Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 28, 2026
Toplines
Russian forces struck a maternity hospital in Odesa City overnight on March 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 273 Shahed, Gerbera, and Italmas-type drones, including about 180 Shaheds, primarily toward Odesa Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 252 drones, that 21 drones struck 18 locations, and that fragments of downed drones struck nine locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces launched over 60 drones just at Odesa City and struck a maternity hospital in the city.[2] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper stated that Russian forces killed two and injured 12 at the maternity hospital and launched over 100 drones against Odesa Oblast, also damaging critical, residential, and port infrastructure.[3] The Ukrainian Health Ministry reported that there were 22 women in labor and 19 newborns in the maternity hospital at the time of the strike.[4] Russian forces also struck residential and industrial infrastructure in Poltava Oblast and industrial and energy infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, overnight.[5] Russian long-range strikes continue to disproportionately affect civilian areas, and Russia has deliberately modified its strike vehicles and tactics to inflict greater amounts of damage against civilian areas.[6]
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial and oil infrastructure on the night of March 27 to 28 and morning of March 28, including with Ukrainian-produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles and FP-1 long-range drones. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 28 that Ukrainian forces conducted an FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile strike against the Promsintez explosives plant in Chapayevsk, Samara Oblast (roughly 890 kilometers from the international border) on March 28.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the plant produces over 30,000 tons of military explosives annually for ammunition, including aerial bombs and missiles. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that the strike damaged the plant and caused secondary explosions at the facility. Geolocated footage and imagery published on March 28 show an explosion and smoke plumes from the direction of the Promsintez plant.[8] An image published on March 28 reportedly shows the FP-5 missile in flight.[9] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on March 28 that Chapayevsk residents reported witnessing the strike and the activation of a missile alert.[10] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev announced a missile alert in the oblast on the morning of March 28 and claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to strike the oblast, but that the strike did not damage social or residential infrastructure.[11]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 28 that Ukrainian forces struck the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl City, Yaroslavl Oblast, overnight on March 27 to 28, starting a fire.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the refinery has an annual refining capacity of about 15 million tons of petroleum products and refines gasoline, diesel fuel, and jet fuel critical to Russian military logistics. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst geolocated footage and assessed that it shows a Ukrainian FP-1 long-range drone in flight over Yaroslavl City and fires likely at production infrastructure, overpasses, and tank farms at the facility.[13] Additional geolocated footage published on March 28 shows fires and smoke plumes originating from the direction of the refinery.[14] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Yevraev claimed on March 28 that Russian air defenses downed over 30 Ukrainian drones over the oblast overnight.[15]
Russia is preparing to temporarily suspend all gasoline exports as of April 1, likely in response to domestic gasoline price increases partly caused by Ukraine’s long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil infrastructure. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak instructed the Ministry of Energy during a March 27 meeting to prepare a draft resolution banning all gasoline exports from April 1 to July 31, 2026, in order to stabilize gasoline prices and prioritize supplies to the domestic market.[16] Russian authorities previously suspended gasoline exports in September 2025 but lifted the ban for large exporters at the end of January 2026.[17] Gasoline prices in Russia have risen sharply since Fall 2025 following the intensification of Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure, placing increasing burdens of the war on the Russian populace as inflation continues to rise, real income continues to fall, and the price of household goods remains high.[18] Russia’s decision to suspend gasoline exports comes amid continued Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure in recent weeks, as well as the war in the Middle East contributing to rising energy prices writ large.[19] Russia’s decision to temporarily suspend gasoline exports, the revenues from which fund Russia’s war machine, is likely the result of increasing pressure on the Kremlin to balance between funding its war effort and mitigating the costs of the war on its domestic populace.
Ukraine continues to conclude bilateral defense cooperation agreements with Gulf states. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on March 28 that Ukraine and Qatar signed a 10-year defense agreement that includes developing defense industry and technologies, air defenses, counter-drone measures, military training, experience sharing, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence (AI), and control systems.[20] Zelensky stated that the agreement includes building joint production factories in both Ukraine and Qatar.[21] Zelensky stated that Ukraine will soon conclude a similar agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) but noted that these agreements do not mean that Ukraine is obligated to help defend these states.[22] Ukraine and Saudi Arabia concluded a defense cooperation agreement on March 27.[23] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine can offer the United States and US allies in the Middle East unique insights into how to counter Iranian strikes, as the Ukrainian military has institutionalized and operationalized the fighting experience that Ukraine has learned throughout the past four years of war.[24]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces struck a maternity hospital in Odesa City overnight on March 27 to 28.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial and oil infrastructure on the night of March 27 to 28 and morning of March 28, including with Ukrainian-produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles and FP-1 long-range drones.
- Russia is preparing to temporarily suspend all gasoline exports as of April 1, likely in response to domestic gasoline price increases partly caused by Ukraine’s long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil infrastructure.
- Ukraine continues to conclude bilateral defense cooperation agreements with Gulf states.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 28 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in the Sumy direction, including northwest of Sumy City toward Tovstodubove, Ulanove, and Shostka and north of Sumy City toward Kindratkivka and Nova Sich on March 27 and 28.[25]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck Kruzhok (northwest of Sumy City) with four FAB-500 guided glide bombs.[26]
Order of Battle: Mobile air defense group of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) is reportedly targeting Ukrainian reconnaissance drones in the Kursk Oblast border area.[27] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue operating in the Sumy direction.[28]
Ukrainian forces continue mid-range strikes against Russian military assets in Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a fuel and lubricants depot near Unecha, Bryansk Oblast (about 62 kilometers from the frontline).[29]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 28 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsya, Vovchanski Khutory, Izbytske, Mala Vovcha, Okhrimivka, Prylipka, Lyptsi, Verkhnya Pysarivka, and Zybyne on March 27 and 28.[30]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Khatnie and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Chuhunivka on March 28 but did not advance.[31]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations and infiltration missions in the Kupyansk direction on March 27 but did not advance.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 28 shows Russian forces operating in northwestern Kupyansk during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[32]
Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka, Pishchane, Hlushkivka, and Podoly and toward Novoosynove on March 27 and 28.[33]
Russian forces are reportedly waiting for weather conditions to improve to intensify offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on March 27 that Russian forces have largely run out of unspecified resources in the Kupyansk direction but are preparing to intensify offensive operations when spring foliage provides better concealment.[34] Trehubov said that no more than 20 Russian servicemembers remain within Kupyansk. Trehubov stated that Russian forces are occasionally attempting to advance toward Kupyansk from the east but have largely stopped attempts to advance toward Kupyansk from the north. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on March 27 that Russian forces are intensifying assault operations as the weather improves and are using small numbers of motorcycles, quad bikes, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) in their assaults.[35]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[36]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Novoplatonivka, south of Borova near Serednie, and southeast of Borova toward Novoserhiivka on March 27 and 28 but did not advance.[37]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Lyman as Russian forces continued infiltration missions in the area.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Lyman.[38]
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Additional geolocated footage published on March 27 shows Russian forces operating elsewhere in eastern Lyman during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[39]
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 28 that Russian forces seized Brusivka (south of Lyman).[40]
Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Drobysheve and toward Svyatohirsk; southeast of Lyman near Yampil and Dibrova; south of Lyman toward Staryi Karavan and Brusivka; east of Slovyansk near Platonivka, Zakitne, Kalenyky, and Riznykivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka on March 27 and 28.[41] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[42]
Russian forces have decreased their tempo of offensive operations in the Lyman direction following intensified offensive operations, including a mechanized assault, in recent days. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on March 28 that Russian forces have reduced their activity in the Lyman direction but continue infiltration missions towards Lyman.[43] Trehubov noted that Russian forces have failed to gain a foothold in Lyman and assessed that Russian forces will likely focus on advancing on the Fortress Belt from the south through Kostyantynivka. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction likewise reported that Russian forces resumed small group infiltration tactics following their March 19 battalion-sized mechanized assault.[44]
Order of Battle: Drone and artillery elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces near Kalenyky.[45] Drone and artillery elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in eastern Lyman.[46] Drone operators of Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[47]
Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on March 27 shows drone and D-30 howitzer elements of the Russian 1008th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) striking Ukrainian positions near Bilinskoho Street in northeastern Kostyantynivka – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[48]
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Markove and Chasiv Yar and toward Chervone; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya and Kleban-Byk; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Berestok, and Illinivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka and Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on March 27 and 28.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Chasiv Yar.[50]
Geolocated footage published on March 27 shows Ukrainian forces intercepting a Russian Knyaz Veshchy Oleg fixed-wing reconnaissance drone just north of Kostyantynivka.[51] Russian forces recently began operating Knyaz Veshchy Oleg fixed-wing reconnaissance drones on the battlefield in Ukraine.[52]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces in western Kostyantynivka.[53] Drone operations of the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kostyantynivka.[54] FPV drone operators of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drones near Rusyn Yar and Mykolaipillya (south of Druzhkivka).[55] Drone operators of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[56]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on March 28 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar, east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove, and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on March 27 and 28.[57]
A Ukrainian unit operating in the Dobropillya direction reported that Russian forces are maintaining the tempo of their assaults while increasingly attempting to conceal themselves in damaged buildings.[58]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[59]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 28 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[60]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko, Serhiivka, and Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Molodetske, Novopidhorodne, and Kotlyne on March 27 and 28.[61]
Russian forces recently intensified assaults in the Pokrovsk direction, particularly during poor weather conditions. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on March 28 that Russian forces intensified offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction and are trying to advance along several tactical directions at once.[62] The 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported that Russian forces are attempting to advance on the flanks near Hryshyne and towards Rodynske. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on March 27 that Russian forces have not changed their tactics and continue to conduct motorized and mechanized assaults during poor weather to take advantage of impeded Ukrainian reconnaissance.[63] The officer noted that Russian forces also conceal their operations with smokescreens to further hinder Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance.
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka and Novomykolaivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on March 27 and 28, but did not advance.[64]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 28 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka, Zelenyi Hai, Sosnivka, Andriivka-Klevtsove and Sichneve and toward Havrylivka and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Zlahoda, Oleksandrohrad, and Kalynivske and toward Verbove on March 27 and 28.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Andriivka-Klevtsove, Berezove, and Fedorivka (both southeast of Oleksandrivka).[66]
Russian forces conducted an at least platoon-sized mechanized and motorized assault in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 28. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on March 28 that Russian forces conducted an at least platoon-sized mechanized and motorized assault on the morning of March 28, the largest in the brigade’s area of operations (AoR) since the start of 2026.[67] The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed one Russian tank, two quad bikes, and two motorcycles, and killed 27 Russian servicemembers and wounded one.
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets near the frontline in the Oleksandrivka direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Sichneve, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, on March 27.[68]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles west of Ternuvate (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[69] Bomber aircraft of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in Velykomykhailivka (east of Oleksandrivka).[70]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on March 27 and overnight on March 27 to 28. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on March 28 that Ukrainian forces struck Gerbera- and Shahed-type drone launchers at the occupied Donetsk City Airport (roughly 41 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on March 27 to 28 as Russian forces were preparing to use the launchers to launch drones against Ukraine.[71] Geolocated footage published on March 28 shows Ukrainian drone operators striking a Russian drone crew launching a Gerbera-type drone at the occupied Donetsk City Airport.[72] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi analyzed satellite imagery on March 28 and assessed that it shows that Russian forces are building at least 11 new structures likely for storage of Geran- and Gerbera-type drones at the airport.[73] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 28 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian fuel and lubricants depots on the outskirts of occupied Donetsk City (roughly 43 kilometers from the frontline); ammunition depots near occupied Manhush (roughly 99 kilometers from the frontline) and Hlyboke (roughly 112 kilometers from the frontline); and a maintenance unit near occupied Prokhorivka (roughly 98 kilometers from the frontline) on either March 27 or on the night of March 27 to 28.[74] Brovdi reported on March 28 that Ukrainian drone operators struck electronic warfare (EW) and ammunition depots, and an EW workshop in occupied Luhanske, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 63 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of March 25 to 26, and an equipment and ammunition depot and communications towers in occupied Manhush on the night of March 26 to 27.[75] Geolocated footage published on March 28 shows Ukrainian drone operators striking a Russian EW depot and workshop in occupied Luhanske.[76]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on March 28 but did not recently advance.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 20 shows destroyed Russian armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) north of Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole), indicating that Russian forces advanced in the area.[77] ISW assesses that this change did not occur within the last 24 hours.
Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Olenokostyantynivka and toward Verkhnya Tersa and Vozdvyzhivka; north of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka, Dobropillya, and Zelene; west of Hulyaipole near Hirke, Zaliznychne, and Staroukrainka; and southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne and Hulyaipilske on March 27 and 28.[78]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), including its 2nd Battalion, are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian reconnaissance and sleeper drones on the outskirts of Zaliznychne and striking Ukrainian forces southwest of Hirke.[79] Drone operators of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Hulyaipilske.[80]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 28 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky and Stepove; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk on March 27 and 28.[81]
Russian forces conducted two mechanized assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 28. A Ukrainian brigade reported on March 28 that Russian forces conducted a roughly company-sized mechanized assault in the Zaporizhia direction on the morning of March 28.[82] The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed all 10 armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) involved and that surviving infantry retreated. Geolocated footage published on March 28 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian AFVs along the T-504 highway north of Robotyne (south of Orikhiv).[83] Another Ukrainian brigade operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast reported on March 28 that Russian forces conducted a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault toward Mala Tokmachka on the morning of March 28, exploiting foggy conditions.[84] The Ukrainian brigade reported that the assault involved a tank, an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), and two all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and that Ukrainian forces destroyed all the vehicles involved, killed 10 Russian servicemembers, and wounded another 10. Geolocated footage published on March 28 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian tank and ATV near Novopokrovka (southeast of Mala Tokmachka).[85]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions toward Orikhiv.[86]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian air defense in western Zaporizhia Oblast overnight on March 27 to 28. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on March 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor-M1 air defense system in an unspecified location in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast overnight.[87]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on March 28 but did not advance.[88]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[89]
Ukrainian forces continued their short- and mid-range strike campaigns against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near occupied Nova Kakhovka and a command and observation post near occupied Lyubymivka (both northeast of Kherson City) on March 27.[90] Brovdi reported on March 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian equipment depot in occupied Blahovishchenka (roughly 80 kilometers from the east [left] bank of the Dnipro River) on March 27.[91]
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian materiel and technical depot near occupied Mizhhirya (about 225 kilometers from the frontline) on March 27.[92]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
See topline text.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/58904
[2] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18448; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2037799120543293784
[3] https://t.me/odeskaODA/15014
[4] https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/2874; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1275396-kilkist-zagiblih-v-odesi-zbilsilasa-do-dvoh/
[5] https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/32838; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1275390-odna-ludina-zaginula-u-rezultati-obstrilu-u-poltavskomu-rajoni/; https://t.me/vilkul/15523; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1275324-vijska-rf-atakuvali-dronami-promislovij-obekt-u-krivomu-rozi-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni-vinikli-pozezi/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/28487; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1275324-vijska-rf-atakuvali-dronami-promislovij-obekt-u-krivomu-rozi-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni-vinikli-pozezi/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2026/
[7] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36626
[8] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12723; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/18076; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2037739266164334834; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2037725537872093566; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2037732106345042265; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2037723779259048371; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2037741287592595825; https://t.me/supernova_plus/50012; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2037886767530152082; https://t.me/supernova_plus/50031; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2037889283676148201;
[9] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/18081
[10] https://t.me/astrapress/108192
[11] https://t.me/fedorishchev_official/477; https://t.me/fedorishchev_official/483
[12] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36627
[13] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12721
[14] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2037702080379638267; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2037693798143390082; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2037703954382127322; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2037719889998471586; https://t.me/supernova_plus/50009; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2037880134993387816; https://t.me/supernova_plus/50036
[15] https://t.me/evraevmikhail/18058
[16] http://government dot ru/news/58203/
[17] http://government dot ru/news/58203/; https://www.rbc dot ru/business/27/03/2026/69c69fce9a794751fe28a69f
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2025/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2026/
[20] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18461; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18460; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2037855177428844601; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/prezident-ukrayini-ta-emir-derzhavi-katar-domovilisya-pro-pa-103585 https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2037881168251527552;
[21] https://suspilne dot media/1275694-nam-vistacae-svoei-vijni-zelenskij-pro-ucast-ukrainskih-vijskovih-u-blizkomu-shodi/
[22] https://suspilne dot media/1275694-nam-vistacae-svoei-vijni-zelenskij-pro-ucast-ukrainskih-vijskovih-u-blizkomu-shodi/
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36599 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36604 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36628 ; https://t.me/uvkkursk/289 ; https://t.me/rybar/78980 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41259
[26] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/204667
[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41249
[28] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/204702
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36627
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36599 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36604; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20336 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36628 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/90282 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33180 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/7313
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36628 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33180
[32] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2037875875413143693; https://x.com/425Skala/status/2037857407645163870
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36599; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36604; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20336; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36628; https://t.me/wargonzo/33180;
[34] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/27/na-pivnochi-nadiyu-vtratyly-v-rajoni-vidpovidalnosti-ugrupovannya-obyednanyh-syl-resursy-rosiyan-vycherpalysya/
[35] https://youtu.be/qR9HjOXy2jU; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/28/shturmy-stayut-dribno-mehanizovanymy-rosiyany-shturmuyut-na-zhygulyah-i-motoczyklah/
[36] https://t.me/gvZapad/18171
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36604; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20336; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36628; https://t.me/wargonzo/33180; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36599; https://t.me/gvZapad/18170
[38] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2037667267463516402; https://t.me/Molodoy_37_msp/50
[39] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11564; https://www.facebook.com/reel/967102996262691
[40] https://t.me/mod_russia/62243
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36599; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36604; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20336; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36628; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41244; https://t.me/wargonzo/33180
[42] https://t.me/gvZapad/18170
[43] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIRlElzXDTk; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1275556-jogo-navit-tam-osoblivo-ne-obijdes-oficer-zsu-poasniv-rol-limana-v-oboroni-slovanska-ta-kramatorska/
[44] https://youtu.be/qR9HjOXy2jU; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/28/znajshly-berizku-i-davaj-horovody-vodyty-navkolo-neyi-vid-drona-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-nyshhat-vorozhyh-shturmovykiv/
[45] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2037496417191649333; https://t.me/OMSBr_123/1806
[46] https://t.me/Molodoy_37_msp/50; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2037667267463516402
[47] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/204702; https://t.me/gvZapad/18173
[48] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2037877987207528843; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/4512; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/32036
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36599; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36604; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36628; https://t.me/dva_majors/90282; https://t.me/wargonzo/33180
[50] https://t.me/rusich_army/28953
[51] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2037503885594464583; https://t.me/OMBR156/2228
[52] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/
[53] https://t.me/lost_armour/8722; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2037874140342870245
[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/62246
[55] http://t.me/nm_dnr/15174
[56] https://t.me/dva_majors/90288
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36599 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36604 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36628
[58] http://t.me/feniksdpsu/1800
[59] https://t.me/motopatriot78/49886
[60] https://t.me/motopatriot78/49894
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36599; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36604; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36628; https://t.me/dva_majors/90282; https://t.me/motopatriot78/49884; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41242; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41244; https://t.me/wargonzo/33180; https://t.me/motopatriot78/49894
[62] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1HXw3X9G3c/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/28/lizut-flangamy-u-gryshynomu-aktyvni-strileczki-boyi-vorog-tysne-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1275484-vijska-rf-aktivizuvalasa-bila-pokrovska-sturmi-vedut-u-kilkoh-napramkah-7-korpus-dsv/
[63] https://youtu.be/qR9HjOXy2jU; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/28/zastosovuvav-dymovi-boyeprypasy-pid-pokrovskom-vidbyly-shturm-voroga-po-kilkoh-marshrutah/
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36599; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36604; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36628
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36599; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36604; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36628; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41241
[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41241
[67] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/18RAphXURw/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/28/najpotuzhnisha-ataka-z-pochatku-roku-morpihy-vidbyly-masovanyj-shturm-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku/
[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36627
[69] https://t.me/voin_dv/19117
[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/19112; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2037825573469196479
[71] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2139; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1275566-sbs-znisili-puskovi-ustanovki-dla-zapusku-sahediv-v-doneckomu-aeroportu/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/28/lyuto-nezabutni-dlya-hrobakiv-nochi-madyar-pokazav-rezultaty-udariv-sbs-po-puskovyh-i-ppo/
[72] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12726; https://t.me/army_1usc/847; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34525; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2037879240838844516
[73] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/u-donetskomu-aeroport-budivnytstvo-garazhiv/
[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36627
[75] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2139
[76] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2037886214859100353; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2037857340855034030; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2139
[77] https://t.me/black_swan_ukraine/526; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34519
[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36599; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36604; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36628; https://t.me/dva_majors/90282; https://t.me/wargonzo/33180; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41241; https://t.me/voin_dv/19113
[79] https://t.me/voin_dv/19109; https://t.me/voin_dv/19115
[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/19114
[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36628; https://t.me/wargonzo/33180; https://t.me/dva_majors/90282
[82] https://t.me/Ronins_65/1058
[83] https://t.me/Ronins_65/1058; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2037856193385808161; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2037860596360630771;
[84] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1BvXZDwQ7t/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/28/navit-ne-dijshly-mehanizovanyj-shturm-okupantiv-na-tavrijskomu-napryamku-zirvano/
[85] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2037875872376516792; https://www.facebook.com/reel/2131019334314420
[86] https://t.me/wargonzo/33178
[87] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2139; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1275566-sbs-znisili-puskovi-ustanovki-dla-zapusku-sahediv-v-doneckomu-aeroportu/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/28/lyuto-nezabutni-dlya-hrobakiv-nochi-madyar-pokazav-rezultaty-udariv-sbs-po-puskovyh-i-ppo/
[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36599; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36604; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36628
[89] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41249
[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36627
[91] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2139
[92] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36627
