Toplines

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly requested that Russia’s top businessmen provide funding for the Russian government, indicating that the Kremlin may be growing desperate for economic relief and may be setting conditions to nationalize their assets to support the war effort. Russian independent outlet The Bell reported, citing multiple sources familiar with the conversation, that Putin held a closed meeting with Russia’s top businessmen on March 26 in which Putin stated that Russia will continue to fight and called on the businessmen to contribute to the Russian federal budget.[1] Two sources stated that Putin asked for these contributions in the context of Russia continuing the war in Ukraine, implying that the funds will support Russia’s war effort. One source told The Bell that the idea to “shake up business” came from Russian state oil company Rosneft Head Igor Sechin, who reportedly made this proposal and a proposal to issue military bonds as a mechanism for raising funds for Putin on March 25. The Bell reported that Russian Federation Council Senator Suleiman Kerimov immediately pledged 100 billion rubles (about $1.22 billion) to Putin and that another unspecified businessman pledged additional support but did not disclose the amount. Three people familiar with the matter told the Financial Times that Putin had asked during the meeting that top businessmen donate money to stabilize Russia’s finances.[2] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed that Putin met with Russian businessmen but denied that Putin asked the businessmen for money, that the money is for the war effort, and that the idea came from Sechin.[3] Peskov claimed that one participant discussed the necessity of donating a “very large sum of money” to the Russian state, but emphasized that this is a personal decision.

Putin’s reported request for Russian top businessmen to donate money to the Russian state threatens to break a promise he made to Russian oligarchs to not nationalize their assets soon after seizing power. Putin met with Russian top businessmen in July 2000 and promised to uphold the 1990s privatization of assets that previously belonged to the Soviet Union in exchange for the businessmen staying out of Russian politics and pledging allegiance to Putin.[4] Peskov claimed on March 27 that one of the March 26 meeting participants had noted that most of those who attended the meeting started their businesses in the 1990s and were connected to the Russian state “in one way or another” at the time, so that many of the participants “consider it their duty” to make financial contributions to the Russian state.[5] Putin has repeatedly implied that the Kremlin is against nationalization of property but has been gradually accelerating nationalization efforts during the full-scale invasion.[6] Peskov’s invocation of the 1990s privatization of industrial assets in Russia and implication that the businessmen should consider funding the Russian state to be their “duty” may intend to set a pattern of expected behavior for oligarchs against the backdrop of increasing Russian censorship efforts. The Kremlin’s crackdowns against Telegram and other internet censorship efforts may help neutralize businessmen who could try to resist the Kremlin’s nationalization efforts by weaponizing the information space.[7]

Ukraine and Saudi Arabia concluded a defense cooperation agreement on March 27. The Ukrainian Presidential Office reported that Ukraine will help Saudi Arabia with air defenses under the agreement, which also outlines the foundations for further contacts and includes technological cooperation and investments.[8] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed the agreement ahead of further talks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud. Zelensky stated that such cooperation can be mutually beneficial as Saudi Arabia has “something that Ukraine is interested in.”[9] Zelensky and al Saud discussed possible energy cooperation. Zelensky also met with Ukrainian military experts who have been supporting air defense operations in Saudi Arabia for over a week (since at least March 20) and discussed additional measures to support Saudi Arabia’s air defense operations.[10] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine can offer the United States and US allies in the Middle East unique insights into how to counter Iranian strikes, as the Ukrainian military has institutionalized and operationalized the fighting experience that Ukraine has learned throughout the past four years of war.[11]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure near the Baltic Sea on the night of March 26 to 27, marking the fourth strike in five days against Russian oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast. Geolocated footage published on March 27 shows fires at the Transneft-Port Primorsk oil terminal and Novatek Ust-Luga oil terminal, both in Leningrad Oblast.[12] Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck the port of Ust-Luga and the Primorsk oil terminal overnight.[13] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who frequently reports on Russian and Ukrainian strikes, heavily implied on March 27 that Ukrainian forces likely struck the port of Ust-Luga overnight.[14] Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko acknowledged the Ukrainian drone strike on Leningrad Oblast overnight on March 26 to 27, but did not specify any damages.[15] Satellite imagery captured by Vantor on March 27 shows a large fire spanning multiple oil storage tanks and creating dark smoke at the Ust-Luga oil terminal. Additional satellite imagery captured by Planet Labs shows a large smoke plume at the Primorsk oil depot on March 27. Ukrainian forces struck the Kirishi oil refinery in Leningrad Oblast on the night of March 25 to 26 and the ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga on the nights of March 22 to 23 and 24 to 25.[16] The Ukrainian General staff confirmed on March 27 that Ukrainian strikes on the Kirishi oil refinery in Leningrad Oblast damaged two crude oil refining units, petroleum bitumen producing facilities, hydrotreating units, and gas fractionation units.[17] A Russian milblogger admitted on March 27 that continued Ukrainian strikes on Ust-Luga demonstrate a major vulnerability in Russian air defenses, harshly criticizing Russia’s failure to develop the air defense capability to defend against the recent strikes.[18]

Latvia warned on March 27 that Russia launched a cognitive warfare campaign falsely accusing the Baltic states of allowing Ukraine to launch strikes against Russia from the Baltic states’ territories. The Latvian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on March 27 that Russia is conducting a large-scale information warfare campaign against Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia by falsely claiming that the Baltic states are allowing Ukrainian forces to use their territory for strikes against Russia.[19] The Latvian MoD is likely responding to claims that emerged following reports that authorities found downed Ukrainian drones in Latvia and Estonia that were likely diverted off course by Russian electronic warfare (EW).[20] The Latvian MoD stressed that the Baltic States are not involved in the planning and implementation of Ukrainian strikes against Russia.[21] The Latvian MoD added that Russia is attempting to divert attention from its inability to defend itself against Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian infrastructure on the Baltic Sea coast. Russia has long criticized the Baltic states for their continued support of Ukraine and likely seeks to use these new allegations to discredit NATO, weaken support for Ukraine, and possibly even set conditions to justify future aggression against Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia at a time of Russia’s choosing.[22]

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for Ukrainian strikes against Russian port and oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) overnight on March 26 to 27. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on March 27 that Ukrainian forces struck the Severstal Cherepovets Iron and Steel Works in Vologda Oblast and assessed that at least one drone likely struck the blast furnace workshop.[23] Astra noted that the Cherepovets Iron and Steel Works is Russia’s second largest steelmaking plant. Geolocated footage published on March 27 confirms the strike against Cherepovets.[24] Vologda Oblast Governor Georgy Filimonov acknowledged that Ukrainian forces struck an industrial zone in Cherepovets but claimed the strike did not damage critical infrastructure.[25] Astra reported on March 27 that fire trucks responded to the Smolensk Aircraft Plant after reports of explosions and drone strikes in the area on March 26.[26] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed drones over Smolensk Oblast in the afternoon and evening of March 26.[27]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 26 and 27 but did not advance.[28]

Order of Battle: An assault company of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) is reportedly operating near Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[29] Drone operators of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade and elements of the 1st Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Kursk Oblast border area.[30] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue operating in the Sumy direction.[31]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsya, Vovchanski Khutory, Izbytske, and Zybyne on March 26 and 27.[32]

A Ukrainian company commander reported on March 27 that Ukrainian forces continue to hold dominant heights in the Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) direction and have prevented Russian forces from making significant advances in the area since 2024.[33]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Vakha Battalion (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[34]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne on March 27, but ISW has not collected any evidence to assess that Russian forces made any advances.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Podoly and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Kurylivka and toward Novoosynove and Kivsharivka on March 26 and 27.[36]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on March 27 that 10 to 20 Russian servicemembers remain in basements and ruins throughout Kupyansk, surviving on food delivered through drone drops.[37]

Order of Battle: Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drone and Kub loitering munition operators of the Russian Kontora Detachment of the 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and FPV drone operators of the 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka and Bohuslavka; northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka; east of Borova near Nadiya and Shyikivka; southeast of Borova near Tverdokhlibove; and south of Borova near Serednie on March 26 and 27.[39]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 2nd Battalion of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA) are reportedly operating near Bohuslavka.[40]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast overnight on March 25 to 26. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) published geolocated footage on March 27 that shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Tor air defense system southeast of occupied Pysarivka (roughly 87 kilometers from the frontline).[41] The footage may be showing the destruction of the Tor-M1 air defense system that the Ukrainian General Staff reported Ukrainian forces struck near occupied Aidar (roughly 87 kilometers from the frontline and just northeast of occupied Pysarivka) overnight on March 25 to 26.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 26 that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian fuel and lubricants depot near occupied Aidar; a fuel and lubricants depot near occupied Raihorodka (roughly 78 kilometers from the frontline); a troop concentration near occupied Kamyanka (roughly 68 kilometers from the frontline); and two equipment depots and a maintenance unit facility in unspecified locations in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts overnight on March 25 to 26.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on March 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into southern Lyman.[44]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Drobysheve and toward Svyatohirsk; southeast of Lyman near Yampil and Dibrova; east of Slovyansk near Platonivka, Zakitne, Kalenyky, Kryva Luka, and Riznykivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka and Mykolaivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka, Vasyukivka, and Fedorivka Druha and toward Lypivka on March 26 and 27.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Mykolaivka.[46]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are striking Ukrainian equipment northwest of Staryi Karavan (northwest of Lyman).[47] Elements of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) are reportedly assaulting Ukrainian positions northeast of Rai-Oleksandrivka.[48] Elements of 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA) and 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[49] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in the Lyman direction.[50]

Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 26 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian-occupied buildings in southern Berestok and southern Illinivka (both south of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[51]

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on March 21 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions northeast of Novodmytrivka (north of Kostyantynivka) – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[52]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Markove and Minkivka and toward Chervone; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Berestok, and Illinivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka and Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on March 26 and 27.[53]

Russian forces continued to exploit the weather and employ infiltration tactics in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on March 27 that the intensity of the Russian attack depends on the weather.[54] The officer reported that Russian forces typically send up to ten servicemembers to advance in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR) daily, but several dozen during poor weather. The officer added that Ukrainian forces expect Russian forces to increase mechanized assaults and vehicular activity as the soil dries. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on March 26 that Russian forces are rotating troops in the Kostyantynivka direction, but Ukrainian forces have not observed a buildup or abnormal concentration of Russian troops.[55] The spokesperson reportedthat Ukrainian forces have covered the roads near Kramatorsk and Slovyansk with anti-drone nets to prevent Russian forces from interdicting Ukrainian logistics. An officer of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on March 27 that Russian forces are using smoke screens to conduct mechanized assaults and to infiltrate on foot and on motorcycles.[56] The officer added that Russian forces are deploying elements of various regiments and brigades in the direction, including mobilized Russians, foreign mercenaries, and Chechen Akhmat troops.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1008th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[57] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and drone control points near Raiske, Priyut, and Novomykolaivka (all southwest of Druzhkivka).[58] FPV and other drone operators of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) and the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[59]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on March 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas, Shakhove, and Nove Shakhove and toward Hannivka; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on March 26 and 27.[60]

Order of Battle: Multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Dobropillya direction.[61]

Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against the Russian near rear in the Dobropillya tactical area overnight on March 26 to 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya) on the night of March 26 to 27.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 27 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 26 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian-occupied buildings in eastern and southeastern Bilytske after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[63]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka, Serhiivka, and Vasylivka; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Svitle; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Molodetske, Novopidhorodne, and Kotlyne on March 26 and 27.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself and northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka on March 27 but did not advance.[65]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 27 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 27 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in central Ternove (southeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[66]

Russian forces attacked east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Oleksandrivka near Krasnohirske; south of Oleksandrivka near Vyshneve; and southwest of Oleksandrivka near Ternuvate on March 26 and 27.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[68]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on March 27 that Russian forces have recently resumed infiltration attempts in the Oleksandrivka direction and that Ukrainian and Russian positions are interspersed on the frontline, forming a large contested “gray zone” without a concrete frontline.[69] The spokesperson added that Russian forces are sending expendable assault troops to conduct infiltrations and that the appearance of foliage will make it harder for Ukrainian reconnaissance to detect small Russian infantry groups.

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 200th Artillery Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions west of Berezove (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[70]

Ukrainian forces continued their short- and mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast between March 25 and 27. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on March 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian logistics hub, troop concentration, command post, and logistics site in occupied Velyka Novosilka (roughly 19 kilometers from the frontline), presumably overnight on March 26 to 27.[71] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 26 that Ukrainian forces struck ammunition depots near occupied Makedonivka (roughly 104 kilometers from the frontline) and occupied Buryakova Balka (roughly 118 kilometers from the frontline) and a troop concentration near occupied Luhanske (roughly 37 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on March 25 to 26.[72] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post near occupied Olhynka (roughly 73 kilometers from the frontline), an ammunition depot near occupied Manhush (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline), and a material and technical depot near occupied Rybynske (roughly 84 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of 26 to 27.[73]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on March 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Svyatopetrivka and Zelene and toward Vozdvyzhivka, Rizdvyanka, and Verkhnya Tersa; southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and toward Staroukrainka and Hulyaipilske on March 26 and 27.[74]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Hulyaipole direction.[75]

Ukrainian forces continued their short- and mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of March 26 to 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian material and technical depot near occupied Novoselivka (roughly 14 kilometers from the frontline).[76] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces (GoF) personnel, vehicles, and equipment at a training ground near occupied Novopetrivka (roughly 101 kilometers from the frontline).[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk, southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, and west of Orikhiv near Stepove and Shcherbaky on March 26 and 27.[78]

Russian forces recently struck a reported Ukrainian Patriot air defense system in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on March 27 shows Lancet loitering munitions operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly striking two launchers and an AN/MPQ-53 radar station of a Patriot air defense system near Vasylkivske (northeast of Zaporizhzhia City and roughly 58 kilometers from the frontline). [79]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Chervona Krynytsya (east of Orikhiv).[80] Elements of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Orikhiv.[81]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on March 27.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly coordinating artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces in Kherson City.[82]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea overnight on March 26 to 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Valdai radar system near occupied Hvardiiske and a Forpost drone ground control station in occupied Yevpatoriya on the night of March 26 to 27.[83] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on March 27 that SSO elements struck a Russian unmanned surface vessel (USV) operator base in occupied Sevastopol.[84]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 102 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which roughly 60 were Shaheds — from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[85] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 93 drones, that nine drones struck eight locations, and that drone debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged energy, residential, commercial, and transportation infrastructure in Poltava, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts.[86]

Russian forces have recently begun operating Knyaz Veshchy Oleg fixed-wing reconnaissance drones. The chief of air defense of a Ukrainian brigade reported on March 27 that Ukrainian forces first observed Russian use of Knyaz Veshchy Oleg fixed-wing reconnaissance drones in January 2026.[87] The chief of air defense noted that the Knyaz Veshchy Oleg drones are significantly larger in size than other Russian reconnaissance drones but possess similar flight characteristics to Supercam fixed-wing reconnaissance drones.

Significant Activity in Belarus 

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continued his state visit to North Korea on March 27. Belarusian Presidential Spokesperson Nataliya Eismont stated that Lukashenko invited North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un to visit Belarus.[88] Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov stated that Belarus plans to open an embassy in North Korea.[89]

Belarusian opposition news outlet Flagshtok reported on March 26 that Belarus is constructing a new border outpost near Svecha, Gomel Oblast, and plans to complete the construction by August 2026.[90]