Toplines

Russia continues to expand its military cooperation with Iran to facilitate Iranian strikes on US and Israeli forces in the Middle East. The Financial Times (FT) reported on March 25, citing Western intelligence reports, that Russia is close to completing a phased shipment of unspecified drones, medicine, and food to Iran.[1] Two officials briefed on the intelligence told FT that Russia and Iran began discussing drone delivering soon after the US-Israeli campaign began, and that subsequent deliveries started processing in early March. The officials stated that they expect Russia to complete the deliveries by the end of March. A Western security official told FT that the specific drone type that Russia agreed to send to Iran is unclear, but that Russia is likely only in a position to deliver models such as the Geran-2. Current and former Western officials told FT that Russia denied Iran’s request for S-400 air defense systems. Russia has reportedly already been providing Iran with modified Shahed drone components and satellite imagery to assist recent Iranian strikes on US forces in the Middle East and US allies in the region.[2] ISW continues to assess that Russia sees aiding Iran’s strike campaign as an effort to weaken the United States, as Russia has self-defined the United States as one of its primary geopolitical adversaries.[3]

Ukrainian counterattacks continue to make gains in southern Ukraine, creating operational and strategic effects against Russian forces going into the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against the Fortress Belt. The Ukrainian Air Assault Forces Command reported on March 26 that Ukrainian forces liberated Berezove (southeast of Oleksandrivka), eliminating a Russian salient.[4] Ukrainian forces have made significant tactical gains in southern Ukraine since late January 2026 and notably retook more territory than Russian forces seized in February 2026.[5] Ukrainian officials have reported that Ukrainian forces have liberated over 400 square kilometers in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions from late January 2026 to mid-March 2026 in two separate drives.[6] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces have liberated at least 334.06 square kilometers in southern Ukraine since January 1, 2026, but ISW’s conservative mapping methodology underestimates Ukrainian advances. Ukrainian forces’ dual tactical efforts to halt and push back Russian gains in southern Ukraine are having cascading effects on other sectors of the front, forcing Russian forces to choose between defending against the Ukrainian counterattacks and allocating manpower and materiel for offensive operations elsewhere on the frontline.[7] The Russian military command had to redeploy elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units from Donetsk Oblast to southern Ukraine in early March 2026 in response to Ukrainian counterattacks, likely disrupting plans for the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against the Fortress Belt.[8] Russian forces have previously failed to conduct simultaneous offensives in different sectors of the front, and it is unlikely that they will be able to make significant efforts to advance in the Fortress Belt area while contending with Ukraine’s recent successes in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions.[9]

Russian forces are unlikely to seize Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in 2026. Russian forces likely began their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt with a significant increase in mechanized and motorized assaults in various sectors of the front between March 17 and 21, and a period of intensified strikes, and the movement of heavy equipment and troops on the frontline.[10] Ukraine’s Fortress Belt is a concentration of four heavily fortified and large cities in Donetsk Oblast, with a total pre-war population of over 380,000, that run north to south along the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Slovyansk highway.[11] Russian forces tried and failed to seize the Fortress Belt in 2014 and 2022, and such an operation in the fifth year of the war will likely be a multi-year effort with significant personnel and materiel losses.[12] Russian forces have also shown no ability to rapidly envelop, penetrate, or otherwise seize cities the size of those in the Fortress Belt and took almost two years to seize Pokrovsk — a significantly smaller town in comparison with a pre-war population of 60,000.[13] Russian officials are already setting expectations in the domestic information space for slow advances and high casualties, with Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claiming on March 26 that it is too soon to talk about a “triumphant spring offensive.”[14] Kartapolov claimed that fighting on the front is difficult and specifically noted that fighting in Kostyantynivka is complicated due to the city’s size and Ukraine’s defensive fortifications. The Kremlin knows that Russian forces’ seizure of the Fortress Belt on the battlefield is not inevitable and is therefore demanding that Ukraine cede the unoccupied parts of Donetsk Oblast. The Kremlin seeks such a concession to save Russia the personnel and materiel resources and to put Russia in a more advantageous position to possibly re-invade in the future.[15]

The United Kingdom (UK) government affirmed its commitment to police sanctioned vessels in UK waters, while Kremlin officials continue to threaten the use of military force to aid Russian sanction-evading ships. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer authorized on March 25 UK Armed Forces and law enforcement officers to interdict UK-sanctioned vessels transiting through UK waters.[16] The UK government noted that UK authorities can bring criminal proceedings against the owners, operators, and crew of interdicted vessels for breaching UK sanctions. The UK government’s decision is notable due to the UK’s significant influence on the global maritime and shipping industry, including holding the largest per-country share at roughly one third of the global marine insurance market.[17] Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev stated on March 25 that the Russian government has allowed Russian-flagged vessels to request mobile fire team escorts to prevent ”actions against the Russian merchant fleet,” likely referring to US and European seizures of sanctioned vessels.[18] Patrushev claimed on March 19 that the Russian government was considering military means to escort Russian ships.[19] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 26 that global coordinated sanctions against Russia have left the Kremlin with less money to spend on the military despite Russian efforts to circumvent sanctions.[20] Zelensky noted that the Russian government had an $83 billion deficit as of the end of 2025, which Ukraine forecasts will reach about $100 billion in 2026. Zelensky added that Russia will likely use the billions of dollars of revenue from relaxed sanctions against Russia’s energy sector to fund its war effort in Ukraine and aid in Iran’s war effort against the US and Israel.

Ukrainian drone strikes and Western seizures of Russian oil tankers are having significant impacts on Russian oil export revenues. Reuters reported on March 25 that it calculated that Ukrainian drone strikes, the disruption to the functions of the Druzhba pipeline, and oil tanker seizures have halted at least 40 percent of Russia’s oil export capacity — roughly two million barrels per day.[21] Ukrainian forces have struck all three of Russia’s major western oil export ports in March 2026 — Novorossiysk on the Black Sea and Primorsk and Ust-Luga on the Baltic Sea. Ukrainian strikes against the Primorsk and Ust-Luga ports on the nights of March 22 to 23 and March 24 to 25, respectively, halted crude loading operations at both ports.[22] Reuters reported that the Novorossiysk Oil Terminal has been operating below its planned capacity since Ukrainian strikes against the terminal in early March.[23] Traders told Reuters that recent seizures of “Russia-related” oil tankers, likely referring to the Russian shadow fleet, in Europe have disrupted 300,000 barrels per day of Arctic oil exports from Murmansk. Traders also noted that disruptions to Russia’s oil export routes to the West have forced Russia to rely on oil exports to Asia, but that export capacity limits these routes. Reuters noted that Russia continues uninterrupted oil supplies of about 1.9 million barrels per day to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) through two pipelines and the port of Kozmino (located in the Russian Far East) and continues to load about 250,000 barrels per day from Russia’s two oil and gas offshore facilities based in Sakhalin. Traders stated that Russia is also supplying about 300,000 barrels per day to refineries in Belarus. Ukrainian drone strikes and Western efforts to seize Russian oil tankers are having significant impacts on Russian oil export revenues, which Russia relies on to fund its war in Ukraine. ISW continued to assess that Russia’s ability to sell oil is partially a function of its ability to transport it, and continued Ukrainian drone strikes and European efforts against the Russian shadow fleet will degrade Russia’s ability to transport oil, which may partially offset the United States’ partial lifting of oil sanctions against Russia.[24]

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure near the Baltic Sea on the night of March 25 to 26, marking the third strike in four days against Russian oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Kirishi oil refinery in Leningrad Oblast, setting fire to primary oil refining plants and two tanks.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Kirishi oil refinery accounts for over six percent of Russia’s total refining volume. Geolocated footage published on March 26 shows smoke plumes near the refinery.[26] This is the third Ukrainian strike against Russian oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast in the last week (March 19 to 26). Two anonymous sources told Reuters on March 25 that Russian Primorsk and Ust-Luga ports suspended crude oil and oil product shipments after Ukrainian strikes against the facilities on the nights of March 22 to 23 and 24 to 25, respectively.[27]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Sumy direction, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on March 25 and 26.[28]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 3rd Assault Company of the 1st Battalion of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[29] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[30] Drone operators of the Russian Krechet unit of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in border areas of Kursk Oblast.[31]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southwestern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[32]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsya, Hrafske, Pishchane, Vovchanski Khutory, and Nesterne and toward Okhrimivka, Verkhnya Pysarivka, and Zybyne on March 25 and 26.[33]

The chief of staff of a Ukrainian border guard detachment reported on March 26 that Ukrainian drone strikes have prevented Russian forces from concentrating forces near the international border in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[34] A Ukrainian border guard reported on March 25 that Russian forces are intensifying drone operations in Kharkiv Oblast, primarily with cheap Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones, especially in areas where Russian forces cannot accumulate sufficient personnel reserves.[35] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in Kharkiv Oblast reported on November 26 that Russian forces have been using more drones due to the warming weather, including Molniya, Shahed-type, Zala, Orlan, and artificial intelligence (AI)-synchronized drones.[36]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in Volokhivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[37] Drone operators of the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) from Kurchaloyevsky Raion, Republic of Chechnya, the 15th Separate Spetsnaz Company (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD), and the 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Vovchansk direction.[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on March 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 26 that elements of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA) seized Shevyakivka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on March 26 that Russian infiltrations remain in the basement of the ruined city hospital in central Kupyansk.[40] ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Kivsharivka, and Kurylivka and toward Novoosynove on March 25 and 26.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in southwest Kupyansk.[42]

Trehubov reported that a small number of Russian soldiers with an estimated strength between that of a squad or a platoon are scattered and continue to operate within Kupyansk.[43] Trehubov stated that it is premature to declare that Ukrainian forces have eliminated all Russian servicemembers within Kupyansk, contrary to Russian milbloggers’ recent statements.

Order of Battle: Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian Kontora Detachment of the 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Kopanky and Nadiya; southeast of Borova near Tverdokhlibove; and south of Borova near Korovii Yar and Oleksandrivka on March 25 and 26.[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1432nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st GTA) are reportedly operating near Bohuslavka (north of Borova).[46] Elements of the 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st GTA) reportedly continue to operate in the Borova direction.[47]

Ukrainian agents reportedly sabotaged railroad infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Atesh Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported its agents disabled a railway relay cabinet near occupied Luhansk City along a railway that serves as a critical ground line of communication (GLOC) for Russian forces in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions.[48] Atesh reported that the attack impacted ammunition and spare parts deliveries to frontline units, restricting their ability to conduct offensive operations.  

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 17 and 26 indicates that Russian forces, including elements of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]), seized Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk) on a prior date, likely seized Kalenyky (west of Riznykivka), and recently advanced west of Kalenyky.[49]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Lyman, southeast of Lyman, west of Dibrova (southeast of Lyman), and northeast of Staryi Karvan (south of Lyman).[50]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northeast of Lyman near Drobysheve and toward Svyatohirsk; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; south of Lyman near Dibrova; east of Slovyansk near Zakitne, Riznykivka, and Platonivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Fedorivka Druha and Lypivka on March 25 and 26.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rai-Oleksandrivka.[52]

Russian forces continue to suffer heavy losses as they attempt to advance toward Slovyansk. Ukrainian 11th AC Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on March 26 that Russian forces are actively advancing towards Slovyansk, attacking seven or eight times daily and increasing artillery strikes, including with tube artillery.[53] Zaporozhets reported that Ukrainian drone operators maintain positions on heights east of Slovyansk and are striking Russian forces in low-lying areas. Zaporozhets denied the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) March 25 claim that Russian forces seized Nykyforivka (southeast of Slovyansk) and assessed that Russian forces are claiming such seizures to create the impression of success for the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are deploying fresh infantry to the frontline.[54] The spokesperson added that Ukrainian forces are striking Russian forces to prevent them from accumulating before spring foliage decreases Ukrainian drone operators’ ability to detect Russian troops. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces escorted armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) with first-person view (FPV) drones to intercept striking Ukrainian heavy bomber drones during their unsuccessful March 19 regiment-sized mechanized assault in the Lyman direction.[55]

Russian forces struck a dam along the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal on March 23. Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast water utility Voda Donbasu CEO Ihor Novak reported on March 24 that the First and Second Stage Pumping Station reservoirs of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas water canal have only about two weeks of water reserves left after Russian forces struck a dam near Raihorodok (northeast of Slovyansk) with two aerial bombs on March 23.[56] Novak added that Ukrainian authorities will implement water rationing schedules in Ukrainian-controlled cities in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast State Emergency Service Spokesperson Stanislav Baldin stated on March 23 that Ukrainian specialists are monitoring the dam and do not currently expect it to collapse or pose a threat to civilians.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk) and in the Lyman direction.[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on March 26 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 26 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in central Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[59]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar and Minkivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Berestok, and Illinivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on March 25 and 26.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Minkivka, Novopavlivka, and Pavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[61]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on March 26 that Russian forces conducted a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault in Kostyantynivka using two camouflaged tanks advancing from Toretsk (southeast of Kostyantynivka) and an infantry group advancing near Ivanopillya (south of Kostyantynivka), a second infantry group moving on motorcycles along the H-32 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway, and a Spetsnaz group advancing near the Donetska railway.[62] The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed one tank, eliminated all three groups, and took one Russian soldier prisoner. Geolocated footage published on March 26 shows Ukrainian drone operators repelling the mechanized assault south of Ivanopillya and north of Toretsk.[63]

A Ukrainian assault regiment operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on March 25 that Russian forces have scaled up the use of Vampyr-type bomber drones in the area during the past month.[64]

Order of Battle: Infrared Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky (KVN) fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment and artillery elements of the 1008th and 1307th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian vehicles and positions in Kostyantynivka.[65] KVN drone operators of the 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian servicemembers in Kostyantynivka.[66] Fiber-optic FPV drone operators of the Russian Plamya detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are striking Ukrainian forces east of Bilenke (northeast of Druzhkivka).[67] Elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Torske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[68] Elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[69]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Dobropillya near Toretske and east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas on March 25 and 26 but did not advance.[70]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones near Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[71]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Pokrovsk.[72]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[73]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka, Shevchenko, Serhiivka, and Svitle; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Molodetske, Kotlyne, and Novopidhorodne on March 25 and 26.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kotlyne and near Hryshyne.[75]

The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on March 26 that Russian forces conducted two motorized assaults of unspecified sizes on the approaches to Hryshyne and toward Rodynske from near Myrnohrad overnight on March 24 to 25.[76] The corps reported that Ukrainian forces repelled the assaults, destroying over 10 motorcycles and two vehicles and killing about 50 Russian servicemembers. Geolocated footage published on March 26 shows Ukrainian forces repelling the motorized assault west of Pokrovsk.[77] Corps Spokesperson Volodymyr Polevyi reported on March 25 that the assaults exploited poor weather conditions overnight.[78]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Novoserhiivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove on March 25 and 26 but did not advance.[79]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: The Ukrainian Air Assault Forces Command reported on March 26 that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Berezove (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[80]

Russian forces attacked east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad, southeast of Oleksandrivka near Krasnohirske and Ternove, south of Oleksandrivka near Vyshneve, and southwest of Oleksandrivka near Ternuvate on March 25 and 26.[81]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces south of Zirnytsya (southwest of Oleksandrivka) and Ukrainian positions near Velykomykhailivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[82] Drone operators of the 186th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Control, 29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces, positions, and equipment in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[83]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on March 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Olenokostyantynivka and Svyatopetrivka and toward Verkhnya Tersa and Vozdvyzhivka; north of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka, Dobropillya, and Pryluky; southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne and Charivne; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne on March 25 and 26.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Myrne, Hirke (west of Hulyaipole), Novoselivka (southwest of Hulyaipole), Vozdvyzhivka, and Rizdvyanka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[85]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on March 26 that Russian forces are redeploying relatively elite naval infantry and airborne (VDV) units to intensify assaults toward Hulyaipilske (southwest of Hulyaipole) and Verkhnya Tersa.[86] Voloshyn added that Russian military command redeployed elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to operate toward Varvarivka and Pryluky roughly two to three weeks ago (between March 5 and 19), which have since suffered notable casualties. Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade were last observed in the Hulyaipole direction as of February 25 after fighting in the Dobropillya tactical area in Donetsk Oblast.[87]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Martyn Pushkar Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces and equipment near Charivne and Hulyaipilske.[88]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Recent video and textual evidence, including geolocated footage published on March 19, 24, and 25, indicates that Ukrainian forces liberated northern and central Prymorske and Richne (both northwest of Orikhiv).[89] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged on March 13, 24, and 25 that Ukrainian forces advanced in central and northern Prymorske, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely also control Richne.[90] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also published a map on March 25 acknowledging that Ukrainian forces liberated northwestern Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[91]

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Recent video and textual evidence, including geolocated footage published on March 19, 24, and 25 and commentary published by a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger on March 13, 24, and 25, indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain control over Veselyanka (northwest of Orikhiv) — an area where some Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[92]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and Stepove; southwest of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske, Lukyanivske, and Novoboikivske and toward Novoyakovlivka and Pavlivka on March 24 and 25.[93]

A Russian milblogger claimed on March 26 that Ukrainian drones are hindering Russian logistics in the Zaporizhia direction both at the frontline and in the near rear.[94]

Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) infiltrated in Richne on a prior date.[95] Drone operators of the 7th VDV Division are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones near Orikhiv.[96]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge and southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island on March 25 and 26 but did not advance.[97]

Order of Battle: Howitzer elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions along the Dnipro River in the Kherson direction.[98]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 25 to 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 153 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which roughly 100 were Shaheds — Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[99] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 130 drones, that 16 drones struck 11 locations, and that drone debris fell on five locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged railway infrastructure in Kirovohrad Oblast; residential infrastructure in Dnipro and Kharkiv cities; commercial infrastructure in Chernihiv City; and port, energy, and commercial infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, leaving 33,400 customers without power.[100] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Sumy, Chernihiv, Zaporizhia, and Kharkiv oblasts.[101]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky provided details on current and future Russian long-range strikes. Zelensky stated on March 25 that Russian forces are preparing an operation against Ukrainian water supply systems in the following months.[102] Zelensky stated on March 26 that Russian forces are continuing the second phase of their Winter 2025-2026 strikes campaign against critical infrastructure, targeting water supply infrastructure, dams, reservoirs, and logistics targets.[103]

Significant Activity in Belarus 

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Belarus continues to increase cooperation with North Korea. Belarus and North Korea signed a treaty on “Friendship and Cooperation” during Lukashenko’s official visit to North Korea on March 26.[104]