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⇱ Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 24, 2026 | ISW


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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 24, 2026

March 24, 2026

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 24, 2026

Correction: ISW has amended Russian unconfirmed claims in northern Kharkiv Oblast to clarify Pishchane as referring to the settlement northeast of Kharkiv City.

Toplines

Russian forces launched nearly 1,000 drones and missiles against Ukraine in a prolonged strike series from the evening of March 23 to the evening of March 24 – the largest Russian strike series against Ukraine of the war thus far. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on the morning of March 24 that Russian forces launched 426 drones and missiles against Ukraine from 1800 local time on March 23 to 0900 on March 24 and another 556 drones from 0900 to 1800 local time on March 24.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 392 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other strike drone types and 34 missiles, including seven Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 surface-to-air missiles, 18 Kh-101 cruise missiles, five Iskander-K cruise missiles, and four Kh-59/69/31 cruise missiles overnight, of which Ukrainian forces downed 256 drones and 25 missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces did not launch any missiles during the day on March 24 and that Ukrainian forces downed 541 of the 556 strike drones launched during the day. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces targeted more areas of Ukraine during the daytime strikes than overnight and that Russian forces launched many drones during the day from the north.[2] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces launched all seven ballistic missiles at areas relatively close to the frontline in Zaporizhia and Poltava oblasts and that Ukrainian forces were unable to intercept the missiles.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian overnight strikes targeted 11 oblasts and killed at least four civilians.[4] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes overnight and during the day damaged civilian, energy, and transport infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, Vinnytsia, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[5]

Russian forces struck a UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage site in Lviv City during the day on March 24. Russian drones struck the Ensemble of the Bernardine Monastery in central Lviv City during the afternoon, causing a fire.[6] Lviv Oblast Military Administration Head Maksym Kozytskyi stated that specialists are still working to determine the extent of the damage.

👁 Russian Drone and Missile Strikes on Ukraine, March 24, 2025 to March 24, 2026

The Russian strikes on March 23 to 24 represent a significant inflection in Russian strike tactics that allow Russia to threaten more areas of Ukraine for longer periods of time and disproportionately affect civilian areas. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on March 24 that the Russian shift in extending the time frame during which Russia delivers its strike packages likely intends to identify vulnerabilities in Ukrainian air defenses and penetrate them.[7] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that Russian forces have been accumulating resources for a “long time” to conduct longer-duration strikes and are deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure, including across Ukraine, including in Dnipro, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Vinnytsia cities.[8] Russian forces often launch no or few missiles for multiple days in a row before launching strike packages with a significantly higher quantity of missiles, likely stockpiling missiles between strike series to maximize damage by launching several missiles alongside a large quantity of drones to overwhelm Ukraine’s air defenses.[9] Russian forces have also likely been stockpiling long-range strike drones for a prolonged strike series against Ukraine at a moment of its choosing. Russia reportedly planned to launch strike packages of over 1,000 strike vehicles against Ukraine by fall 2025, and the March 23 to 24 strike series is the closest Russian forces have gotten to this goal.[10] Russia also launches these larger strike packages to coincide with the days before and after bilateral and trilateral peace negotiations, and notably launched this most recent strike package in the days following US-Ukrainian talks on March 21 and 22 in Florida.[11] Russia’s increasingly large and diverse strike packages continue to highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, both with high-end US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missiles and other lower-end forms of air defense, for a holistic, well-equipped air defense umbrella.[12] Russia likely seeks to take advantage of a global shortage of Patriot interceptors and the current war in the Middle East to escalate its strike campaign against Ukraine.

Ukraine notably disrupted elements of the strike package by destroying ground-based Zirkon hypersonic missile launcher while it was moving into a firing position in Crimea on the night of March 23 to 24 – a difficult task that is a testament to Ukraine’s maturing operational planning and extended-range strike capabilities. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) posted geolocated footage on March 24 showing Ukrainian forces striking a column of Bastion-M coastal missile system launchers that were moving toward firing positions in occupied Crimea overnight on March 23 to 24.[13] The GUR reported that the Ukrainian strikes destroyed one launcher and two Zirkon hypersonic cruise missiles, damaged another launcher, and killed seven Russian servicemembers. Russian forces likely intended to launch the two Zirkon missiles as part of their large-scale drone and missile strike series on the night of March 23 to 24. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile launcher that had been preparing to fire at Ukraine in occupied Crimea overnight on March 13 to 14 and have been waging a systematic campaign against air defense assets in the region.[14] Russia’s strike package likely would have been larger and more damaging if not for Ukraine’s campaign aimed at degrading Russian missile strike capabilities.

Russia recently launched satellites as part of its efforts to develop a Russian analogue to Starlink. Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440 announced on March 24 that a launch vehicle successfully deployed the company’s first 16 Rassvet communications satellites into low orbit on the evening of March 23 and that this launch supports Russian efforts to establish a low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite-based broadband communications service.[15] Bureau 1440 stated that it plans to launch “hundreds” more satellites into space across dozens of launches and that the company intends to create a constellation of LEO satellites capable of global coverage. Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti reported that Bureau 1440 intends to start testing low-orbit broadband service in 2026 and officially launch services in 2027, though it is unclear whether Russia will introduce this service in a limited geographical area, such as the theater in Ukraine, or globally.[16] The system is very likely Russia’s attempt to establish a sovereign version of SpaceX’s Starlink, which Russian forces lost access to in Ukraine on February 1.[17] Russian milbloggers emphasized that such a communications system will support Russian military operations against Ukraine and further Russia’s efforts to digitally isolate itself from reliance on Western systems.[18] One Russian milblogger characterized the launch as a “complete failure,” however, claiming that Bureau 1440 was supposed to launch these 16 satellites in December 2025 and that the project has experienced significant delays and a collapse in satellite production.[19] The milblogger noted that Bureau 1440 lacks the production logistics to build the satellites on the large scale required to truly replace Starlink. It remains unclear how effectively the Rassvet communications satellites will replicate the capabilities of Starlink, if at all. Russia may eventually intend to export this communications service to its allies and other interested actors as a non-US-controlled alternative to Starlink, if it is successful.

Key Takeaways

  1. Russian forces launched nearly 1,000 drones and missiles against Ukraine in a prolonged strike series from the evening of March 23 to the evening of March 24 – the largest Russian strike series against Ukraine of the war thus far.
  2. Russian forces struck a UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage site in Lviv City during the day on March 24.
  3. The Russian strikes on March 23 to 24 represent a significant inflection in Russian strike tactics that allow Russia to threaten more areas of Ukraine for longer periods of time and disproportionately affect civilian areas.
  4. Ukraine notably disrupted elements of the strike package by destroying ground-based Zirkon hypersonic missile launcher while it was moving into a firing position in Crimea on the night of March 23 to 24 – a difficult task that is a testament to Ukraine’s maturing operational planning and extended-range strike capabilities.
  5. Russia recently launched satellites as part of its efforts to develop a Russian analogue to Starlink.
  6. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
  7. Ukrainian overnight March 22 to 23 strikes halted operations at a Russian oil port for exports.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian strikes conducted overnight on March 22 to 23 halted operations at a key Russian oil port for exports. Reuters reported on March 23 that Ukrainian drone strikes on the night of March 22 to 23 halted operations at the Transneft-Port Primorsk Oil Terminal in Primorsk, Leningrad Oblast – Russia’s largest Baltic oil export port.[20] Planet Labs satellite imagery collected on March 23 indicates that the drone strike damaged at least five of the 18 storage tanks, each with a capacity of 50,000 tons.[21] The Transneft-Port Primorsk oil terminal transports roughly 60 million tons of crude oil annually.[22]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Sumy direction, including northwest of Sumy City near Novomykolaivka; north of Sumy City near Kostyantynivka, Oleksiivka, and Kindrativka, and toward Mala Korchakivka, Khrapivshchyna, and Nova Sich; and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka on March 23 and 24.[23]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in the Sumy direction.[24]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Starytsya, Verkhnya Pysarivka, and Okhrimivka on March 23 and 24.[25]

A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported that Russian forces continue to employ the same infiltration tactics with newly deployed reinforcements, resulting in heavy casualties sustained.[26]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Vakha Battalion (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment), the Federal Security Service (FSB) Special Purpose Center, the Federal Security Service (FSB) Oktyabrsky Command Post, and of the SKAD 697 Gorets Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kharkiv direction.[27]

A Russian milblogger claimed Russian forces attacked toward Velykyi Burluk itself on March 24.[28]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that the elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Pishchane (northeast of Kharkiv City).[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces had seized Pishchane as of February 2.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[31]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka and Pishchane and toward Kivsharivka, Novoosynove, and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, and on March 23 and 24.[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Borova near Novoplatonivka and Bohuslavka, northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka, and southwest of Borova toward Izyum on March 23 and 24 but did not advance.[33]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of March 23 to 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near occupied Khoroshe (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline).[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced within and north of Zakitne (east of Slovyansk).[35]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northeast of Lyman near Drobysheve; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; south of Lyman near Dibrova; east of Slovyansk near Platonivka, Zakitne, Kryva Luka, and Riznykivka, and toward Rai Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Lypivka on March 23 and 24.[36]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Shrama Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are shelling Ukrainian positions north of Zakitne.[37] Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[38]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage and a report from a Ukrainian military source published on March 23 and 24 indicate that Ukrainian forces likely liberated Minkivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[39] Geolocated footage published on March 20 and 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern and southeastern Kostyantynivka and south of the settlement.[40] Geolocated footage published on March 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced south of Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka).[41] Likely archival geolocated footage published on March 24 shows Ukrainian forces clearing a Russian position and capturing two Russian servicemembers southeast of Novopavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka), indicating that Russian forces no longer maintain this position.[42]

Refinements of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on March 23 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in northern Novodmytrivka (north of Kostyantynivka) and east of Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka), both areas in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[43]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka and Chasiv Yar and toward Chervone; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Kleban-Byk, Ivanopillya, Berestok, and Illinivka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on March 23 and 24.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Chasiv Yar.[45]

Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported on March 24 that Russian forces conducted nine KAB airstrikes against Druzhkivka, killing one and damaging residential infrastructure.[46]

Geolocated footage published on March 24 shows that Russian forces conducted a FAB-1500 glide bomb strike against Ukrainian forces in central Kostyantynivka.[47] Geolocated footage published on March 20 shows Russian forces conducting a FAB-3000 glide bomb in Kostyantynivka.[48]

Order of Battle: Howitzer and artillery elements of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian servicemembers and equipment in western Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (just south of Druzhkivka) and in Kostyantynivka.[49] Drone operators and artillery elements of the 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka.[50] Drone operators of the 7th Company of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka and Novodmytrivka.[51] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and deployment points near Mykolaipillia (south of Druzhkivka) and Novohryhorivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[52] Drone operators of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Dobropillya near Toretske on March 23 and 24 but did not advance.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka, Shevchenko, and Svitle; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Molodetske on March 23 and 24.[55]

A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on March 24 that Russian forces have intensified attacks after receiving reinforcements and recently conducted an assault on a 10-kilometer stretch using a large number of manpower, motorcycles, and transport vehicles.[56] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces killed 90 percent of the Russian personnel involved in the assault.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and southeast of Novopavlivka near Filiya on March 23 and 24 but did not advance.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 24 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in southern Ternove (southeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[58]

Russian forces attacked east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Ternove, Zlahoda, Krasnohirske, and Novohryhorivka, and toward Stepove on March 23 and 24.[59]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Velykomykhailivka (east of Oleksandrivka).[60] Tor-MU air defense missile system crews of the 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[61]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of March 23 to 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian manpower concentrations and a drone control point near occupied Velyka Novosilka (roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline).[62]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on March 24 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 22 and 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position along the T-0401 highway in central Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole) and a Russian servicemember southeast of Hirke (west of Hulyaipole) after what ISW assesses were both Russian infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[63]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Olenokostyantynivka, Svyatopetrivka, and Zelene and toward Boikove, Verkhnya Tersa, and Vozdvyzhivka; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya and Varvarivka; southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne and Charivne; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and toward Hulyaipilske and Novoselivka on March 23 and 24.[64]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in Staroukrainka (northwest of Hulyaipole) and Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole).[65] Elements of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD) reportedly continue to operate in Zaporizhia Oblast.[66]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of March 23 to 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian military personnel concentrations and a repair and recovery unit near occupied Novozlatopil (roughly 43 kilometers from the frontline) overnight.[67]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.


Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 24 shows Ukrainian forces clearing a Russian-occupied building and detaining Russian prisoners of war (POWs) in eastern Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[68]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 23 that Russian forces seized Pavlivka (northwest of Orikhiv).[69]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and toward Novoandriivka; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and toward Richne and Veselyanka on March 23 and 24.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk.[71]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian Baba Yaga drones in the Zaporizhia direction.[72]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on March 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudskyi Island, on March 23 and 24.[73]

A spokesperson for a Ukrainian marine corps operating in the Kherson direction stated on March 24 that Russian forces deploy an average of 2,000 to 2,500 drones per week to strike Ukrainian positions on the left bank of the Dnipro River and used 3,247 drones over the past week.[74] The spokesperson added that, on average, Ukrainian forces destroy 90 percent of Russian drones.

The Russian Investigative Committee in Crimea claimed on March 24 that the accidental detonation of an explosive device caused an explosion in occupied Sevastopol.[75] Occupation Governor of Sevastopol, Mikhail Razvozhaev, claimed on March 23 that the explosion in an apartment building caused a large fire, killing two and injuring eight.[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking a Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) station in the Kherson direction.[77]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in and near occupied Crimea. Russian opposition media Astra reported on March 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tavricheskaya Thermal Power Plant (TPP) near occupied Simferopol on the night of March 21 to 22, setting a diesel fuel tank on fire.[78]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

See topline text.

Significant Activity in Belarus 

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Belarus continues to increase cooperation with Russia’s allies. Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin met with Kyrgyz Defense Minister Ruslan Mukambetov on March 24 and discussed increasing bilateral military cooperation.[79] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko will conduct an official visit to North Korea from March 25 to 26.[80]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/58637 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/58685

[2] https://t.me/kpszsu/58685

[3] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/24/vsi-buly-zbyti-u-povitryanyh-sylah-rozpovily-pro-100-perehoplenyh-krylatyh-raket/

[4] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2036351243501674830; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18397

[5] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/28140 ; https://t.me/chernihivrada/3417 ; . https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/28407 ; https://www.facebook.com/ruslan.martsinkiv/posts/pfbid0z8X2Hhv2q7We5H68pzMk5bSDFvaA6UuyLz5TDBRYbbtEySNBgiQny1gWQoDj5Ybnl?__cft__[0]=AZZeFj0xGzWbqCjpWezkLzCXoE2_6NhcQ8fXgssUMkZ15Fv8K8sf7ptDp21kjpJaFdQVWAFWw5zJf3EelB4kXjX9ACiifrUiUJ0y0JdvqnVcp-mwuaSBO0MuO7vZkEr5w_Fl9N2UI83XycgRt68z4fR9n9qbw0BeB6q4oyxzjAF4xJ6t3a40yTzQWXNHuUrxiLI&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://suspilne dot media/ivano-frankivsk/1245938-rosijski-vijska-dronom-atakuvali-ivano-frankivsk/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/24/na-harkivshhyni-rosijskyj-dron-vdaryv-po-elektropotyagu-zagynuv-pasazhyr/; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/27760 ; https://t.me/synegubov/20661 ; https://t.me/synegubov/20663 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3672 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3670 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3671 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/24/vsi-buly-zbyti-u-povitryanyh-sylah-rozpovily-pro-100-perehoplenyh-krylatyh-raket/ ; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/28914; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/28921; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/28925; https://suspilne dot media/lviv/1106682-u-lvovi-24-berezna-prolunali-vibuhi-so-vidomo/ ; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid02ZrUGtFaW6BcJ7oQyv8bwTdpGyHakvPAnFSLs5LDiPmfDXgLwPbQJ4spg8NtRD6JKl?__cft__[0]=AZZNGjGtPxCmtfv-x7k_UUjaMs2RS5ow2ObgVTRtJRi5h5DRldW48kHjjAMFzKuxEZNhvurC_NNMP50_BgGZD9iaqsV3LzTGWKJZXKZZAP2H-1VgQGQTDL7PPz1WNF1TJNN_f2KnniiW1zggxiAvzxw58RHxGNyT4-yx9p_b38Kclw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/19437; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1271432-rf-zdijsnila-masovanu-ataku-na-mikolaivsinu-raketami-ta-dronami/; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1271394-u-poltavi-zaginuli-dvoe-ludej-se-odinadcat-travmovani-aki-naslidki-ataki/; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/32779 ; https://pol.gp.gov dot ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=415658; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1271526-u-poltavi-vnaslidok-obstrilu-12-postrazdalih-sered-akih-5-ricnij-hlopcik-sbu-rozpocali-rozsliduvanna/; https://od dot gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=415625 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1271488-rf-atakuvala-odesinu-raketami-j-dronami-prokuratura-vidkrila-provadzenna-e-poraneni/ ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/14886 ; https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/1887 ;

https://t.me/prokuraturasumy/5069; https://suspilne.media/sumy/1271842-troe-ludej-travmovani-cerez-ataku-bezpilotnikiv-na-sostkinsini/ ; https://www.facebook.com/ZabolotNAtalia/posts/pfbid0gAsZ6fFe3Qi9e2M2of4fYmYcVWtszKs5LQfeVjCCsfSGei4AyEeZS3ErvRQWtubWl?__cft__[0]=AZZp2_7qsenRk23Al2Q4HSuigODTNcpXf7xZhDPypMQNeEfp2lf2fAOzahcW3PmIlKorI-Hst-XfIY5zUlXWRWTte19CD9fZeCMgx9PixtdGiEYYsCwH2wvS2YJdjoLbJfSlSGCbdp_8z-XaDcAz3Shj1BRLfB0hgkIq-3VaHYE-Zw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://suspilne dot media/vinnytsia/1271510-na-vinniccini-vnaslidok-ataki-rf-poskodzeni-budinki/ ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/36990 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/36991 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/36992 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/36995 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/36997 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/37003 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/37004 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/37012 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/37020 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/37021 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/57998 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/58000 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/03/24/vorog-vdaryv-po-zaporizhzhyu-5-raketamy-ye-zagyblyj-ta-poraneni/

[6] https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/28921; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/28914; https://suspilne dot media/lviv/1106682-u-lvovi-24-berezna-prolunali-vibuhi-so-vidomo/;

[7] https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid05KW5LFDy1cUAohNr5Nd6dAeg7UXgjsNMSo1ykpRwNoEWTVQYdp1ynSYQuATN1hqJl ; https://t.me/serhii_flash/7171

[8] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/10557

[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/

[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2025/

[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2026/

[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2025/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070425; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2025/

[13] https://t.me/DIUkraine/8080 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34448; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/2036441476607979971?s=20; ; https://t.me/s/DniproOfficial ; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2036445101711319282; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2036440692034048289 ; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/2036441476607979971

[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2026/

[15] https://t.me/bureau_1440/145; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/03/24/rossiya-zapustila-sputniki-sistemy-rassvet-kotoruyu-nazyvayut-analogom-starlink

[16] https://ria dot ru/20260324/sputniki-2082543161.html

[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2026/; https://x.com/elonmusk/status/2017868971479818599

[18] https://t.me/rybar/78870 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/49762; https://t.me/yurasumy/27339

[19] https://t.me/mil_hub/126709

[20] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/ataka-droniv-zypunila-primorsk-port/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/fuel-reservoir-russias-primorsk-port-fire-after-drone-attack-governor-says-2026-03-23/?

[21] https://x.com/kromark/status/2036036563444855244?s=20

[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2026/

[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36444 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36442 ; https://t.me/uvkkursk/284 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33096 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/7266  

[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41113 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/204133

[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36444; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20311 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36442 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36467 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/90059 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/7266 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33096

[26] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/24/jdut-shlyahom-z-trupiv-poperednykiv-rosiyany-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku-regulyarno-otrymuyut-popovnennya/

[27] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6436

[28] https://t.me/dva_majors/90059

[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/62156 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/62162; https://t [dot] me/warriorofnorth/16516; https://t [dot] me/wargonzo/33114; https://t [dot] me/Sladkov_plus/15344

[30] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2026/

[31] https://t.me/motopatriot78/49758  

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36467 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36444; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20311 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36442 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/90059 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41126 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33096

[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36444; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20311 ; ttps://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36442 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41126

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36461

[35] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2036230214813098054; https://t [dot] me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/13865; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2036247463594451052?s=20; https://t [dot] me/specnazahmat/2029

[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36467 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36444; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20311 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36442 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/90059 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33096

[37] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2036247463594451052?s=20; https://t.me/specnazahmat/2029

[38] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/204133

[39] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2036134992963567948?s=20;  https://x.com/425Skala/status/2035974038590243080 ; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/2036421881713053716; https://t.me/skala425/819;

[40] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2036074244937785676; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/31934; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2036101469443592202; https://t.me/Legion_W_Bat1/1067

[41] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2036144012218814492; https://t.me/motopatriot78/49751  

[42] https://x.com/Danspiun/status/2036422730183041305

[43] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2036141617560567945; https://t.me/RembaKillers/35; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2036174758891466938; https://t.me/berloga_live/10966

[44] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/14UrYhbb96J/ ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/shturmovykiv-rf-pidirvaly-protytankovymy-minamy-u-kostyantynivtsi-bijtsi-brygady-lyut/ ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36467 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36444; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36442; https://t.me/rybar/78846 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/367621 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/90059 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33096  

[45] https://t.me/dva_majors/90059  

[46] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/60410 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/24/styrayut-z-lyczya-zemli-rosiyany-skynuly-odrazu-9-kabiv-na-druzhkivku/

[47] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2036401755135652213?s=20; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/28589; https://t.me/it_is_zp_tg/22878; https://t.me/epoddubny/26831  

[48] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2036103729347183069; https://t.me/Legion_W_Bat1/1067

[49] https://t.me/Osintpen/2690; https://t.me/verumreactor/34564; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2036074244937785676; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/31934

[50] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2036105126058876983?s=20; https://t.me/rusich13sho/1492

[51] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2036141617560567945; https://t.me/RembaKillers/35; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2036142816393408675; https://t.me/RembaKillers/29

[52] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15157

[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/90048 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/90085 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/90091 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/90068

[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36444; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36442

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36467 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36444 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36442 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33096

[56] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/24/tyagla-na-czij-liniyi-vony-otrymuyut-regulyarno-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-znyshhyly-90-uchasnykiv-oldovogo-shturmu/

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36467 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36444 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36442

[58] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2036143046165729425;  https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2036146942514799033;  https://x.com/425Skala/status/2035974038590243080  

[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36467 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36444 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36442

[60] https://t.me/voin_dv/19076 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/19077

[61] https://t.me/mod_russia/62151

[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36461

[63] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2036093690024771592; https://t.me/romedronen/536; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/2036167110187975153?s=20; https://www.instagram.com/achilles_429brigade/reel/DWOFA7uCoyw/; https://x.com/achilles_429/status/2036001439315530188

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36467; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36444; https://t.me/wargonzo/33096; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36442; https://t.me/dva_majors/90059; https://t.me/voin_dv/19073; https://t.me/voin_dv/19068;

[65] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2036194135804104958; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2036196755591610871; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2036199922756665616; https://t.me/projectrhbz/16050  

[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/19068 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/62163

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36461

[68] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2036364273098674449?s=20; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gJ2e5jKGUmE; https://t.me/DIUkraine/8072  

[69] https://t.me/rybar/78847

[70] https://t.me/rybar/78847 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/90059 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/49764; https://t.me/wargonzo/33096  

[71] https://t.me/rybar/78847  

[72] https://t.me/wargonzo/33093

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36444; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36442

[74] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/24/sproby-perepravytysya-zakripytysya-v-rezhymi-non-stop-na-prydniprovskomu-napryamku-tryvaye-bytva-za-ostrovy/

[75] https://t.me/tass_agency/367759

[76] https://t.me/razvozhaev/18988; https://t.me/razvozhaev/18987 ; https://t.me/razvozhaev/18996 ; https://t.me/vrogov/23972 ; https://t.me/astrapress/107824 ; https://t.me/astrapress/107827 ; https://t.me/astrapress/107865 ; https://t.me/astrapress/107891 ; https://t.me/istories_media/11725 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/367618; https://t.me/tass_agency/367630; https://t.me/tass_agency/367625; https://t.me/tass_agency/367626; https://t.me/tass_agency/367630

[77] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41113  

[78] https://t.me/astrapress/107862

[79] https://t.me/modmilby/54649

[80] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/366436; https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-25-26-marta-sovershit-ofitsialnyj-vizit-v-kndr-771421-2026/

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