Toplines

Russian forces are struggling to advance on the northern part of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt following the onset of the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 29 that elements of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) fighting near Kryva Luka and Zakitne (east of Slovyansk, the northern tip of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt) have stalled after making tactically-significant advances in the last month (since about February 27).[1] Mashovets noted that Russian forces have failed to advance within the last week (since about March 22) after achieving a tactical penetration of Ukrainian defenses between Kryva Luka and Riznykivka (southeast of Kryva Luka).[2] Mashovets noted that elements of the Russian 20th and 25th CAAs (Moscow Military District [MMD] and Central Military District [CMD], respectively) in the Lyman direction and 8th CAA (SMD) and 3rd Army Corps (SMD) in the Kostyantynivka direction are advancing much more slowly than the 3rd CAA Mashovets assessed that Russian forces will only have the 3rd CAA available drive directly on Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.[3] A decision to conduct such an operation without mutually-supportive operations on the flanks would likely further stymie the Russian rate of advance east of Slovyansk and inflict critically high casualties for disproportionately minimal gains. Mashovets warned, however, that elements of the 3rd CAA could instead support the Russian offensive operations in the Lyman or Kostyantynivka directions instead of a direct drive on the Fortress Belt.[4] This operation would also require Russian forces to temporarily abandon their offensive directly against the northern part of the Fortress Belt, which challenges the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort that aims to portray Russian forces as making simultaneous advances across the theater and to misrepresent Ukrainian defensive lines as collapsing.[5]

The recent Russian tactical gains could support offensive operations to the north against Lyman or to the south against Kostyantynivka, but so far are insufficient for a drive directly on Slovyansk itself. ISW assessed on March 19 that Russian forces likely began their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive between March 17 and 21 after significantly intensifying mechanized and motorized assaults in various sectors of the front, including a battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Borova-Lyman direction, a period of intensified drone, artillery, and air strikes, and the movement of heavy equipment and troops on the frontline.[6] The pace of Russian offensive operations in the Lyman direction has slowed in recent days, however, suggesting that Russian forces are unable to maintain the same intensity of their recent mechanized assaults at the cost of significant losses taken in the near term. Current weather conditions may also be slowing the Russian rate of advance. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov assessed on March 28 that Russian forces are likely waiting for more spring foliage to emerge to provide concealment for Russian assaults and infiltration missions toward Lyman.[7] Russian forces remain unlikely to seize Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in 2026, especially if many of the forces involved in such an operation are bogged down in Ukrainian defenses.[8]

Russian forces conducted another massive strike against Ukraine on the night of March 28 to 29, striking a public recreation area and inflicting civilian casualties. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Kinzhal aeroballistic missile and 442 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other drones —of which roughly 300 were Shaheds.[9] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 380 drones, that 16 drones struck seven locations, and that downed debris fell on 14 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes hit a civilian enterprise and residential areas in Chernihiv Oblast; residential areas in Kharkiv City; agricultural infrastructure and residential areas in Kyiv Oblast; a public recreation area in Mykolaiv Oblast; civilian and energy infrastructure in Odesa Oblast; and a civilian infrastructure facility in Sumy Oblast.[10] Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike against the public recreation area killed one child and injured at least 10 other civilians, including eight children.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 29 that Russian forces launched 3,000 drones, 1,450 guided aerial bombs, and 40 missiles against Ukraine in the last week (between March 22 and 29.[12] Russian forces have launched four strike packages with over 400 projectiles against Ukraine thus far in March 2026, including the largest strike package of the war containing nearly 1,000 drones launched throughout the night and day on March 23 and 24.[13] Russia’s increasingly large and diverse strike packages continue to highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, both with high-end US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missiles and other lower-end forms of air defense, for a holistic, well-equipped air defense umbrella.[14]

👁 Russian Drone and Missile Strikes on Ukraine, March 29, 2025 to March 29, 2026

Russian forces also conducted a large glide bomb strike against Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast on March 29, inflicting heavy civilian casualties. Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin and the Donetsk Oblast Police reported on March 29 that Russian forces conducted five KAB-250 glide bomb strikes against Kramatorsk, killing three and injuring 13 others.[15] The Donetsk Oblast Police reported that Russian airstrikes damaged more than 30 civilian infrastructure objects in Kramatorsk, including residential buildings and educational institutions, and that Russian forces later shelled Kramatorsk with cluster munitions.[16] Russian forces’ intensified glide bomb strikes against Kramatorsk are likely part of their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against the southern tip of the Fortress Belt aimed at degrading Ukrainian logistics and fortifications ahead of ground operations.[17] Russian forces have also integrated intentional civilian harm into their wider operation BAI template, indicating that the Russian military is weaponizing civilian harm as an intentional tool of war.[18]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and defense industrial infrastructure on the night of March 28 to 29, including launching the fifth strike in the last week against Russian oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast. A source from Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on March 29 that Ukrainian forces again struck an oil terminal at the port of Ust-Luga in Leningrad Oblast on the night of March 28 to 29, marking the fifth Ukrainian strike against Russian oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast in the last week and the second against this oil terminal at Ust-Luga.[19] The SBU source reported that the strike caused serious damage and a fire at the terminal. Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko acknowledged the Ukrainian drone strike on Leningrad Oblast and reported fire at the port of Ust-Luga.[20] National Aeronautics and Space Administration Fire Information for Resource Management System (NASA FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies at the TolyattiAzot chemical plant in Tolyatti, Samara Oblast on March 29.[21] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed on March 29 that a Ukrainian drone struck an industrial facility in Tolyatti, possibly referring to the TolyattiAzot chemical plant.[22] Russian milbloggers continued to criticize Russian forces’ inability to protect Russian oil infrastructure against Ukrainian drone strikes on March 29.[23] One Russian milblogger harshly criticized the Kremlin for lacking the resolve to make changes to Russian air defenses and laws to adequately defend against Ukrainian drone strikes against deep-rear areas.[24] The milblogger expressed frustration that the Kremlin has not adjusted Russian policy meaningfully after previous Ukrainian drone strikes against the Kremlin itself and noted that Russians are frustrated that Russian soldiers are dying while Russian authorities are unable to defend against Ukrainian strikes. Another milblogger noted that there are ongoing debates in the Russian information space about who is responsible for defending Russian infrastructure from drone strikes and called for a unified, societal response to increased Ukrainian drone strikes.[25]

Russian milbloggers are criticizing the ineffectiveness of Russian forces’ Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) recruitment campaign amid ongoing indications that the Kremlin may resort to involuntary reserve callups to maintain its replacement rate in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed on March 29 that the USF recruitment campaign has stalled because USF recruiters are offering conventional military contracts, and that potential Russian USF recruits therefore worry that they will be transferred to infantry assault units.[26] The milblogger argued that specialists recruited for the USF should not fight as part of assault units and harshly criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) inability to develop a technologically advanced and multifunctional USF. Another Russian milblogger agreed and complained that Russian forces cannot develop such a USF because Russian generals dislike adopting changes or innovations that they do not understand.[27] The Russian MoD began a USF recruitment campaign in January 2026, targeting student populations, but Russian opposition sources have long warned that the contracts offered to these students did not contain promised provisions to prevent the Russian MoD from transferring recruits to non-USF units.[28] The Russian MoD has had to resort to new force generation mechanisms, incentives, and target new populations as their previous mechanism of offering high one-time signing bonuses to volunteers has declined in effectiveness in late 2025.[29] The Russian recruitment rate fell below its casualty rate for the first time since 2022 in January 2026.[30] The March 29 milblogger complaints indicate that the Russian MoD’s attempts to revamp its voluntary recruitment campaign, even for the USF, are not achieving its desired results. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is preparing for limited, rolling, involuntary reserve callups in the future that would likely seek to allow Russian forces to continue sustaining high casualties in Ukraine rather than grow the size of the Russian military.[31]

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text.

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northwest of Sumy City toward Tovstodubove and Ulanove and southeast of Sumy City near Novodmytrivka on March 29 but did not advance.[32]

Order of Battle: The counter-drone Krechet Detachment of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade reportedly continues to intercept Ukrainian drones in the Kursk Oblast border area.[33]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vilcha, Prylipka, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Starytsya on March 28 and 29.[34]

Order of Battle: Elements of the pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[35]Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Chuhunivka on March 28 and 29 but did not advance.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 29 that Russian forces seized Kivsharivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[37]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka, Pishchane, Podoly, and Novoosynove on March 28 and 29.[38]

Russian forces are using Shahed strike, Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky (KVN) fiber-optic, and Molniya fixed-wing drones against Ukrainian logistics and civilian objects in the Kupyansk direction. The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces have recently begun using jet-powered Shahed and Gerbera drones against civilian areas of Kupyansk Raion.[39] The commander reported that Russian forces recently used a large number of jet-powered Shahed or Gerbera drones to strike a hospital in Shevchenkove (west of Kupyansk) on March 25. The commander stated that Russian forces are predominantly using KVN first person view (FPV) fiber optic drones, which can operate at a range of over 40 kilometers, and sleeper drones to conduct drone ambushes against Ukrainian logistics and civilian vehicles in the Kupyansk direction. The commander reported that Russian forces also use a large number of Molniya-1 and Molniya-2 fixed wing FPV drones to target logistics, residential areas, and other targets. The commander stated that Russian forces have shifted tactics from previously avoiding striking hospitals to routinely targeting ambulances and emergency response vehicles. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have integrated intentional civilian harm into their wider operation battlefield air interdiction (BAI) template, indicating that the Russian military is using FPV drones to weaponize civilian harm as an intentional tool of war.[40]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Pishchane.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka; northeast of Borova near Kruhlyakivka, Borivska Andriivka, and Novoplatonivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka on March 28 and 29.[42]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of March 28 to 29. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian fuel tanks near occupied Novosvitlivka (roughly 128 kilometers from the frontline).[43] Geolocated footage published on March 28 shows the Ukrainian forces striking a Russian fuel and ammunition depot in occupied Aidar (roughly 104 kilometers from the frontline).[44]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on March 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Stavky; east of Slovyansk near Platonivka, Zakitne, Kryva Luka, and Riznykivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Lypivka, Nykyforivka, and Fedorivka Druha on March 28 and 29.[45]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 29 that Russian forces likely do not confidently control Riznykivka or Kalenyky (just west of Riznykivka), as there are only a few small Russian infantry groups operating in either settlement.[46] Mashovets stated that Russian forward units likely continue limited assault operations along the Zakitne-Riznykivka line, but that Ukrainian forces likely hold part of Zakitne (northeast of Riznykivka). Mashovets stated that Russian forces are attempting to break through to Rai-Oleksandrivka from the northeast and southeast and encircle Ukrainian forces defending areas east of Rai-Oleksandrivka.[47] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian defenses are forcing the Russian military command to send some units that had been operating on the Lyman-Siversk road northeast of Rai-Oleksandrivka to the Zakitne area.

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that likely elements of the Russian 127th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (reportedly 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reinforced with elements of the 6th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are trying to advance along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River from Zakitne toward Kryva Luka (southeast of Zakitne), from Platonivka toward Kalenyky (southwest of Platonivka), and from Svyato-Pokrovske toward Riznykivka (west of Svyato-Pokrovske).[48] Mashovets stated that elements of the 123rd, 85th, and 88th separate motorized rifle brigades (all of the 3rd CAA) are attacking on both sides of the M-03 (E40) Slovyansk-Bakhmut highway.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northeastern Kostyantynivka.[49]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on March 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions northeast of Kostyantynivka in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[50]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya and Kleban-Byk; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Berestok, and Illinivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka toward Dovha Balka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka, Pavlivka and Sofiivka on March 28 and 29.[51]

Geolocated footage published on March 28 shows Russian forces conducting a FAB-3000 glide bomb strike against Kostyantynivka.[52]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 136th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th CAA, SMD) are intercepting Ukrainian heavy bomber drones near Kostyantynivka.[53] Drone operators of the 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are intercepting Ukrainian drones near Berestok and in Kostyantynivka.[54] Infrared Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky (KVN) fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka.[55] Elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka direction.[56] Drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian armored vehicles near Staroraiske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[57] Elements of the 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division), the 77th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD), and the 10th Tank Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly conducting aerial reconnaissance for artillery elements of the 1st Battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade in the Kostyantynivka direction.[58] FPV drone operators of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones near Rusyn Yar (south of Druzhkivka).[59]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on March 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar and east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and Novyi Donbas on March 28 and 29.[60]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are intercepting Ukrainian drones near Novotoretske (southeast of Dobropillya).[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko and Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Molodetske, Novopidhorodne, and Kotlyne on March 28 and 29.[62]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian Irlandtsy Strike Detachment of the Grom-Kaskad Drone Brigade (reportedly of the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) are striking Ukrainian forces north of Shevchenko.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Bilyakivka, southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on March 28 and 29 but did not advance.[64]

Russian forces advanced during a recent mechanized assault in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka), during a recent Russian mechanized assault in the Oleksandrivka direction.[65] A Ukrainian brigade published footage and reported on March 28 that Russian forces conducted a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Oleksandrivka direction on the morning of March 28.[66] The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed one tank, two all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and two motorcycles and inflicted 28 casualties.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 28 shows Russian forces operating in central Zlahoda (southeast of Oleksandrivka) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[67]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka, Zelenyi Hai, Sosnivka, Andriivka-Klevtsove and Sichneve; southeast of Oleksandrivka near Zlahoda, Oleksandrohrad, Ternove, and Rybne and toward Verbove; and south of Oleksandrivka near Vyshneve on March 28 and 29.[68]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are striking Ukrainian forces in western Ternuvate and reportedly near Zirnytsa.[69] Elements of the 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk direction.[70] ISW last observed elements of the 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment operating in the Pokrovsk direction as of December 13, 2025.[71]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on March 28. Geolocated footage published on March 28 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian diesel locomotive with an FP-2 drone in occupied Volnovakha (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline).[72]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Pryluky (northwest of Hulyaipole).[73]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Olenokostyantynivka and toward Verkhnya Tersa, Vozdvyzhivka, and Tsvitkove; north of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka and toward Dobropillya; southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne and toward Hulyaipilske; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and toward Hirke; on March 28 and 29.[74]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hulyaipole.[75] Drone operators of the 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kopani (northwest of Hulyaipole).[76]

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on March 28 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position south of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[77]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky and Stepove; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on March 28 and 29.[78]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1251st and 71st motorized rifle regiments (both of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions south of Mala Tokmachka and in Novodanylivka.[79]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on March 28 and 29 but did not advance.[80]

Order of Battle: Snipers of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in the Kherson direction.[81]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaigns against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on March 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian BM-30 “Smerch/Tornado-S” multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) in occupied Crimea.[82] Geolocated footage published on March 29 shows the Ukrainian USF striking three BM-30 “Smerch/Tornado-S” rocket launchers and a TZM (transport-loading vehicle) west of Yany Kapu (roughly 108 kilometers from the frontline).[83]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

See topline text.

Significant Activity in Belarus 

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Nothing Significant To Report.