and the state corporation Tactical Missiles Corporation, which manufactures cruise missiles, including the Kh-59, Kh-69, Kh-101, and Kh-555 missiles that Russia uses to strike Ukraine.[13]

The Kremlin attempted to downplay the significance of the Ukrainian strike against the Kremniy El factory. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed on March 11 that the strike targeted civilians and that Ukraine cannot conduct such strikes without the United Kingdom (UK) and other NATO intelligence sharing, portraying the strike as an attempt by the UK and other Western countries to derail the US-Ukrainian-Russian trilateral negotiations.[14] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, and other Russian officials and State Duma deputies echoed the MFA’s accusations of UK involvement and claimed that the strike targeted civilians.[15] These Russian accusations are attempts to downplay Ukrainian long-range strike capabilities and to deflect from Russia’s intransigence in the peace process by blaming the UK for intelligence sharing with Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s efforts to downplay and misrepresent the Ukrainian strike against the Kremniy El factory sparked backlash among Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, however. Russian milbloggers rejected the contradictory Russian state efforts to downplay the significance of the strike and criticized the Russian MoD’s failure to protect one of Russia’s largest and most critical DIB facilities.[16] Some milbloggers criticized poor Russian air defense and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, noting that “no one” is asking how many missiles that Russia managed to down, likely criticizing Russian authorities for failing to provide transparent reports regarding the Ukrainian strikes against the plant and Russian air defense performance.[17] Russian milbloggers reiterated that the plant was a major producer of high-frequency transistors necessary for Russian military communications and EW devices and components for Yars, Bulava, and Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) systems — claiming that it will be difficult to replace the specialists whom the strike killed.[18] Russian milbloggers also complained about Russian missile shortages, inadequate EW capabilities, failure to disable Ukrainian airfields that facilitated strikes against the plant, and the Russian inability to repair damaged air defense systems due to sanctions.[19]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Germany delivered an unspecified number of PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot air defense systems on March 10.[20] Zelensky stated that the March 10 delivery is part of 35 air defense missiles that Ukraine’s partners promised Ukraine during the last Ramstein format meeting on February 13.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces likely continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian chemical plants overnight on March 10 to 11. Russian opposition outlet Astra geolocated footage published on March 11 and assessed that the footage showed a fire at the KuybyshevAzot chemical plant in Tolyatti, Samara Oblast.[21] Astra reported that residents reported a fire at one of the plant’s workshops during a drone raid alert.[22] Astra reported that KuybyshevAzot is one of the leading chemical plants in Russia, producing caprolactam and nitrogen fertilizers. Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed that Russian forces downed Ukrainian drones over the oblast early in the morning of March 11.[23] Perm Krai Head Dmitry Makhonin claimed on March 11 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against an industrial facility in Gubakha.[24] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported on March 11 that residents speculated on Telegram that Makhonin may have been referring to the Metafrax Chemical Plant.[25] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Metafrax Chemical Plant in September 2025.[26]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on March 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 11 that Russian forces seized Chervona Zorya (on the international border roughly 95 kilometers northwest of Sumy City).[27] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the seizure of the settlement.[28]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Sopych and north of Sumy City near Mala Korchakivka on March 10 and 11.[29]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[30]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Vovchanski Khutory, and Hrafske and toward Zybyne on March 10 and 11.[31]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction (northeast of Kharkiv City) reported on March 11 that Russian forces initially commit poorly trained infantry en masse to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses through numerical superiority and later commit better-trained troops in fewer numbers.[32]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MOD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv direction.[33]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on March 10 and 11, but ISW has not collected any evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 10 shows Ukrainian forces clearing a substation north of Kivsharivka (southeast of Kupyansk), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the area.[35]

Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Kucherivka on March 10 and 11.[36]

A Russian milblogger claimed on March 11 that the Russian military command is redeploying elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Control) (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) from the Vovchansk direction (northeast of Kharkiv City) to the Kupyansk direction.[37]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka and southeast of Borova near Cherneshchyna on March 10 and 11.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksandrivka (south of Borova).[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on March 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Slovyansk near Dronivka; east of Slovyansk near Rai-Oleksandrivka, Platonivka, Riznykivka, Kryva Luka, and Zakitne; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka and toward Pazeno and Yampil on March 10 and 11.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Svyatohirsk (north of Slovyansk).[41]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported that Russian forces are using Mavic first-person view (FPV) drones to guide infiltration groups.[42] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces provide infiltrators with Global Positioning System (GPS) trackers and directly send route coordinates to infiltrators’ cell phones, allowing the infiltrators to navigate toward designated positions while moving on foot. The spokesperson added that Russian prisoners of war (POWs) claimed that Russian military commanders lied to them that Ukrainian forces were not present in the infiltration areas.

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Slovyansk direction reported that Ukrainian drone operators are striking Russian vehicles at depths of 10 to 15 kilometers behind the frontline.[43] The commander stated that Russian forces continue to employ infiltration tactics in the area and are increasingly conducting logistics on quad bikes, motorcycles, and minibuses. The commander added that Ukrainian forces can more effectively shell Russian targets in favorable weather conditions.

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported that the majority of Russian infantry in the area are contract soldiers primarily motivated by financial incentives, and that about 90 percent of captured Russian POWs stated that they were financially motivated to fight in Ukraine.[44] The spokesperson stated that Russian force composition in the Slovyansk direction also includes former prisoners and individuals mobilized from occupied Ukraine. The spokesperson added that some of the prisoners serving in Russian units were imprisoned on fabricated charges before their deployment.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 9 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position east of Kostyantynivka, indicating that Russian forces infiltrated the fields east of Kostyantynivka on a prior date.[45] ISW assesses that this footage is archival and that Russian forces no longer maintain this position. Geolocated footage published on March 9 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian servicemembers north of Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced north of Ivanopillya.[46] Geolocated footage published on March 11 shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian position southwest of Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka).[47] Artillery is an area-of-effect weapon, and its usage indicates that Russian forces likely do not maintain a presence southwest of Berestok.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on March 10 and 11 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions in southern Kostyantynivka and eastern Illinivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[48] Artillery is an area-of-effect weapon, and its usage indicates that Russian forces likely do not maintain a presence in southern Kostyantynivka and eastern

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Novopavlivka on March 10 and 11.[49]

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on March 10 that both Ukrainian and Russian forces primarily focus on striking drone operators and drone command and control infrastructure in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka direction.[50] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are beginning to prioritize strikes against Ukrainian logistics.

Order of Battle: Artillery crews of the Russian 1st Krasnodar Battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are shelling Ukrainian positions and drone control points in Illinivka with reconnaissance support from the 10th Tank Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) and 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD).[51] Drone operators, artillery crews, and other elements of the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps [AC], under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces), 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA), and the 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[52] Drone operators of the Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in the Kostyantynivka direction.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on March 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and toward Novyi Donbas and southeast of Dobropillya near Ivanivka on March 10 and 11.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Vilne (east of Dobropillya).[55]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dobropillya tactical area reported on March 11 that Russian forces likely maintain their goals of seizing Dobropillya and Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya and north of Pokrovsk).[56] The brigade reported that Russian forces recently conducted a roughly company-sized motorized assault consisting of 12 all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) in an attempt to seize Dobropillya and Bilytske, but that Ukrainian forces repelled the assault. The brigade reported that Russian forces struggle to extend logistics into contested “gray zones” or to infiltrate Russian positions in Ukraine’s near rear. An intelligence officer in the Ukrainian brigade reported on March 11 that Russian forces are struggling to advance because muddy fields are inhibiting motorized and infantry operations, therefore reducing the number of Russian assaults in the area.[57] The intelligence officer reported that Russian forces are compensating for reduced ground operations with increased drone operations and are operating a significant number of Molniya and Lancet loitering munitions in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR). The intelligence officer reported that Russian forces in the area are still struggling to find an alternative for Starlink to maintain communications during assaults.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 120th Naval Infantry Division (Baltic Fleet, newly formed from the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 11 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 11 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember northwest of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[59] Geolocated footage published on February 24 and geolocated on March 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers in northwestern Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[60] ISW assesses that these changes did not occur within the last 24 hours.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske on March 10 and 11.[61]

Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction are continuing to divert Russian resources from the Pokrovsk direction. Spokesperson of the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces, Volodymyr Polevyi, reported on March 10 that Russian forces appear to have reduced the intensity of KAB guided glide bomb strikes in the Pokrovsk direction, possibly due to Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions diverting Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) assets.[62] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces had previously conducted about 25 percent of their total KAB strikes against the Pokrovsk direction in recent months. The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces maintain fire control over key roads and entrances leading into Pokrovsk, while Russian forces exploit urban terrain to conceal personnel and equipment and stage attacks toward areas north of Pokrovsk and Hryshyne. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces lack established defensive positions within Hryshyne, although Russian forces retain a manpower advantage in the area. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces have redeployed unspecified elements from the Pokrovsk direction to the Oleksandrivka direction.[63] The spokesperson added that Russian forces are flying fewer drones deep behind Ukrainian lines following the February 1 Starlink blocking.[64] The spokesperson stated that Russian drones previously operated up to 50 kilometers behind the frontline but are now largely limited to a 15-to-20-kilometer zone.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on March 11 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 9 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember northwest of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka) during a Russian infiltration mission that ISW assesses did not change the control of terrain or the FEBA.[65] ISW assesses that this change did not occur in the last 24 hours.

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself and northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka and Novomykolaivka on March 10 and 11.[66]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember behind a vehicle in Novohryhorivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces likely liberated the settlement.[67]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Novohryhorivka and toward Verbove on March 10 and 11.[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hai (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[69]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on March 11 that fighting continues for Novohryhorivka and Berezove (southeast of Oleksandrivka) near the administrative border of Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[70] Voloshyn noted that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) continue to operate in the Oleksandrivka direction and that heavy losses have rendered the 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA) combat ineffective. Voloshyn reported that the commander of the 90th Tank Division ordered military police to deploy Russian servicemembers from other units, who were detained for minor infractions while moving through the division’s AoR, to replenish the 6th Tank Regiment.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (90th Tank Division) are reportedly operating in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[71]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of March 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 11 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post in occupied Avdiivka (roughly 44 kilometers from the front line) and a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Shyroka Balka (roughly 112 kilometers from the front line).[72] Geolocated footage published on March 11 shows a large fire near Shyroka Balka.[73]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 11 shows Ukrainian forces clearing a Russian-occupied residential building and basement in southeastern Rizdvyanka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[74]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Rizdvyanka.[75]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Rizdvyanka, Tsvitkove, Varvarivka, Svyatopetrivka, Staroukrainka, and Verkhnya Tersa and toward Vozdvyzhivka; north of Hulyaipole near Zarichne; west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and Hirke; and southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne and toward Hulyaipilske on March 10 and 11.[76] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacked near Rizdvyanka, Vozdvyzhivka, and Pryluky (northwest of Hulyaipole).[77]

Order of Battle: FPV drones of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Lyubitske (northwest of Hulyaipole).[78] Drone operators of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly reconnoitering near Vozdvyzhivka and Rizdvyanka.[79] Drone operators of the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA) are reportedly in the Vozdvyzhivka direction.[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk and toward Mahdalynivka, southeast of Orikhiv near Luhivske and Bilohirya, and west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky on March 10 and 11.[81]

Drone operators of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported March 11 that Russian forces are increasingly using cheap Molniya fixed-wing drones to strike both Ukrainian frontline positions and the Ukrainian rear.[82] The drone operators noted that the Russian Molniya drones can carry relatively large warheads despite their construction with cardboard and aluminum components.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Martyn Pushkar Detachment and Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in the Orikhiv direction.[83]

Ukrainian forces recently continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 11 that Ukrainian forces struck a Buk-M1 air defense system near occupied Bahativka (roughly 57 kilometers behind the frontline) on either March 10 or over the night of March 10 to 11.[84] Geolocated footage published on March 11 shows a Ukrainian drone striking a Buk-M1 air defense system west of occupied Bahativka.[85] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on March 11 that Ukrainian forces also struck logistics depots near occupied Pryshyb (roughly 55 kilometers behind the frontline) and occupied Maryanivka (roughly 37 kilometers behind the frontline) and a drone warehouse near occupied Novozlatopil (roughly 45 kilometers behind the frontline) on either March 10 or overnight on March 10 to 11.[86] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian drone operators struck a command post and logistics depot of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) near occupied Pryshyb.[87] Geolocated footage published on March 11 shows fires in Pryshyb, Maryanivka, and Novozlatopil after Ukrainian strikes.[88] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck fuel and lubricants depots near Berdyansk (roughly 100 kilometers behind the frontline) and Kuznetsivka (roughly 63 kilometers behind the frontline), and an oil depot in Berdyansk on either March 10 or during the night of March 10 to 11.[89]

Russian forces conducted limited attacks in the Kherson direction, including southeast of Kherson City near Velykyi Vilkhovyi Island, on March 11 but did not advance.[90]

Russian milbloggers, including a Russian milblogger who reports on Russian strikes in the Kherson direction, reported that Ukrainian drones have been striking Russian vehicles up to 25 kilometers behind the frontline in the Kherson direction for about the past week (since about March 4).[91]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vyacheslav Volodin reported on March 11 that the Russian military command has cancelled leave of drone operators operating in Oleshky (south of Kherson City) due to poor combat performance.[92]

Order of Battle: Molniya-2 loitering munition operators of the Russian 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kherson Oblast.[93]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military assets and oil infrastructure in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 11 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil depots near occupied Dzhankoi and Azovske.[94] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian 64N6E radar and antenna for an S-400 air defense system in occupied Sevastopol, and geolocated footage published on March 11 shows Ukrainian drones striking the system.[95]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

Russian forces launched a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 99 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which about 70 were Shaheds — from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[96] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 90 drones; that nine drones struck six locations; and that drone debris fell at three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck a civilian food enterprise in Kharkiv City with a Shahed-type drone on the morning of March 11, killing two civilians and injuring at least seven.[97]

Significant Activity in Belarus 

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Nothing Significant To Report.