Toplines

Russian advances have slowed as Ukrainian forces continue to contest the initiative in different frontline sectors for a protracted period. Russia’s position on the battlefield has changed over the past six months (October 2025 through March 2026) as Ukrainian counterattacks and mid-range strikes, the block on Russia’s use of Starlink terminals in Ukraine, and Kremlin efforts to throttle Telegram have exacerbated existing issues within the Russian military. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized 1,929.69 square kilometers between October 1, 2025, and March 31, 2026, advancing at an average of 10.66 square kilometers per day. Russian forces comparatively seized 2,716.57 square kilometers of territory between October 1, 2024, and March 31, 2025, advancing at an average rate of 14.9 square kilometers per day. Russian forces advanced at an average of 5.5 square kilometers per day in the first three months of 2026, compared to an average rate of 11.06 square kilometers per day in the first three months of 2025.

👁 Declining Russian Territorial Gains in Ukraine, October 2024-March 2025 and October 2025-March 2026

👁 Declining Russian Territorial Gains in Ukraine, October 2024-March 2025 and October 2025-March 2026 2

Ukrainian counterattacks and mid-range strikes are likely impeding Russian efforts to advance. Ukrainian forces in Winter and Spring 2026 have made their most significant gains on the battlefield since Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 and have liberated the most territory in Ukraine itself since the 2023 counteroffensive.[1] Ukrainian forces reportedly liberated over 400 square kilometers in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions from late January 2026 to mid-March 2026 in two separate drives.[2] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on March 30 that Ukrainian forces are prioritizing conducting counterattacks in areas where Russian forces are the weakest in order to retake and maintain the operational and strategic initiative.[3] Ukrainian counterattacks in southern Ukraine have had cascading effects on other sectors of the front, forcing Russian forces to choose between defending against the Ukrainian counterattacks and allocating manpower and materiel for offensive operations elsewhere on the frontline.[4] Ukrainian forces also retook at least 183 square kilometers in and around Kupyansk in December 2025, which Ukraine has largely held onto despite Russian efforts to reverse them.[5]

Battlefield realities as of late March 2026 continue to show that significant Russian battlefield gains, let alone total victory, are not imminent nor inevitable. Current battlefield dynamics do not suggest that Russia will quickly regain land in the Kupyansk direction or in southern Ukraine.[6] Russian advances have significantly slowed as Russian forces continue to suffer personnel losses and increasingly rely on poorly trained and underequipped infantry to make gains.[7] Russian forces also shifted to infiltration tactics to make gains across the front in 2025, but have struggled recently to consolidate their infiltrations, which partially enabled Ukrainian counterattacks in southern Ukraine in February 2026.[8] Russian forces have held the theater-wide initiative since 2023, but the Ukrainian recent advances in the Kupyansk direction and in southern Ukraine demonstrate that Ukrainian forces are capable of conducting successful counterattacks, making tactically significant gains, hindering Russian preparations for offensive operations, and contesting the battlefield initiative in some sectors.

The Kremlin is trying to create a false sense of urgency by reportedly trying to force Ukraine to cede the unoccupied part of Donetsk Oblast, which Russian forces have proven unable to take on the battlefield. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 31 that Russia is demanding that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remainder of Donetsk Oblast within two months (likely referring to late May 2026), including from Ukraine’s heavily fortified Fortress Belt.[9] Zelensky implied that the Kremlin is trying to create a perception that Russia will imminently take Donbas and will impose new, harsher demands if Ukraine does not withdraw from Donetsk Oblast. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed on March 31 that Ukraine needs “any kind” of truce as the dynamics on the front are not in Ukraine’s favor and Russian forces are advancing along the entire frontline.[10] These Russian claims are false, as Russian forces tried and failed to seize the Fortress Belt in 2014 and 2022, and Russian advances have slowed since the start of 2026. Russian forces have also shown no ability to rapidly envelop, penetrate, or otherwise seize cities the size of those in the Fortress Belt.[11] The Kremlin’s optimistic portrayal of Russian battlefield prospects is in stark contrast with recent criticism from prominent Russian milbloggers and other ultranationalist information space voices, which have complained about Russia’s unfavorable battlefield situation.[12] Russian officials have also recently attempted to set expectations for slow and costly Russian advances during the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.[13] The Russian information space is markedly not unified around the Kremlin’s continued exaggerated portrayal of the frontline situation. The Kremlin’s demands are thus part of its cognitive warfare effort to aggrandize Russian advances and falsely portray Ukrainian defenses as on the verge of collapse to drive the United States into forcing Ukraine to unnecessarily cede territory that Russian forces are far from seizing militarily, if at all.[14]  

The Kremlin continues to set conditions to reject the legitimacy of any Ukrainian elections without direct Russian involvement in an effort to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty and stall the peace negotiations process. Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) Chairperson Ella Pamfilova claimed on March 31 that the CEC will work to “ensure” that Ukrainian citizens living in Russia have the right to vote should Ukraine hold elections.[15] Pamfilova’s claim follows Russian President Vladimir Putin’s and other Russian officials’ claims that Ukraine will try to prevent “Ukrainian citizens” living in Russia from voting in a future Ukrainian election.[16] The Kremlin has repeatedly attempted to use the topic of elections in Ukraine to claim that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and to set conditions to reject any potential peace agreements Russia signs with the current Ukrainian government.[17] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is setting conditions to claim that any future Ukrainian election that does not “sufficiently” allow “Ukrainians” under Russian control to vote is not free and fair in an attempt to manipulate potential Ukrainian elections and to enable massive Russian election interference.[18]

Russian authorities are increasingly turning to forced covert mobilization efforts as Russian forces suffer unsustainably high losses on the battlefield and Russian recruitment rates decline. Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov signed a decree on March 20 requiring medium and large businesses in Ryazan Oblast to select employees to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the law will be in effect until at least September 20, 2026.[19] The decree requires businesses with between 150 and 500 employees to select two to five employees to sign contracts, depending on the size of the business. The decree uses several federal decrees that Russian President Vladimir Putin signed in October 2022 as a justification for these requirements. The March 20 decree is a continuation of Russian covert mobilization efforts that aim to avoid conducting another involuntary call-up of Russian men while continuing to generate manpower for the frontlines in Ukraine.[20] The Kremlin is setting conditions to deflect blame for this latest forced covert mobilization effort by making medium and large businesses responsible for selecting employees to sign contracts. Forcibly mobilized employees are likely to direct their ire at the businesses that selected them or the governor who issued the decree, though the Kremlin is ultimately responsible for the Russian forces’ unsustainable casualty rate in Ukraine that is necessitating this new covert mobilization effort. The Russian recruitment rate fell below its casualty rate for the first time since 2022 in January 2026, and the Russian MoD appears to be struggling to find new force generation mechanisms and target new populations, as their previous mechanism of offering high one-time signing bonuses to volunteers has declined in effectiveness in late 2025.[21] The Kremlin is likely to continue to pursue regional covert and rolling mobilization efforts that fall short of a large-scale involuntary call-up to make up for its losses in Ukraine.[22]

The Ukrainian long-range strike campaign against the Russian Baltic Sea port and oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast is degrading Russian oil export capacity. Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko reported damage at the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast on March 31 following a presumable Ukrainian drone strike.[23] Sources within the Leningrad Oblast emergency services told Russian opposition source Astra that Ukrainian drone strikes caused a 50,000-ton oil tank to catch fire on the night of March 30 to 31.[24] Ukraine has been targeting Russian Baltic Sea port and oil infrastructure for the past week (since March 23) in Leningrad Oblast, causing significant damage at the Kinef oil refinery in Kirishi, the Novatek Ust-Luga in Ust-Luga, the Transneft oil terminal at the port of Primorsk, and a project 23550 Purga-class patrol icebreaker at the Vyborg Shipyard.[25] Bloomberg reported on March 31 that Ukrainian strikes against the ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga in the past week reduced Russia’s oil income by more than $1 billion as Russian weekly crude oil flows decreased by 1.75 million barrels a day.[26] Bloomberg noted that the ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga decreased the number of tankers loading crude oil from 18 tankers between the two ports from March 16 to 22 to six tankers between March 23 to 29 as a result of the Ukrainian strikes. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s ability to sell oil is partially a function of its ability to transport it, and continued Ukrainian drone strikes will degrade Russia’s ability to transport oil, which may partially offset the United States’ partial lifting of oil sanctions against Russia.[27]

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text.

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 31 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Mala Korchakivka (north of Sumy City).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Kindrativka, south of Andriivka, east of Mala Korchakivka, and south of Varachyne (all north of Sumy City).[29]

Russian forces attacked in the Sumy direction, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Mala Korchakivka, and Oleksiivka, on March 30 and 31.[30]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade reportedly continue to intercept Ukrainian drones in Kursk Oblast border areas.[31]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 31 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Starytsya, Okhrimivka, Lyptsi, and Hrafske and toward Verkhnya Pysarivka on March 30 and 31.[32]

Improving weather conditions are likely enabling Russian forces to fly more drones and intensify assaults in the Kharkiv direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on March 31 that Russian forces have intensified assaults and the use of first-person view (FPV) drones in the past week (March 24 to 31) due to warming weather conditions.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Khatnie on March 30 and 31.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northeastern Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[35]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in northwestern Kupyansk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[36] 

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk) and advanced east of Tyshchenkivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[37]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself and southeast of Kupyansk near Novoosynove, Kivsharivka, Kurylivka, and Pishchane on March 30 and 31.[38]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 27th Separate Mot

orized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[39]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka and Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka on March 30 and 31.[40]

Ukrainian forces recently continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and defense industrial infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on March 31 that Ukrainian drone operators struck a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[41] Geolocated footage published on March 30 shows Ukrainian drone operators striking a Russian Tor air defense system north of occupied Pokrovske (roughly 44 kilometers from the frontline) and four power substations and the Alchevsk Metallurgical Plant in occupied Alchevsk (roughly 65 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on March 29 to 30.[42]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on March 31 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Lyman.[43]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve; southwest of Lyman near Brusivka; east of Slovyansk near Zakitne; and southeast of Slovyansk near Riznykivka, Fedorivka Druha, Lypivka, Nykyforivka, and Kalenyky and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka on March 30 and 31.[44]

Order of Battle: Multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) elements of the Russian Pyatnashka International Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are striking Ukrainian forces in Slovyansk.[45] Elements of the 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[46]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Kostyantynivka and on the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka.[47]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Illinivka, Kleban-Byk and Pleshchiivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and toward Mykolaipillya; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on March 30 and 31.[48]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 1008th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces), 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]), and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[49] Drone operators of the Rys detachment of the 8th Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are striking Ukrainian forces in Minkivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[50] Reconnaissance elements of the 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division), 77th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD), 10th Tank Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) and artillery elements of the 1st Krasnodar Battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade, are coordinating artillery strikes on Ukrainian positions in Illinivka, Stepanivka, and Dovha Balka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[51] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian equipment northwest of Mykolaipillya.[52] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mikolaipillya.[53] Elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on March 31 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced into eastern Novyi Donbas (southeast of Dobropillya).[55]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Toretske and southeast of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove on March 30 and 31.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Novy Donbas (southeast of Dobropillya).[57]

Russian forces may be redeploying some reserve elements, including unspecified elements of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, near Dobropillya. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that some elements of the 76th VDV Division and other unspecified reserves are reportedly arriving in unspecified areas in an effort to attack in the Dobropillya direction.[58] Meduza hypothesized that the Russian military command may be aiming to seize Dobropillya in an effort to develop an assault on Kramatorsk from the west. ISW previously observed some elements of the 76th VDV Division operate in the Pokrovsk direction in late 2025.[59]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 57th Separate Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) are coordinating with reconnaissance elements of the 5th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) to strike Ukrainian positions in Dobropillya.[60]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction as Russian forces continued infiltration missions near Pokrovsk.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 31 shows Ukrainian forces operating in western Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[61]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 31 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions east of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[62] Geolocated footage published on March 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building north of Pokrovsk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the FEBA.[63]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske on March 30 and 31.[64] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pokrovsk, Bilytske, Hryshyne, Rodynske, and Vodyanske (northwest of Pokrovsk).[65]

Russian forces are reportedly trying to advance into Hryshyne by exploiting poor weather in the area. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on March 31 that Russian forces attempted to covertly advance into Hryshyne amidst fog and mist before Ukrainian forces eliminated a Russian company-level officer, causing disorganization among Russian troops and reducing their combat capabilities.[66] The corps added that Russian forces are unable to advance into central Hryshyne and suffer from food and water shortages.

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 57th Separate Spetsnaz Company are coordinating with reconnaissance elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade to strike Ukrainian positions in Bilytske and reportedly in Vodyanske.[67]  Elements of the 76th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[68] Elements of the 7th Military Commandant’s Office of the 51st CAA are reportedly operating in Pokrovsk.[69]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Muravka; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove on March 30 and 31, but did not advance.[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 31 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Pryvillya, Zlahoda, Oleksandrohrad, Berezove, and Kalynivske and toward Verbove and southwest of Oleksandrivka near Nove Zaporizhzhia on March 30 and 31.[71]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on March 31 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Verkhnya Tersa, Vozdvyzhivka, and Rizdvyanka; north of Hulyaipole near Olenokostyantynivka; northeast of Hulyaipole near Rivnopillya and Novomykolaivka; southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne; and west of Hulyaipole near Staroukrainka, Charivne, and Zaliznychne and toward Hulyaipilske on March 30 and 31.[72]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Hirke (west of Hulyaipole). [73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 31 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya; northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Pavlivka; and west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on March 30 and 31.[74]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Chervona Krynytsya (east of Orikhiv).[75] Drone operators of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Orikhiv.[76]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on March 31.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[77]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on March 30 to 31. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 289 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones, of which about 200 were Shaheds, from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[78] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 267 drones, that 20 drones struck 11 locations, and that drone debris fell at six locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and commercial infrastructure in Sumy, Odesa, and Poltava oblasts.[79] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure caused power outages in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Poltava oblasts on the morning of March 31.[80]

Russian forces continue to adapt Shahed-type drones to counter Ukrainian air defenses. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on March 31 that Russian forces have begun to equip Shahed drones with decoy R-60 air-to-air missiles to ward off intercepting Ukrainian aircraft and divert Ukrainian interceptor drones.[81]

Significant Activity in Belarus 

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Nothing Significant To Report.