Toplines

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Russian forces intensified ground attacks across the theater in the last week, which is consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces have launched their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. Syrskyi stated on March 23 that Russian forces intensified offensive actions across the theater between March 17 to 20, attacking 619 times over the four-day period.[1] ISW assessed on March 21 that Russian forces likely began their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt after a significant increase in mechanized and motorized assaults in various sectors of the front since March 17, a period of intensified strikes, and the movement of heavy equipment and troops on the frontline.[2] Syrskyi stated that the Russian military command is trying to bring up new forces and is counting on deteriorating spring weather conditions, like fog, to reduce the effectiveness of Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes for future assaults.[3] Syrskyi stated that the Russian military command deployed tens of thousands of servicemembers into highly attritional infantry-led assaults that resulted in more than 6,090 killed and wounded during the four-day period, for a daily average of about 1,520 casualties. Syrskyi stated that Russian forces lost a total of 8,710 troops during the last week (between roughly March 17 and 23). Such a high casualty rate is unsustainable given Russia’s current recruitment rates and would likely degrade Russia’s ability to wage such large assaults in the mid- to long-term. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are unlikely to seize the Fortress Belt in 2026 but will likely make some tactical gains at a significant cost.[4] Russian officials are already setting expectations in the domestic information space for slow advances and high casualties, however, with one Russian State Duma deputy stating on March 23 that all wars have casualties but that Russian forces will try to minimize casualties by advancing at a “leisurely pace” toward Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.[5]

The Kremlin continues to attempt to disguise and dismiss the economic impacts of its costly war in Ukraine while trying to take advantage of the current high energy prices. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on March 23 that Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in January 2026 was 2.1 percent lower than in January 2025.[6] Putin also acknowledged that Russia needs to return to a sustainable economic growth trajectory with slowed inflation and stabilized labor markets. Putin claimed that Russian unemployment was 2.2 percent in January 2026 and that inflation is below six percent year on year. Russia’s extremely low unemployment rate reflects the fact that Russia is experiencing labor shortages, however. The labor shortages are likely causing wage inflation in the civilian and defense sectors, contributing to overall inflation. Putin stated that Russia needs to consider the “fluctuations” in global energy markets, given current “global tensions” — likely referring to rising energy prices due to the conflict in the Middle East.[7] Putin repeated his calls for Russian oil and gas companies to use additional revenues from rising oil prices to reduce their debt burden to domestic banks.[8] Putin implicitly acknowledged that Russia is monetarily benefiting from the global rise in oil prices and the increased sales of Russian energy after the United States temporarily lifted sanctions on Russia, thereby refuting previous Kremlin claims that the Russian economy was unaffected by Western sanctions.[9]

The ongoing war in the Middle East is likely exacerbating Russia’s ability to resolve its liquidity problems related to its unsustainable wartime spending. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on March 23 that Russian state agencies and regulatory data show that the Russian Central Bank’s gold reserves fell to 74.3 million troy ounces in February 2026, the lowest since March 2022.[10] Kremlin newswire TASS noted that gold reserves had also fallen by 500,000 troy ounces between January 1 and March 1.[11] The Russian Central Bank resorted to selling its gold reserves for the first time in November 2025 due to unsustainably high spending coupled with Russia’s steady depletion of its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves in order to fund the war.[12] Meduza noted that the war in the Middle East is causing global gold prices to fall, which, if sustained, could undercut Russia’s attempts to use gold reserves as an alternate funding method.[13]

Russia is turning to private military companies (PMCs) to defend Russian critical infrastructure against Ukrainian drone strikes. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on March 23 authorizing some PMCs and affiliated security organizations to obtain combat-grade small arms and ammunition from Rosgvardia to defend critical infrastructure against Ukrainian drone strikes.[14] The law applies to PMCs belonging to Russian fuel and energy companies, strategic enterprises, state corporations, and organizations that protect critical facilities. The law states that Rosgvardia will issue weapons to prevent various types of drone strikes during the period of the “special military operation” in Ukraine. The PMC must submit a request to Rosgvardia, which will seek approval from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) directorate overseeing that region.[15] Vasily Piskarev, head of the State Duma Committee on Security and Anti-Corruption, stated that PMCs already provide security for over 80 percent of Russia’s fuel and energy infrastructure but previously relied on weapons that are insufficient for repelling unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). The March 23 law is likely in part meant to address years-long complaints from the Russian milblogger community about insufficient protections for Russian critical infrastructure against Ukrainian drone strikes.[16] The Kremlin similarly passed a law in Fall 2025 requiring active reservists to participate in special training to protect critical and other infrastructure in Russia, which ISW assesses is a part of Kremlin preparation for limited, involuntary reserve callups in the future.[17]

US and Ukrainian delegations held another round of bilateral meetings in Miami, Florida, on March 22. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated on March 22 that the “constructive” US-Ukrainian talks focused on humanitarian efforts and the establishment of a durable and dependable security framework for Ukraine.[18] Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov noted that the meetings focused on security guarantees and the exchange and return of Ukrainian citizens from Russia.[19]

Russia continues to take steps to expand its permanent military basing in Belarus, particularly to increase Russia’s long-range drone strikes against Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on March 23 that Russia plans to deploy four ground stations for controlling long-range drones to Belarus and further deploy an additional unspecified number to occupied Ukraine.[20] Zelensky reported on February 23 that Russian forces were using repeaters in Belarus to support Shahed-type drone strikes.[21] Russia and Belarus signed an agreement on February 5 allowing Russia to establish “military objects” in Belarus.[22] Zelensky’s statement is consistent with ISW’s long-held forecast that Russia plans to expand its permanent basing presence in Belarus.[23] ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that Belarus is a cobelligerent in Russia’s war against Ukraine.[24] Russia will likely continue to develop its military capabilities in Belarus to support its military operations in Ukraine and set conditions to use Belarus in a potential future war with NATO.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russia’s energy infrastructure on the night of March 22 to 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the oil tank farm and the oil loading infrastructure of the Transneft-Port Primorsk oil terminal in Primorsk, Leningrad Oblast, causing a fire.[25] Geolocated footage shows at least four storage tanks on fire at the terminal following the Ukrainian strike.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Transneft-Port Primorsk oil terminal is a critical node in Russia’s energy export system, transporting roughly 60 million tons of crude oil annually.[27] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drosdenko acknowledged on March 23 that Ukrainian forces struck the Port of Primorsk, causing fires to oil tanks.[28]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim oil refinery in the Republic of Bashkortostan, causing a fire.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the oil refinery has an estimated processing capacity of six to eight million tons annually and serves as a key node in Russia’s fuel production network, supplying refined petroleum products to Russian forces. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim oil refinery is located roughly 1,400 kilometers from the international border with Ukraine.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 2S6 Tunguska anti-aircraft missile system and a “Nebo-U” radar station in Bryansk Oblast on the night of March 22 to 23.[30] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that this system marks the 28th Russian air defense system that Ukrainian forces have struck since March 1st.[31] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) news agency Armyinform reported that the “Nebo-U” is one of Russia’s rarest and most advanced radar systems, designed to detect and track cruise and ballistic missile threats and provide continuous airspace monitoring across large areas.[32]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Bobylivka (northwest of Sumy City).[33]

Russian forces attacked in the Sumy direction, including northwest of Sumy City near Potapivka, north of Sumy City toward Nova Sich, and southeast of Sumy City near Pokrovka and Hrabovske, on March 22 and 23.[34]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian infantry in the Sumy direction.[35]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Starytsya, and toward Zybyne and Okrimivka on March 22 and 23.[36]

Ukraine’s Joint Forces Task Force reported on March 23 refuted claims about Russian advances near Vovchansk.[37]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that small Russian infantry groups, which have broken through to Symynivka and Hrafske (both northeast of Kharkiv City) on an unspecified date, are experiencing supply issues.[38] Mashovets stated that Russian forces cannot reinforce the area as Ukrainian fire is covering the reinforcement routes on both the western and eastern flanks.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on March 23 but did not advance.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk toward Hyrhorivka on March 23.[39]

Mashovets stated that elements of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) have been unsuccessfully trying to seize Ambarne (east of Velykyi Burluk) for two months (since roughly late January 2026).[40]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division are attacking near Ambarne and Khatnie (east of Velykyi Burluk).[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Kivsharivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Kurylivka and toward Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on March 22 and 23.[42] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 23 that “ultra-small” Russian infantry groups are operating north of Kucherivka (east of Kupyansk).[43]

Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction are reportedly significantly understrength and in need of replenishment. Mashovets stated that some elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are significantly understrength after fighting for Kupyansk, with some regiments and brigades having only a battalion’s or a few companies’ worth of combat-capable infantry.[44]

A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on March 22 that Ukrainian forces control central Kupyansk.[45] Mashovets reported that Russian forces could not free the Russian soldiers trapped at the central hospital in Kupyansk and that Ukrainian forces are likely clearing the nearby areas.[46] Ukraine’s Joint Forces Task Force refuted claims about Russian advances near Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk).[47]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA) are attacking toward Novovasylivka and Mytofanivka (both northeast of Kupyansk).[48] Mashovets stated that elements of the 121st and 122nd motorized rifle regiments (both of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA) are attacking Kupyansk from the north. Mashovets stated that elements of the 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) and 68th Motorized Rifle Division are attacking in the Lyman Pershyi-Kupyansk (northeast of Kupyansk) and Vilshana-Petropavlivka (northeast to east of Kuyansk) directions.[49] Mashovets stated that elements of the 47th Tank Division (1st GTA) are attacking in the Pishchane-Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) direction, with elements of the division’s 153rd Tank Regiment operating in southeastern Kurylivka. Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian tanks in the Kupyansk direction.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Borova near Novoplatonivka and Bohuslavka; northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka and toward Shyikivka; southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Novomykhailivka, and Olhivka; and south of Borova near Serednie on March 22 and 23, but did not advance.[51]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricants warehouse near occupied Vedmezhe (roughly 140 kilometers from the frontline) on March 22 or the night of March 22 to 23.[52] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on March 23 that Ukrainian forces struck a train carrying fuel and lubricants in occupied Stanytsya Luhanska (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline).[53] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik acknowledged that Ukrainian forces struck railway infrastructure in Stanytsya Luhanska overnight.[54]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances; Geolocated footage published on March 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zakitne (east of Slovyansk).[55]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Stavky; southeast of Lyman near Yampil and Zakitne; south of Lyman near Dibrova; east of Slovyansk near Platonivka, Riznykivka, and Kalenyky; and southeast of Slovyansk near Pazeno, Fedorivka Druha, Lypivka, and Nykyforivka on March 22 and 23.[56]

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces credited elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) with the recent, roughly battalion-sized mechanized and motorized assault in the Lyman direction.[57] The source claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces destroyed three tanks, 11 infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers, and over 80 motorized vehicles.

A Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Slovyansk direction reported that Russian forces continue to conduct small group infiltration missions in contested “gray zones,” after which the groups wait for reinforcements for further attacks.[58] The battalion reported that Russian forces mostly use Molniya fixed-wing drones to strike Ukrainian logistics.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA) are reportedly operating near Drobysheve (northeast of Lyman).[59]

Ukrainian forces recently pushed out Russian infiltrators from a position in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 23 shows Ukrainian forces clearing a Russian-occupied building in southern Kostyantynivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces have retaken this position after Russian forces previously infiltrated the area on an unknown prior date.[60]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway in southern Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[61]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway in southern Kostyantynivka.[62]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka, Chasiv Yar, and Orikhovo-Vasylivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Kleban-Byk, Ivanopillya, Berestok, and Illinivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on March 22 and 23.[63] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Minkivka.[64]

Russian forces have intensified their glide bomb and artillery strikes against the Fortress Belt, likely as part of the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive campaign in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported that Russian forces launched eight glide bombs against Druzhkivka on the night of March 22 to 23.[65] Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported that Russian forces conducted three guided glide bomb strikes against Druzhkivske (just east of Druzhkivka) on March 22.[66] A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk direction reported that Russian forces have increased artillery strikes in the past few weeks.[67] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are conducting drone and guided glide bomb strikes against Chasiv Yar, Kostyantynivka, Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Druzhkivka. The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces have destroyed twice as many Russian troops in the past week (March 17 to 23) as compared to the previous week (March 10 to 16) in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR), indicating that Russian forces have “activated” operations in the area. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are attacking in small groups and that Russian drone operators are striking any targets they can find, such as houses, roads, or fields. A Russian milblogger stated that the high number of Ukrainian drones in the sky is complicating Russian advances from Berestok to western Kostyantynivka.[68]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian armored vehicles in Kostyantynivka.[69] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian armored vehicles near Kurtivka (east of Druzhkivka).[70] Artillery elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian ammunition depots in Kostyantynivka.[71] FPV drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian armored vehicles and personnel in the Kostyantynivka direction.[72] Elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on March 23 but did not advance.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas and Vilne on March 22.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novyi Donbas.[75]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that western Novyi Donbas is a contested “gray zone.”[76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka, Shevchenko, and Svitle; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Molodetske, Kotlyne, and Novopidhorodne; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on March 22 and 23.[77] A Russian milblogger claimed that small Ukrainian groups unsuccessfully counterattacked in Udachne.[78]

Russian forces reportedly conducted a mechanized and motorized assault on the outskirts of Pokrovsk. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian special forces group stated that fighting continues in northern Pokrovsk, where Russian forces recently unsuccessfully conducted a mechanized and motorized assault of an unspecified echelon with motorized vehicles, motorcycles, and armored fighting vehicles.[79] ISW observed reports of a platoon-sized mechanized assault northwest of Pokrovsk in Hryshyne on March 19, and it is unclear if the deputy commander is reporting an additional mechanized assault.[80] Russian forces have been increasingly conducting mechanized assaults on the frontline in the last week (March 17 to 23), likely as part of the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.[81]

Ukrainian forces are reportedly downing about 1,000 Russian drones per week in the Pokrovsk direction. Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on March 23 that Ukrainian forces destroyed or downed about 26,000 Russian drones in the corps’ AoR in the Pokrovsk direction in the past eight months (since roughly mid-July 2025).[82] The corps reported that this averages to about 1,000 drones per week and noted Russian forces particularly increased the number of fixed-wing reconnaissance and strike drones since Fall 2025.

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka on March 22 and 23, but did not advance.[83]

Russian forces continue offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 23, but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Ternove, Stepove, and Novohryhorivka and south of Oleksandrivka near Yehorivka, Zlahoda, and Krasnohirske on March 22 and 23.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novooleksandrivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[85]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]), the 77th Separate Counter-Unmanned Systems Regiment (Eastern Military District [EMD]), and of the 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Velykomykhailivka (east of Oleksandrivka).[86]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on March 22 to 23. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Tor-M1 air defense system in occupied Kurakhivka (roughly 36 kilometers from the frontline); a chemical munitions workshop in occupied Avdiivka (roughly 35 kilometers from the frontline); a Shahed drone warehouse in occupied Makiivka (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline); a telecommunications server and fiber-optic convergence point in occupied Donetsk City; and ammunition, material and technical equipment, and missile and artillery weapons warehouses in unspecified locations in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[87] Geolocated footage published on March 23 confirms the strikes on the outskirts of Makiivka and Kurakhivka.[88] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 22 that Russian soldiers operating in occupied Horlivka (roughly 25 kilometers from the frontline) reported that it is becoming “impossible” to use highways in the area due to Ukrainian strikes against Russian vehicles.[89]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on March 23, but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Staroukrainka, Olenokostyantynivka, Svyatopetrivka, and Zelene; north of Hulyaipole near Solodke and Varvarivka; southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne on March 22 and 23.[90]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are maintaining a high offensive tempo along the southern front and have extended the “kill zone” (an area of elevated drone strike risk) up to 20 kilometers.[91] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are redeploying assault units to southern Ukraine from unspecified other areas of the frontline, including elements of two naval infantry divisions.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions west of Krynychne, Dolynka (west of Hulyaipole), and Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[92] Drone operators of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian armored personnel carriers west of Kopani (northwest of Hulyaipole).[93] Drone operators of the 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hirke (west of Hulyaipole).[94] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhzhia direction.[95]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Pavlivka; and northwest of Orikhiv near Novoboikivske and Novoyakovlivka, and toward Lukyanivske on March 22 and 23.[96] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Richne (northwest of Orikhiv).[97]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Rapid Response Drone Detachment of the Russian Ministry of Defense are striking Ukrainian tanks in Orikhiv.[98] Drone operators of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics in the Zaporizhia direction.[99] Snipers of the 104th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly providing cover for Russian assault groups and countering Ukrainian drones in Zaporizhia Oblast.[100]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction, including northeast of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge, on March 22 and 23, but did not advance.[101]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 22 to 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 251 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which roughly 150 were Shaheds — from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[102] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 234 drones, that 17 drones struck 11 locations, and that downed drone debris fell on eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes struck civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, and Odesa oblasts.[103]

Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Development Minister Oleksiy Kuleba reported on March 23 that Russian forces have struck Ukrainian railway and logistics infrastructure 160 times in recent months.[104]

Significant Activity in Belarus 

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

See topline text.