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⇱ Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 30, 2026 | ISW


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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 30, 2026

March 30, 2026

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 30, 2026

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Ukraine’s operational and strategic ability to inflict mounting costs on Russia is generating increasing anxiety in the Russian ultranationalist information space. A prominent Russian ultranationalist military and political commentator claimed that Western economic potential is “orders of magnitude” larger than Russia’s and is becoming militarily evident as “Western-backed” Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia have increasingly involved hundreds of drones.[1] The commentator claimed that the size of such strikes will only increase, and that Russia cannot produce enough interceptor missiles to compete with Western economic potential and is thus “doomed to defeat” and forced to immediately “solve the problem of ending the war.” The commentator claimed that Russia must either agree to a “shameful peace” or decisively defeat Ukraine through a strategic offensive, but that the Russian leadership is not politically ready to conduct such an offensive, and is therefore already working toward a “shameful peace.” The commentator’s statements come on the backdrop of recent successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian Baltic Sea oil infrastructure, which are generating tangible impacts on the Russian economy. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on March 30 that Ukrainian strikes against Russian Baltic Sea ports that began on March 24 have halted a significant portion of Russian oil exports, including from Russia’s largest crude oil exporting port on the Baltic Sea at Primorsk.[2]

Russian pro-war information space voices are beginning to acknowledge Ukraine’s frontline successes, mid-range BAI campaign, and drone adaptations. A prominent Russian ultranationalist milblogger complained on March 26 that Russian forces will be unable to reverse an unfavorable battlefield situation in the coming months and that “rather successful” Ukrainian counterattacks have disrupted Russia’s ability to pursue offensive efforts in 2026.[3] Russian information space voices are also increasingly questioning Russia’s ability to pursue offensive operations in 2026 — Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov, for example, stated on March 29 that the fight for Kostyantynivka itself is an important milestone but not ”decisive” and indicated Russia should focus on seizing Slovyansk and Kramatorsk to achieve victory.[4] The Russian ultranationalist milblogger also highlighted the success of Ukraine’s successful mid-range BAI campaign in disrupting Russian logistics ”dozens of kilometers” behind the frontline and noted that Russian forces suffer from significant communications problems due to the February 1 Starlink blocking and from a shortage of electronic warfare (EW) systems.[5] The milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces are ”surpassing” Russian forces in their ability to adapt technologically, praised the quality of Ukrainian interceptor drones, and criticized the Russian military leadership for its sluggish response to Ukrainian drone adaptations. The milblogger stated that Russian forces will be unable to achieve a frontline breakthrough or hold the frontline solely by relying on personnel. The milblogger’s criticisms are set against the backdrop of recent prominent milblogger complaints about Russian battlefield problems and Russia’s intensified efforts to crack down against the information space.[6]

Ukraine continues to offer concessions and demonstrate its willingness to negotiate with Russia even as Russian officials reject Ukraine’s attempts to establish a negotiating position short of Ukrainian capitulation. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 30 that Ukraine is ready to accept a temporary ceasefire for the “Easter holiday” (likely Orthodox Easter on April 12), whether it takes the form of a full ceasefire or a moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes.[7] Russian Federation Council Foreign Affairs Committee Chairperson Grigory Karasin responded to Zelensky’s statement on March 30, claiming that Zelensky’s statements should not be taken seriously.[8] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously declared a unilateral ceasefire (which Ukraine did not sign onto) in honor of Easter in mid-April 2025 and for Russian Victory Day in early-May 2025, but Russian and Ukrainian sources repeatedly accused each other of violating the ceasefire throughout the theater in Ukraine.[9] The Kremlin has previously offered short-term ceasefires as part of a cognitive warfare effort to portray the Kremlin as acting in good faith while rejecting Ukrainian and US calls for a longer or permanent ceasefire or moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure.[10] Russian forces have also used shorter-term ceasefires and strikes moratoriums to stockpile missiles to maximize damage in subsequent strike packages shortly after ceasefires expire.[11] Zelensky continues to make concessions and demonstrate Ukraine’s willingness to engage in diplomatic dialogue and commit to an unconditional ceasefire, while Russia continues to demonstrate that it is uninterested in a ceasefire or in good faith negotiations to end the war.[12]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through bolstering Ukraine’s indigenous defense production. The European Commission announced on March 29 that it approved a 1.5-billion-euro (roughly $1.7 billion) package to enhance and modernize Europe’s defense industry, reinforce cooperation with Ukraine, and boost industrial production capabilities.[13] The European Commission reported that 260 million euros (roughly $298 million) will fund efforts to rebuild and modernize Ukraine’s defense technological and industrial base through investment in collaborative projects to increase production capabilities in both Ukraine and Europe. The European Commission noted that it will allocate 35.3 million euros (roughly $40.5 million) to the BraveTech EU initiative that will support both Ukrainian and EU defense industries and boost innovation to tackle urgent military challenges.[14] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Bulgarian Acting Prime Minister Andrey Gyurov signed a bilateral security agreement on March 30 that provides for Bulgaria joining the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative and joint Ukrainian-Bulgarian drone production through the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program.[15] Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braze announced on March 30 that Latvia will provide Ukraine with 6.8 million euros (roughly $7.8 million) to strengthen Ukraine’s energy grid, shelters, infrastructure, and drone capabilities.[16] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s partners stand to benefit from continuing to aid the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) with joint production, as Ukraine’s experience in an accelerated offense-defense technological cycle will allow its partners to bolster their own defenses and domestic DIBs.[17]

Key Takeaways

  1. Ukraine’s operational and strategic ability to inflict mounting costs on Russia is generating increasing anxiety in the Russian ultranationalist information space.
  2. Ukraine continues to offer concessions and demonstrate its willingness to negotiate with Russia even as Russian officials reject Ukraine’s attempts to establish a negotiating position short of Ukrainian capitulation.
  3. Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through bolstering Ukraine’s indigenous defense production.
  4. Ukrainian forces advanced near Slovyansk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces advanced near Hulyaipole, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
  5. Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).  Russian forces launched 164 drones and one missile against Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces likely struck Russian defense industrial infrastructure in Rostov and Samara oblasts overnight on March 29 to 30. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on March 30, citing sources in the Rostov Oblast emergency services, that Ukrainian strikes damaged two production workshops at the Atlant Aero drone development and production plant in Taganrog, which produces Molniya-type strike drones, reconnaissance drones, and Orion reconnaissance drone components.[18] Astra’s sources reported that the Ukrainian strikes also damaged a warehouse and administrative building at the Beriev Aircraft Plant in Taganrog, which modernizes Tu-95 bombers and A-50 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. Geolocated footage published on March 29 shows Ukrainian drone strikes and Russian air defenses activating near Taganrog.[19] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Slyusar and Taganrog Mayor Svetlana Kambulova acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes damaged industrial enterprises in Taganrog.[20]

Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed that Ukrainian forces struck an industrial facility in Tolyatti, and a geolocated image published on March 30 shows a fire at the  KuibyshevAzot chemical plant in Tolyatti.[21] Ukrainian forces previously struck the  KuibyshevAzot plant overnight on March 10 to 11, March 13 to 14, and March 20 to 21 and also hit other chemical plants in Tolyatti on the night of March 28 to 29.[22]

Ukraine confirmed its recent strikes against Russian Baltic Sea port oil infrastructure. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on March 30 that Ukraine has been targeting Russian Baltic Sea port oil infrastructure for the past week (since about March 23) and struck two large oil tanks at the Kinef oil refinery in Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast on the night of March 25 to 26; an oil tank farm and oil loading arms at the Novatek Ust-Luga in Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast on the nights of March 23 to 24 and March 28 to 29; the Transneft oil terminal at the port of Primorsk, Leningrad Oblast on the nights of March 21 to 22 and March 22 to 23; and the project 23550 Purga-class patrol icebreaker at the Vyborg Shipyard in Leningrad Oblast on the night of March 24 to 25.[23]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Novodmytrivka (southeast of Sumy City).[24]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas in northern Sumy Oblast on March 29 and 30.[25]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction, including near Volodymyrivka (north of Sumy City).[26] Fiber-optic drone operators of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast border areas.[27] Elements of the 51st and 119th VDV regiments (both of the 106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[28]

Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in the near rear of the Sumy direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 30 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian manpower concentrations near Basivka (northeast of Sumy City, roughly four kilometers from the frontline) and Nova Tavolzhanka, Belgorod Oblast (northeast of Kharkiv City, roughly eight kilometers from the frontline).[29]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Lyptsi, Vilcha, Zybyne, and Okhrimivka and toward Verkhnya Pysarivka on March 29 and 30.[30]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian State Border Guard Service unit operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on March 30 that Ukrainian forces are focusing on strikes against Russian vehicles and personnel concentrations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and Belgorod Oblast.[31] The spokesperson reported that Ukrainian forces recently intercepted an expensive Russian Skat-450M reconnaissance drone that Russian forces use for deep aerial reconnaissance.

Order of Battle: Molniya-2 fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Korneta Group (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on March 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Khatnie on March 30.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 30 that Russian forces seized Novoosynove (southeast of Kupyansk).[35]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Novoosynove, Pishchane, and Kurylivka on March 29 and 30.[36]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on March 30 that some Russian soldiers remain in the hospital in central Kupyansk. Trehubov stated that an unspecified number of Russian soldiers remain in the hospital, despite Russian sources’ claims of their deaths.[37] Trehubov suggested that Russian sources may have declared them dead either to deflect attention away from the situation in the Kupyansk direction or to justify Russian strikes against the hospital.

Ukrainian forces and a Russian milblogger refuted the Russian military command’s recent claimed seizure of Kivsharivka (southeast of Kupyansk). A Ukrainian servicemember reported on March 30 that Ukrainian forces captured four soldiers of the Russian 153rd Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) who were trying to raise a flag in Kivsharivka.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 30 that Russian forces are “far” from seizing the settlement.[39] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 29 that Russian forces seized Kivsharivka.[40]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Novoplatonivka; east of Borova near Borivska Andriivka and Novoserhiivka; southeast of Borova near Cherneshchyna; and south of Borova near Korovii Yar and Oleksandrivka on March 29 and 30.[42]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[43]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on March 29 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position west of Stavky (north of Lyman) – an area in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained positions.[44]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northeast of Lyman near Drobysheve, Yarova, and Svyatohirsk; southeast of Lyman near Zakitne; east of Slovyansk near Platonivka, Kalenyky, and Riznykivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Fedorivka Druha on March 29 to 30.[45]

Russian forces are reporting increasing their drone use in the Slovyansk direction as springtime weather conditions improve. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported that the number of Russian strike and reconnaissance drones in the area has increased as springtime weather conditions have created better conditions for drone operation.[46] The brigade reported that Russian forces have also increased their use of sleeper drones along the main routes that Ukrainian forces use. The brigade stated that Russian forces are attempting nighttime infiltration missions with camouflage and drone support.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 85th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating within Fedorivka Druha.[47] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces east of Lyman.[48] Drone operators of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions west of Stavky.[49] FPV drone operators of the Chechen 204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment are striking Ukrainian positions near Yampil.[50]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Kostyantynivka.[51]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Stepanivka (south of Druzhkivka).[52]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 19 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[53] ISW recoded Russian advances along the Donetska Railroad and Ostrovskoho Street in southeastern Kostyantynivka as Russian infiltrations as ISW assesses that Ukrainian and Russian forces in southeastern Kostyantynivka are intermixed.[54]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Mykolaivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk and Pleshchiivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka and Pavlivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on March 29 and 30.[55]

Russian forces continue heavy glide bomb strikes against Kostyantynivka, likely as part of Russia’s battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign to degrade Ukrainian logistics and fortifications ahead of ground operations. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported that Russian forces are completely destroying Kostyantynivka’s infrastructure and dropped 70 guided glide bombs on the city on an unspecified day.[56] The commander stated that Russian forces are trying to enter Kostyantynivka in fireteams of one to three servicemembers and conduct occasional unsuccessful mechanized assaults. The commander reported that Russian forces are trying to conceal their artillery guns with wood and nets and are deploying Russian infantry nearby to shoot down Ukrainian drones targeting the artillery guns.

Order of Battle: Fiber optic drone operators of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces on the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka.[57] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment and Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly providing targeting data for Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) glide bomb strikes against Kostyantynivka.[58] Artillery elements of the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[59] FPV drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated as the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are striking Ukrainian armored vehicles in the Kostyantynivka direction.[60] Drone operators of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on March 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar and east of Dobropillya toward Hannivka on March 29 and 30.[62]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Dobropillya direction.[63] Reconnaissance elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly conducting reconnaissance for drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) to support strikes on Ukrainian forces near Dobropillya.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Molodetske on March 29 and 30.[65]

An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces have slightly decreased their offensive tempo in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR) as Russian forces need to replenish their units.[66] The officer noted that Russian forces are still struggling to establish normal communications, with Russian forces having to purchase their own radios, possibly in response to the recent Starlink cutoff and the Kremlin’s throttling of Telegram. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian drone interceptor battery reported that Ukrainian forces are destroying up to 20 Russian reconnaissance drones daily in the Pokrovsk direction and that these drones can cost up to $100,000 each.[67] The NCO noted that Ukrainian forces are particularly destroying Russian Mavic reconnaissance drones near Hryshyne. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported that Russian forces are conducting frontal assaults against Hryshyne after failing to bypass the settlement.[68] The 7th Corps noted that Russian forces attack with infantry groups daily and sometimes use all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorcycles. The 7th Corps reported that Ukrainian forces are preventing Russian advances into central Hryshyne.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian forces north of Serhiivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[69] FPV drone operators of the Irlandtsy Strike Detachment of the Grom-Kaskad Drone Brigade (reportedly of the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, VKS) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area.[70] Reconnaissance elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly conducting reconnaissance for drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) to strike Ukrainian forces near Bilytske and Vodyanske (northwest of Pokrovsk).[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Bilyakyivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on March 29 and 30, but did not advance.[72]

Ukrainian and Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka, Andriivka-Klevtsove, and Sichneve and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Zlahoda, Berezove, Oleksandrohrad, Ternove, Krasnohirske, and Rybne and toward Verbove and Vyshneve on March 29 and 30.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Dobropasove (east of Oleksandrivka) toward Hai (south of Dobropasove).[74]

Russian forces are reportedly struggling to contest continued Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction. Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces have liberated nine settlements in the Oleksandrivka direction, including two in Zaporizhia Oblast and seven in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, between an unspecified date and March 29, and that Ukrainian forces have cleared an additional three settlements.[75] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 2 that Ukrainian forces had liberated nine settlements in the Oleksandrivka direction and were clearing three additional settlements at the time.[76] The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported that Russian forces had seized prepared defensive lines, making them difficult to dislodge during Ukrainian counterattacks, but that Ukrainian forces used drones and rapid assault group advances to liberate territory.[77] The commander reported that Ukraine’s rapid advances in the area disoriented Russian forces, making the deployment of Russian reserves difficult in the first days of the Ukrainian counterattacks. The commander stated that Russian forces have since brought up reserves, but only operate in small groups that Ukrainian forces often strike. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian artillery brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported that Russian forces have not conducted mechanized assaults in recent days.[78] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces maintain a significant presence in the direction but have not built up forces since wintertime. The spokesperson reported that most small Russian assault groups do not reach the frontline, since Ukrainian drones are able to reconnoiter Russian forces to a depth of 50 kilometers from the frontline and to strike them with FPV drones roughly 25 kilometers from the frontline.

Ukrainian forces continued strikes against frontline Russian military targets near Oleksandrivka. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian personnel concentration near Berezove.[79]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novohryhorivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[80]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Myrne (southwest of Hulyaipole).[81]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Olenokostyantynivka and toward Verkhnya Tersa and Vozdvyzhivka; north of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka and toward Dobropillya; southwest of Hulyaipole toward Hulyaipilske; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and toward Staroukrainka on March 29 and 30.[82]

Ukrainian forces continued strikes against frontline Russian military assets in the Hulyaipole direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone command post and personnel concentration near Hulyaipole.[83]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Verkhnya Tersa.[84] Drone operators of the 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Hirke (west of Hulyaipole).[85]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Luhivske (southeast of Orikhiv).[86]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Luhivske.[87]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya; west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk on March 29 and 30.[88]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on March 30.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in the Kherson direction.[89] Molniya-2 drone operators of the 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and transport vehicles on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[90]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-400 air defense launcher near occupied Hvardiiske.[91] Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Spokesperson Olha Melyoshyna confirmed on March 30 that Ukrainian USF forces recently destroyed three BM-30 Smerch or Tornado-S multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in occupied Crimea.[92]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on March 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and 164 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones, of which about 90 were Shaheds, from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 150 drones, that the ballistic missile and 12 drones struck seven locations, and that drone debris fell at two locations. Ukrainian officials reported on March 30 that Russian forces struck energy infrastructure in Chernihiv Oblast.[94] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure caused power outages in Odesa, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Khmelnytskyi, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts on the morning of March 30.[95]

Russian forces are reportedly equipping Shahed-type drones to hunt Ukrainian radar systems. A Ukrainian military auction site listed for sale a passive radar homing head from a downed Russian Shahed-type drone.[96]  Ukrainian source Militarnyi noted that the component allows Russian drones to autonomously target sources of radio radiation during the flight and essentially turns conventional drones into an analogue of an anti-radar missile.

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces are adapting to Russia’s changing long-range drone strike tactics.[97] Syrskyi stated that Ukraine is increasing its number of interceptor drone crews and reorganized the Unmanned Air Defense Systems Command into the Direct Air Cover Forces Command in March 2026. Syrskyi stated that the new command operates as part of the Ukrainian Air Force and is responsible for developing the use of drones in air defense and modernizing equipment and training. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian drone interceptors increased their number of destroyed targets in March 2026 by 55 percent compared to February 2026 and have destroyed more than 2,300 air targets since March 1. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian helicopters have destroyed 379 Russian strike drones since March 1.

Significant Activity in Belarus 

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Nothing Significant To Report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] https://www.rline dot tv/programs/tochka-zreniya/video-332978/ (8:28); https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2038526112955867255/video/1
[2] https://mod dot gov.ua/news/znishhuyemo-eksport-rosijskoyi-nafti-na-balticzi-znachennya-ta-naslidki-udariv-po-leningradskij-oblasti ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2026/
[3] https://t.me/yurasumy/27358 (4:46); https://x.com/NSTRIKE1231/status/2038293381864944126; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/
[4] https://news dot ru/vlast/nazvan-uchastok-fronta-gde-vsu-zhdet-razgromnoe-porazhenie
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2026/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/cognitive-warfare/putins-internet-crackdown-is-rooted-in-weakness-and-a-need-to-demand-greater-war-sacrifices/
[7] https://suspilne dot media/1276612-zelenskij-zaaviv-so-ukraina-gotova-do-pripinenna-vognu-na-velikden/
[8] https://lenta dot ru/news/2026/03/30/v-rossii-otvetili-na-zayavlenie-zelenskogo-o-gotovnosti-k-pashalnomu-peremiriyu/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2025/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2025/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2026/ ;
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040425
[13] https://ec dot europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_752
[14] https://ec dot europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_752
[15] https://suspilne dot media/1277108-ukraina-i-bolgaria-pidpisali-bezpekovu-ugodu/
[16] https://x.com/Braze_Baiba/status/2038494835288547372 ; https://suspilne dot media/1276522-latvia-vidilae-ukraini-novij-paket-dopomogi-na-sumu-68-mln-evro-kudi-spramuut-kosti/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2026/
[18] https://t.me/astrapress/108454
[19] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2038363248735437249; https://x.com/ayzin_illya/status/2038340379385172337; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2038450749437583847; https://x.com/visegrad24/status/2038376872489152535/history;
[20] https://t.me/tass_agency/368518; https://t.me/astrapress/108403; https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/5242; https://t.me/tass_agency/368509; https://t.me/tass_agency/368510;
[21] https://www.idelreal dot org/a/drony-vnov-atakovali-himzavod-kuybyshevazot-v-tolyatti-samarskoy-oblasti/33719676.html; https://t.me/fedorishchev_official/493; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/18212; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/18211
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2026/
[23] https://mod.gov dot ua/news/znishhuyemo-eksport-rosijskoyi-nafti-na-balticzi-znachennya-ta-naslidki-udariv-po-leningradskij-oblasti
[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/90374
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36699 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/90374 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/7334 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33231
[26] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/204906; https://t.me/severnnyi/7336
[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41301
[28] https://t.me/severnnyi/7344
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36698
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36699; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36677 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20352; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36675; https://t.me/dva_majors/90374; https://t.me/wargonzo/33231; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41319; https://t.me/severnnyi/7334
[31] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/30/vony-dobre-zamaskovani-ta-chasto-zminyuyut-pozycziyi-skladni-vorozhi-czili-znyshhyly-dronari-striks-na-harkivshhyni/
[32] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6456
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36699
[34] https://t.me/dva_majors/90374
[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/62294
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36699; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36677 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20352; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36675; https://t.me/gvZapad/18183; https://t.me/wargonzo/33231
[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/30/vgatyat-u-toj-moment-koly-vylizesh-chomu-rosijske-komanduvannya-pohovalo-zhyvczem-svoyih-soldativ-u-kupyansku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA
[38] https://t.me/a_shtirlitz/32402;
[39] https://t.me/motopatriot78/50040
[40] https://t.me/mod_russia/62263
[41] https://t.me/gvZapad/18185
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36677 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20352; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36675; https://t.me/gvZapad/18183
[43] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2038451956461838589; https://t.me/specnazahmat/2042
[44] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2038401492542214568; https://t.me/kotjambo/4338
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36699 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36677 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20352; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36675; https://t.me/gvZapad/18183; https://t.me/rybar/79018; https://t.me/wargonzo/33231
[46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/30/drony-povodyri-ta-maskuvalni-zasoby-okupanty-vnochi-namagayutsya-infiltruvatysya-v-ukrayinski-pozycziyi/; https://t.me/ngu_3005/7601
[47] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2038283586009190410; https://t.me/shock3OA/5999
[48] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2038386805159162353; https://t.me/BV25org/2112
[49] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2038401492542214568; https://t.me/kotjambo/4338
[50] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2038451956461838589; https://t.me/specnazahmat/2042
[51] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2038300470284857398?s=20; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/4535
[52] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2038269974892953666; https://www.facebook.com/reel/938330155271301
[53] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11575; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DWEiEDVites
[54] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2037944813622816868; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/28631; https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2036401755135652213; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/28589
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36699 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36677; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36675; https://t.me/dva_majors/90374 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33231
[56] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/30/vystavlyayut-svoyih-durniv-z-rushnyczyamy-bilya-kostyantynivky-znyshhyly-shturmovykiv-yaki-atakuvaly-na-tehniczi/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIRlElzXDTk
[57] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2038300470284857398?s=20; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/4535
[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/90409
[59] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/204926
[60] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15180
[61] https://t.me/dva_majors/90381
[62] https://t.me/wargonzo/33231 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36677 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36675
[63] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/112073
[64] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15177
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36699 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36677 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36675 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/90374 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33231
[66] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/30/trenuyetsya-bagato-najmancziv-z-efiopiyi-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-inozemcziv-gotuyut-do-odnorazovyh-shturmiv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA
[67] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/30/zakryty-ochi-vorogu-maksymalno-poblyzu-pokrovska-shturmy-vidbyvayut-znyshhuyuchy-vorozhyh-shpyguniv-u-nebi/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIRlElzXDTk
[68] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/30/u-gryshynomu-vorog-vtratyv-kilka-pozyczij-7-j-korpus-dshv/ ; https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1267
[69] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/1274; https://t.me/Osintpen/2725
[70] https://t.me/milinfolive/169469
[71] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15177
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36699 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36677 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36675
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36699; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36677; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36675; https://t.me/wargonzo/33231
[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/19130
[75] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/30/vorog-buv-dezoriyentovanyj-ne-vstygav-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku-rosiyan-vybyly-z-ukriplenoyi-liniyi-oborony/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIRlElzXDTk; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1277068-pidrozdili-dsv-vzali-pid-povnij-kontrol-berezove-na-dnipropetrovsini-na-oleksandrivskomu-napramku-trivae-nastup/
[76] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2-2026/
[77] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/30/vorog-buv-dezoriyentovanyj-ne-vstygav-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku-rosiyan-vybyly-z-ukriplenoyi-liniyi-oborony/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIRlElzXDTk
[78] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1277068-pidrozdili-dsv-vzali-pid-povnij-kontrol-berezove-na-dnipropetrovsini-na-oleksandrivskomu-napramku-trivae-nastup/
[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36698
[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/19127
[81] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2038575127462351196; https://t.me/morok_225_oshp/40
[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36699 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36677 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36675 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33231 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/90374 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/19130
[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36698
[84] https://t.me/voin_dv/19127
[85] https://t.me/voin_dv/19133
[86] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2038538453571514618; https://t.me/voin_dv/19131
[87] https://t.me/mod_russia/62294
[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36677; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36675; https://t.me/dva_majors/90374; https://t.me/wargonzo/33231; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36699
[89] https://t.me/wargonzo/33252
[90] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41301
[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36698
[92] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/03/30/u-krymu-spalyly-batareyu-dalekobijnyh-rszv-voroga-ponyattya-bezpechnogo-tylu-dlya-rosiyan-bilshe-ne-isnuye/; plus https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2026/
[93] https://t.me/kpszsu/59065
[94] https://t.me/chernihivrada/3454
[95] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4828
[96]
https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/model-shahed-iz-golovkoyu-samonavedennya/#google_vignette; https://reibert dot info/lots/vpershe-zamicheniy-blok-z-4-napravlenimi-antenami-z-bpla-shahid.1782310
[97] https://t.me/osirskiy/1420; https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid0auxhnh9gkWyxmg1WYMZfPSmALaSursSJZwyFca5qqc7HuxMsEVsWA1BgBXbBJoBwl

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