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VOOZH | about |
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VOOZH | about |
Dr Michal Meidan is Head of China Energy Research at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Before joining OIES in July 2019, she headed cross-commodity China research at Energy Aspects. Prior to that, she headed China Matters, an independent research consultancy providing analysis on the politics of energy in China. Michal also held senior analytical roles at Eurasia Group in New York and London, and at Asia Centre-Sciences Po, Paris. She taught undergraduate courses on China’s political economy at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and has authored numerous academic articles. Michal also regularly provides comments for a wide variety of media outlets and is featured as a speaker at industry conferences.
Michal holds a PhD in Political Science and East Asian studies from Sciences Po, Paris. She is fluent in Mandarin and French.
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[post_content] => Joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran, which began on 28 February, are quickly turning into a regional conflict and an energy shock. US and Israeli strikes have hit numerous targets across Iran. In retaliation, Iran has launched missile and drone strikes on US bases and Gulf states hosting them, hitting ports and at least two oil tankers near Oman. It has also vowed to attack any ship attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz, bringing transit through the Strait to an effective halt.
Beyond immediate supply disruptions, the implications for China will be felt over the coming months. The impact will be more acute in a number of provinces and subsectors, given China’s reliance on the Middle East for crude, products and LNG. Overall, though, China’s energy system has significant buffers including large volumes of crude stocks, some product- and LNG stocks, as well as alternative fuels mainly in its power system.
This comment reviews China’s exposure to supply outages from Iran, the disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz and how it impacts energy flows. It analyses the actors, sectors and regions that would be most affected by lengthy outages, as well as potential responses to the crisis. It argues that the most underappreciated impact is likely to be on China’s gas users and the chemicals industry.
[post_title] => Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz: Implications for China’s energy markets and policies
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[post_content] => Each issue of the China Energy Monthly includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends.
[post_title] => China Energy Monthly – Issue 19
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[post_content] => In 2025, estimates for China’s implied crude stock builds ranged from 0.4 mb/d to 1.1 mb/d. Estimates also place the country’s total crude stocks to anywhere between 1.1-1.3 billion barrels, which would be equivalent to 110-140 days of import cover.
The limited data and opacity surrounding the reserve build up has kept oil markets supported and observers busy:
China is the world’s largest oil importing country, and over the last two decades has accounted for roughly half of global oil demand growth. Within that, between 2005-2015, gasoline contributed one-third of China’s product demand growth, effectively displacing diesel as the biggest driver of domestic product demand. The country’s strong economic growth, rising disposable incomes and surging vehicle sales, alongside an expected structural shift from reliance on industrial activity toward more consumer-led growth, suggested that the shift from diesel to gasoline would remain the dominant trend. This, in turn, underpinned crude oil producers’ expectations about the volume and types of crude oil China would need going forward and refiners’ calculus both within China and outside of it.
Yet during the COVID pandemic, China’s gasoline demand began to sputter. After growing at average rates of around 7% y/y for the better part of the 2020s, consumption slowed to an average 2% between 2020 and 2024. The change can be partly explained by lockdowns and concerns about disposable incomes, as these also led to a slowdown in passenger vehicle sales. But at the same time, electric vehicle sales surged. China is the world’s largest manufacturer of electric vehicles and in 2024, for the first time, new energy vehicles (NEVs, pure-electrics and plug-in hybrids) accounted for over half of new light-duty vehicle sales on a monthly basis while conventional internal combustion vehicle sales were in free fall. Four years on, the consumption changes seen during COVID may not be a blip, but rather the beginning of a new trend: In 2024, China’s gasoline demand also fell y/y prompting fiercer debates about whether gasoline demand had peaked or was set to peak soon.
Prominent forecasters diverge in their views on NEV adoption rates and how they will affect China’s oil demand. China’s own state-owned companies have been bringing forward their estimates of peak gasoline demand, announcing in December 2024 that gasoline consumption peaked in 2023 at 3.7 mb/d. Given the variation in forecasts, this Energy Insight explores three scenarios to estimate the impact of China’s NEV adoption on gasoline demand with transparent assumptions and sensitivity analysis.
[post_title] => Rising new energy vehicle sales in China: falling gasoline demand, rising uncertainty [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => rising-new-energy-vehicle-sales-in-china-falling-gasoline-demand-rising-uncertainty [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-04-29 12:37:48 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-04-29 11:37:48 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=48489 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [19] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 48260 [post_author] => 1152 [post_date] => 2025-02-19 14:25:25 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-19 14:25:25 [post_content] => Each issue of the China Energy Monthly includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends. To purchase your copy of this issue please clickSince the end of 2023, policy documents in China have increasingly highlighted environmental protection and have either set tighter and more specific targets or called out the need for faster progress towards existing goals. 2024 also brings three important catalysts for accelerated environmental policy. First, the 14th Five Year Plan (FYP) interim report, published in late 2023, highlighted that China is not on track to meeting its CO2 and energy intensity targets. Second, as planning gets underway for the 15th Five-Year Plan, this year China will need to revisit its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) climate pledges. Third and related to these, China is expanding its emissions trading scheme (ETS) and is increasing penalties for non-compliance in energy-intensive industries.
But even as policy documents emphasize environmental protection, implementing climate goals remains a challenge. Disagreement between the Ministry of Environment and Ecology (MEE) on one hand and the National Energy Administration (NEA) on the other on carbon accounting guidelines is one case in point. As China looks to balance economic growth—in large part from energy intensive industries—with increased renewable penetration, carbon accounting is an important part of the toolbox. But with the NEA and MEE disagreeing on guidelines and fighting for policy making power, the lack of clarity raises uncertainty for companies, particularly those in the aluminum and cement sectors that will soon need to comply with mandates for both carbon and renewables. At the diplomatic level, the incompatibility of the two measures also complicates China’s response to the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).
[post_title] => China’s policy pendulum shifts back toward environmental protection, but will bureaucracy get in the way? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => chinas-policy-pendulum-shifts-back-toward-environmental-protection-but-will-bureaucracy-get-in-the-way [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-02-15 10:54:12 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-02-15 10:54:12 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=47022 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [33] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 46846 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2023-12-15 13:35:48 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-12-15 13:35:48 [post_content] => 2023, as the mid-point of the 14th Five Year Plan is also when assessments begin ahead of planning for the next Plan in 2024. Yet the general direction of China’s energy and environmental policies and priorities has been confusing: Despite a weak macroeconomic picture, energy and commodity demand has grown strongly in 2023. And despite a commitment to peak carbon emissions before 2030, China has been increasing coal production and adding new capacity. This has translated into a confusing stance in climate diplomacy: The US-China Sunnylands Declaration suggested progress and ambition, China’s position at COP28 was more circumspect. Finally, with questions around the decarbonisation of China’s power sector, electric vehicle (EV) penetration continues to surge, even as sales slow. The domestic market seems to be facing a consolidation but exports are rising strongly. Countries in developed economies are now grappling with the need to protect their domestic auto industries from Chinese competition while also needing to accelerate the electrification of their fleets. What do these opposing trends means for China’s energy and environmental policies? This Comment looks back at China’s energy policies and markets in 2023 and discusses these contradictions, assessing what they mean for 2024. [post_title] => Four contradictions in China’s energy and environmental policies in 2023 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => four-contradictions-in-chinas-energy-and-environmental-policies-in-2023 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-12-15 13:35:48 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-12-15 13:35:48 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=46846 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [34] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 46438 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2023-08-08 11:08:42 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-08-08 10:08:42 [post_content] =>China has a huge and growing influence on the global politics and economics of energy. The topic of China’s role in the new geopolitics of energy is hardly new, but the supply chain crisis following Covid and then the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have combined to further elevate the topic. Decarbonization and the risk of de-globalization are increasingly central to energy policies and are framing the geopolitics of energy. China’s energy security concerns are also closely linked to these trends: China is a leading importer of oil and gas, so its energy supplies are exposed to price volatility, which is exacerbated by supply shocks due to instability in producer countries, transportation bottlenecks, and sanctions. But as China has established itself as the world’s leading manufacturer of renewable energy sources, and as the energy transition gathers momentum, China’s energy security opportunities and challenges are evolving.
From the point of view of advanced economies, China has long been viewed both as an economic partner and as an industrial competitor. Since the Paris Climate Agreement, China has been a central actor in climate diplomacy as well as a leader in clean energy, but China’s dominance of clean energy supply chains has raised concerns about whether Western countries can catch up. For many years, the example of China’s clean energy scale-up acted as a positive spur to more policy action, but since 2020 these efforts have taken on a more urgent and confrontational aspect as governments explicitly target reducing China’s dominance in specific technologies (batteries, solar) and critical materials. In other world regions, attitudes towards the role of China in energy geopolitics are vastly different and are informed, in part, by the deepening rift between China and the US.
The rapidly changing role of China in world energy politics makes it important and timely to review the topic. In this issue of the Oxford Energy Forum, we present insights and views from experts from around the world, showcasing the broad range of views on China’s geopolitical position and trajectory. The issue discusses the role of China and perceptions of it in the geopolitics of hydrogen, renewables, power grids, minerals, finance, and carbon, combined with regional perspectives from Russia, the US, the Middle East, Africa, South-East Asia, and India.
[post_title] => Taking Stock of China and the Geopolitics of Energy - Issue 137 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => taking-stock-of-china-and-the-geopolitics-of-energy-issue-137 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-08-14 15:51:19 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-08-14 14:51:19 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=46438 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [35] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 46292 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2023-06-21 11:08:34 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-06-21 10:08:34 [post_content] => China is currently the world’s largest oil importer and is on track to becoming the biggest consumer of liquefied natural gas (LNG). This dependency is viewed as a strategic vulnerability, especially as China’s ties with the USA are worsening and Beijing has growing concerns about Washington’s use of sanctions. As China pursues its low carbon energy transition, will reduced consumption of oil and gas shape its views of energy security and its geopolitical relations with producer countries? This paper discusses different scenarios for China’s oil and gas consumption, and notes that even though the overall demand volumes vary quite widely between outlooks, China is set to remain the world’s largest consumer of oil and the second largest importer of gas (behind the EU) for decades to come. It argues that given the dominance of coal and increasingly of renewables in the country’s energy mix, the economic impact of oil and gas supply outages is limited and will decline further. Nonetheless, China’s sense of energy insecurity will be informed as much by Beijing’s perceptions as by market realities. Looking ahead, the number of oil and gas suppliers to China is set to shrink, with imports coming predominantly from the USA, Russia, and the Middle East (and most notably Saudi Arabia for oil, and Qatar for LNG). But just as China will become increasingly dependent on a small number of exporters, their interdependence will deepen, leading producers to compete for market share in China. The dependence on a smaller number of suppliers could be seen as a vulnerability, but it also gives Beijing geopolitical leverage. The paper analyses the importance of oil and gas in China’s relations with its main suppliers, and argues that as China has incorporated energy interests into its broader foreign policy objectives, given the ongoing need for critical materials and other commodities (metals and grains, for instance), China will likely remain invested in countries and regions even after its oil and gas imports from them fall. Finally, the paper argues that China’s energy security policies are increasingly being shaped by the prospect of sanctions. Beijing will want to deepen ties and build coalitions aimed at weakening the USA’s ability to contain and suppress China. Beijing will also want to consolidate its relations with energy suppliers (as well as suppliers of other raw materials) so that, in the event of sanctions or a conflict, suppliers will struggle to pick between the USA and China, or will opt to align with China. [post_title] => The outlook for China’s fossil fuel consumption under the energy transition and its geopolitical implications [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-outlook-for-chinas-fossil-fuel-consumption-under-the-energy-transition-and-its-geopolitical-implications [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-06-21 11:08:34 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-06-21 10:08:34 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=46292 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [36] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 46109 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2023-04-26 09:48:31 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-04-26 08:48:31 [post_content] => China’s all important “Two Sessions” wrapped up in Beijing on 13 March 2023, setting out the key macroeconomic priorities for the year and suggesting a cautious growth outlook. While Beijing set to deliver its “around 5%” GDP growth target—leading to a recovery in energy consumption—the nature nature of the economic rebound matters: Whether it is more consumer-led, as Q1 2023 data seem to suggest, or infrastructure-heavy will determine oil product use and the strength of gas consumption. The Two Sessions also emphasized coal and energy security, using new language about coal being the mainstay of the country’s energy system, a departure from previous policy documents that discussed coal’s gradual transition to a supplementary energy source. Despite this, clean energy additions are unlikely to slow so China’s 2030 and 2060 carbon peaking and neutrality goals remain within reach. But the policy stance on coal will limit the space for raising China’s climate ambitions or accelerating the low-carbon transition in industry. Meanwhile, the continued investment in coal infrastructure will make meeting the low-carbon objectives more challenging while raising the absolute quantity of carbon dioxide emissions over time. In its Two Sessions Work Reports and in subsequent guidance for 2023, the government emphasized energy security and called for an all-of-the above approach to energy supplies, with the exception of gas, where Beijing is limiting coal-to-gas switching for now. And just as the tension between coal and renewables was striking, so is the tension between the role of the State and markets: While markets were discussed at length, market reforms are still on the backburner as the government maintains a strong role in energy sector management. [post_title] => China’s climate and energy policy after the Two Sessions: More wait and see [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => chinas-climate-and-energy-policy-after-the-two-sessions-more-wait-and-see [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-04-26 11:00:02 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-04-26 10:00:02 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=46109 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [37] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 46070 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2023-04-17 10:59:56 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-04-17 09:59:56 [post_content] =>In this latest edition of the Gas Quarterly we review the first quarter of 2023 against the signposts that we outlined at the start of the year. The overarching theme is that the outturn for Europe has been much more benign than could have been expected at the start of winter. A combination of warm weather, aggressive demand response to high gas prices and changing consumer behaviour, as well as the increased availability of LNG to Europe, have led to a situation where the market seems well balanced. However, although prices have fallen sharply from their 2022 highs, they still remain well above the 5-year average level, underlining the point that although the outlook for 2023 looks relatively calm it would not take much of a shift in supply or demand to cause a sharp rebound.
In this Quarterly we also look at one of the big questions in the global gas market, namely how the unwinding of the COVID lockdown in China would impact energy markets. With the economy now fully re-opened, it is expected that growth will resume and with it energy demand growth, including demand for pipeline gas and LNG imports. Much depends on what route to growth the Chinese leadership decides to take, and also on the policy concerning energy security, which tends to favour gas over coal. In addition, the drive to increase domestic gas production and to optimise imports via pipeline means that the need for spot LNG purchases could be minimal in 2023, albeit that LNG supply under long-term contracts is set to grow. As a result, a low level of competition with Europe over spare LNG cargoes again points to a benign scenario for gas prices this year.
[post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review - Issue 21 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-issue-21 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-04-17 11:29:09 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-04-17 10:29:09 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=46070 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [38] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 45867 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2023-02-20 11:15:17 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-02-20 11:15:17 [post_content] => China's reversal of its zero-COVID policy in December 2022 and macro policies aimed at reinvigorating economic activity point to a strong outlook for energy demand. But the sharp policy U-turns are also leading to volatility and uncertainty in the domestic market: Oil product stocks have drawn down while gas shortages have emerged in northern China. With oil demand likely to grow by 0.7 mb/d this year, and gas demand by close to 30 bcm y/y, there will be more volatility in the domestic market. In the power sector, China continues to add coal capacity due to the fear of repeat power outages, even though solar and wind had a strong year in 2022 and are expected to grow even more in 2023. Supply security will continue to dominate policy makers' priorities, raising questions about the speed and scope of power market reforms. [post_title] => China re-opens: Implications for energy markets and policies [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => china-re-opens-implications-for-energy-markets-and-policies [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-02-20 11:18:57 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-02-20 11:18:57 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=45867 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [39] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 45480 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-11-21 14:00:06 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-11-21 14:00:06 [post_content] => The 20th National Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) started on 16 October 2022, with President Xi Jinping delivering the Party’s work report and ending with the unveiling of the new line-up of the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee and other top Party leadership bodies. Not only was Xi Jinping appointed for an unprecedented third term in office, promoting allies to top positions, but the Congress was also eagerly observed for any indication of change in the country’s macro-economic and energy policies. Overall, the Party Congress signalled considerable policy continuity in terms of energy and climate. This Comment discusses these outcomes and Xi Jinping's Report, which includes both good, bad and lots of unknowns: The emphasis on coal as a source of energy security and resilience complicates the country’s dual carbon targets (to peak emissions before 2030 and strive to reach carbon neutrality by 2060), but the focus on renewables as part of the securitisation of everything suggest China will overshoot its targets, at least with respect to renewable energy. Similarly, the ongoing zero-COVID policy and the resulting economic weakness have led to a drop in Chinese emissions, and efforts to rebalance the Chinese economy could further benefit the dual carbon goals if implemented with a focus on efficiency gains. In the near-term, the Report and government statements suggest there will be limited change to the country’s zero-COVID policy, even as tweaks are being made to travel and quarantine guidelines. Meanwhile, the economic slowdown is leading to lower oil and gas imports—for now a positive in tight global gas markets, but a weakness for oil markets. Efforts to sustain economic activity, even if not at high levels, has already led the government to reverse its policy on oil product export quotas. This, in turn, will alleviate pressure in global diesel markets but raises questions about the government’s commitment to its peak emission targets in the refining and chemicals sector. The Report and outcome of the leadership transition also leave many open questions: to what extent will the new leadership, made up of President Xi’s confidantes who seem to support a growing role for the State in the economy, accelerate market reforms? How will the drive for technological self-sufficiency, combined with the US ban on exports of semiconductors impact China’s ability to scale up and export existing technologies that are critical for the energy transition? [post_title] => China’s 20th Party Congress and energy: The good, the bad and the unknown [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => chinas-20th-party-congress-and-energy-the-good-the-bad-and-the-unknown [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-11-21 09:36:12 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-11-21 09:36:12 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=45480 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [40] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 45410 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-10-31 12:29:29 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-10-31 12:29:29 [post_content] => China is the world’s leading emitter of heat-trapping gases by a wide margin. Its policies for limiting emissions will have a significant impact on the global climate for decades to come. This Guide to Chinese Climate Policy provides information on China’s emissions, the impacts of climate change in China, the history of China’s climate change policies and China’s response to climate change today.The second quarter of 2022 has been a dramatic one for the European gas market. On the supply side, relatively modest increases in European production and pipeline imports from Norway and Azerbaijan have been overshadowed by two significant shifts: the decline in pipeline flows from Russia and the high level of LNG, both of which are continuations of trends seen in Q1. Last year, China’s LNG imports of 107 Bcm were greater than those of all European importers (excluding Turkey) combined (89 bcm). The fact that LNG imports into China have been substantially lower year-on-year in both Q1 and Q2 has enabled a greater volume to flow to Europe. Both of these dynamics are examined in this review.
We begin this edition of our OIES Quarterly Gas Review, as always, with our review of gas prices, and in doing so, we assess the impact of the present market situation on LNG margins, as a motivator for LNG project FIDs, and inter-fuel dynamics in Europe. We then take a deeper dive into the supply-demand balance on the European market in recent months and the key factors in that balance. Finally, we present two special sections: Firstly, ‘In the Bleak Midwinter’ considers the EU proposal to reduce gas consumption during the coming winter and the impact of a complete curtailment of Russian flows to the EU. Secondly, we present the near-term outlook for China. Given that the extent to which Chinese LNG demand rises or falls has a significant impact on the availability of LNG for Europe, we examine the economic context behind China’s current LNG demand dynamics.
[post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review - Issue 18 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-issue-18 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-08-04 11:01:12 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-08-04 10:01:12 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=45135 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [43] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44927 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-05-23 11:02:21 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-05-23 10:02:21 [post_content] => Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, global energy markets have tightened with prices of oil and gas surging. At the same time, Chinese oil and gas demand has been relatively weak, raising questions about the impact of high prices on China’s appetite for imported oil and gas. This comment argues that China's weakening economy, due to Beijing’s dynamic zero-COVID policy, is weighing on demand for oil gas imports more than high costs. This matters because if prices are the main culprit, China’s oil and gas imports may well remain muted through year-end, as markets seem set to remain tight. But if the macroeconomic outlook is the main driver for oil and gas buying, a recovery in economic activity later this year, on the back of a strong government stimulus, will support renewed buying activity. But it is by no means a foregone conclusion that the government's 5.5 per cent GDP growth target will be met. Despite the need for stability in this year of political transition, limiting the spread of the pandemic will remain the top priority. The government will seek to reinvigorate growth to the extent possible, but the focus will be on employment and if logistics allow, on infrastructure development. [post_title] => China’s diminished appetite for imported oil and gas: is the price not right? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => chinas-diminished-appetite-for-imported-oil-and-gas-is-the-price-not-right [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-05-23 11:02:21 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-05-23 10:02:21 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44927 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [44] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44749 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-03-31 10:35:49 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-03-31 09:35:49 [post_content] =>On February 4 2022 China’s President Xi Jinping and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin signed a series of new oil and gas contracts including an additional 10 bcma gas pipeline deal. This comment reviews how the new gas deal between Russia and China fits into their strategies, highlights the key implications of expanded gas cooperation between Russia and China and addresses some of the open questions in the deal. The main outcome of the agreement is a diversification of foreign trade options for both countries: The conflict in Ukraine has created a new reality in which Europe is going to reduce its energy dependence on Russia as soon as possible. Russia must therefore accelerate its Pivot East. From China’s perspective, the additional 10 bcma gas comes at an opportune time, as the country faces rising gas demand and highly volatile global LNG prices, but these incremental flows are still unlikely to diminish China’s appetite for imported LNG, nor should they be taken as a sign that an additional pipeline deal is imminent. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s growing international isolation could lead it to offer China an attractively-termed deal on an additional pipeline, and Beijing will likely be inclined to accept it, but the raft of uncertainties surrounding China’s future demand in light of ongoing price volatility as well as its willingness to conclude another large agreement with Russia now may prompt it to hold off on an additional commitment just yet.
[post_title] => Russia and China Expand Their Gas Deal: Key Implications [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => russia-and-china-expand-their-gas-deal-key-implications [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-03-31 10:35:49 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-03-31 09:35:49 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44749 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [45] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44704 [post_author] => 259 [post_date] => 2022-03-21 12:14:41 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-03-21 12:14:41 [post_content] => On 17 March, Michal Meidan testified before the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission on China’s Energy Plans and Practices. In her testimony, Michal discussed the outlook for China’s fossil fuel demand in China, the successes and challenges associated with fossil fuel supply and how this fits into the country’s low carbon energy transition. Michal assessed these successes and challenges through three factors: economic stability, supply security and environmental sustainability and argued that from Beijing’s perspective, the domestic availability of fossil fuels helps China meet both economic stability and energy security, even as it works to enhance environmental sustainability. Link to testimony recording [post_title] => Statement before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: Policymaking and Energy Supply and Demand in China’s Domestic Economy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => statement-before-the-u-s-china-economic-and-security-review-commission-policymaking-and-energy-supply-and-demand-in-chinas-domestic-economy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-03-22 14:02:29 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-03-22 14:02:29 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44704 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [46] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44684 [post_author] => 259 [post_date] => 2022-03-17 12:17:49 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-03-17 12:17:49 [post_content] => In late 2021, China experienced a severe electricity supply crisis that affected 20 provinces. Industrial activity was curtailed, and even households suffered prolonged outages in some areas. The country is no stranger to periodic energy supply shortages and in many outages in the past, the principal causes involved either poor policy coordination or a clash between market forces and government plans and administrative measures. This time it was no different. This issue of the Oxford Energy Forum analyses the 2021 energy crisis in China, its causes and its implications for domestic energy markets and the country’s low-carbon energy transition. [post_title] => Oxford Energy Forum - The 2021 energy crisis: Implications for China's energy market and policies - Issue 131 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => oxford-energy-forum-the-2021-energy-crisis-implications-for-chinas-energy-market-and-policies [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-04-04 10:31:26 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-04-04 09:31:26 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44684 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [47] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44616 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-03-07 14:35:13 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-03-07 14:35:13 [post_content] => Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, energy markets are in turmoil. Oil and gas prices are rising and exhibiting high volatility as the markets grapple with the impact of sanctions and the prospect of reduced flows from Russia . China is heavily exposed to Russian commodity exports and to global markets. The invasion and its aftermath have a profound impact on China’s short term energy supplies, its policy priorities for the coming year and long term energy policies. In the near term, China will suffer from higher energy costs and commodity prices much like other energy importing countries. The economic and geopolitical fallout pose challenges for China in this critical year of a domestic leadership transition, a time when it is seeking stability. But in the longer-term, China could benefit from higher volumes of yuan-denominated trading (should Russian sellers chose to rely on it) and greater use of China’s payment settlement system. Russia’s growing international isolation could also lead it to offer attractively priced gas pipeline deals to China and open up new investment opportunities for Chinese firms in Russia’s energy sector. This comment offers some preliminary analysis of these issues. [post_title] => The Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s energy markets [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-and-chinas-energy-markets [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-03-07 14:35:13 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-03-07 14:35:13 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44616 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [48] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44395 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-12-10 11:10:34 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-12-10 11:10:34 [post_content] =>The global low-carbon energy transition will require major changes to institutional practices and energy industry paradigms with implications for society writ large. A country’s existing institutional pattern inevitably shapes the transition, and helps or hinders its progress. This is perhaps especially so in state-dominated systems such as China, which have historically considered energy as a strategic field for reasons of both security and economic development.
China has already taken steps to embrace clean energy, even as it remains the world’s largest consumer of fossil fuels: Indeed, it is the world’s leading producer and consumer of renewable energy in absolute terms today, and the country’s leaders speak of encouraging a revolution in energy consumption and production, in line with new targets announced in 2020 to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. But how successful will China be in introducing the sweeping changes required? At the technological level, such changes could include replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy sources, but they also require institutional shifts, which could entail major market reforms and changes to the structure of the Chinese energy sector, dominated now by SOEs and administrative planning.
This Insight examines how China’s institutional setting both contributes to and hinders the energy transition, with a particular emphasis on the energy sector. It also aims to dispel the binary view of China’s governance and the energy transition, in which central government commitment is portrayed as the sole determinant of success. Finally, it sets out a preliminary framework for analysing the areas where technological and institutional factors make change more likely to be lasting and transformative, versus areas in which resistance will likely remain strong.
Historically, China has been better at building out energy supplies and adding the ‘hardware’ of energy infrastructure, while having greater difficulty adjusting the ‘software’ of institutional and societal change or practices related to energy demand and energy efficiency. We would argue that China is likely to continue to expand the hardware, given its strong institutions devoted to investing in supply. But China will struggle with the software as this relies on a demand pull, market incentives, and greater coordination among stakeholders and between sectors.
When considering innovation for the energy transition, the paper makes a similar argument: China’s technology innovation system has enabled innovation in first generation technologies. But will China’s strong incumbent industries impede the transformational change required for the more modular technologies that are less capital intensive and require greater societal involvement and coordination? China has come to dominate global supplies in manufacturing-intensive technologies – solar photovoltaics and batteries – which have also seen the most rapid cost declines due to scale. For design-intensive technology – such as wind, concentrating solar power plants, or advanced coal plants – cost declines have not been as pronounced. For those technologies that are less modular and more design-intensive, state-owned enterprises may play a larger role and the potential for transformative technological change could be slower to emerge.
Read the full paper here - Software versus hardware: how China’s institutional setting helps and hinders the clean energy transition [post_title] => Software versus hardware: how China’s institutional setting helps and hinders the clean energy transition [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => software-versus-hardware-how-chinas-institutional-setting-helps-and-hinders-the-clean-energy-transition-2 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-12-13 09:57:19 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-12-13 09:57:19 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44395 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [49] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44393 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-12-10 11:06:41 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-12-10 11:06:41 [post_content] =>The global low-carbon energy transition will require major changes to institutional practices and energy industry paradigms with implications for society writ large. A country’s existing institutional pattern inevitably shapes the transition, and helps or hinders its progress. This is perhaps especially so in state-dominated systems such as China, which have historically considered energy as a strategic field for reasons of both security and economic development.
China has already taken steps to embrace clean energy, even as it remains the world’s largest consumer of fossil fuels: Indeed, it is the world’s leading producer and consumer of renewable energy in absolute terms today, and the country’s leaders speak of encouraging a revolution in energy consumption and production, in line with new targets announced in 2020 to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. But how successful will China be in introducing the sweeping changes required? At the technological level, such changes could include replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy sources, but they also require institutional shifts, which could entail major market reforms and changes to the structure of the Chinese energy sector, dominated now by SOEs and administrative planning.
This paper examines how China’s institutional setting both contributes to and hinders the energy transition, with a particular emphasis on the energy sector. It also aims to dispel the binary view of China’s governance and the energy transition, in which central government commitment is portrayed as the sole determinant of success. Finally, it sets out a preliminary framework for analysing the areas where technological and institutional factors make change more likely to be lasting and transformative, versus areas in which resistance will likely remain strong.
Historically, China has been better at building out energy supplies and adding the ‘hardware’ of energy infrastructure, while having greater difficulty adjusting the ‘software’ of institutional and societal change or practices related to energy demand and energy efficiency. We would argue that China is likely to continue to expand the hardware, given its strong institutions devoted to investing in supply. But China will struggle with the software as this relies on a demand pull, market incentives, and greater coordination among stakeholders and between sectors.
When considering innovation for the energy transition, the paper makes a similar argument: China’s technology innovation system has enabled innovation in first generation technologies. But will China’s strong incumbent industries impede the transformational change required for the more modular technologies that are less capital intensive and require greater societal involvement and coordination? China has come to dominate global supplies in manufacturing-intensive technologies – solar photovoltaics and batteries – which have also seen the most rapid cost declines due to scale. For design-intensive technology – such as wind, concentrating solar power plants, or advanced coal plants – cost declines have not been as pronounced. For those technologies that are less modular and more design-intensive, state-owned enterprises may play a larger role and the potential for transformative technological change could be slower to emerge.
Read the short-version of the full paper here - OIES Energy Insight - Software versus hardware: how China’s institutional setting helps and hinders the clean energy transition [post_title] => Software versus hardware: how China’s institutional setting helps and hinders the clean energy transition [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => software-versus-hardware-how-chinas-institutional-setting-helps-and-hinders-the-clean-energy-transition [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-03-15 12:18:57 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-03-15 12:18:57 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44393 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [50] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44324 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-11-17 11:30:09 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-11-17 11:30:09 [post_content] => Power outages in China were widely expected this year after the country experienced some rationing in December 2020 and then again over the summer. In early September a handful of localities were seeing shortages, but by October over 20 Chinese provinces were curbing or rationing power supplies, not only for industrial, but also residential users, a rare occurrence for a country aiming to prioritise household energy supply. The reasons for these outages are widely covered but also highly debated: is it high coal prices or the “dual control” policies — the cap on provincial energy consumption and the energy intensity reduction target set by the central government? While there are a number of factors contributing to the power outages, the mixed signals from the central government combined with pricing distortions in China’s power market are at the heart of this crisis. This comment briefly reviews the causes of the power outages, their near-term market impact on oil and gas as well as the outlook for power pricing reform and the extent to which they are changing the thinking in China about the 2030-2060 goals. [post_title] => China's power crisis: Long-term goals meet short-term realities [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => chinas-power-crisis-long-term-goals-meet-short-term-realities [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-11-17 11:30:26 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-11-17 11:30:26 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44324 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [51] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44189 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-09-29 11:53:49 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-09-29 10:53:49 [post_content] => China’s announcement that it will release oil from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), a first such announcement and release, is hugely significant. But its importance stems from the institutionalization of China’s SPR programme rather than the near-term impact on markets and flows. Indeed, the decision to release crude from the SPR follows similar releases of metal and grain reserves, which have all been aimed at taming inflationary pressure given rising input costs. But the volumes released in the first batch are a drop in the ocean compared to China’s total imports and are unlikely to impact global prices or radically alter import flows. Moreover, they are unlikely to significantly dent producer price inflation because of the small size of the release and the domestic product pricing mechanism. The first auction, is therefore likely, first and foremost, a test of the newly created SPR mechanism. In the coming months, the government could draw down stocks from additional tanks to further test the mechanism especially if this first release is deemed a success. But even additional draws are unlikely to fundamentally alter China’s import needs as the tanks will need to be replenished subsequently. Indeed, in the near-term, any weakness in crude buying will be related to refining margins and a weak demand outlook rather than the SPR release. [post_title] => China’s SPR release: a test of mechanisms rather than a show of market might [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => chinas-spr-release-a-test-of-mechanisms-rather-than-a-show-of-market-might [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-09-29 11:53:49 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-09-29 10:53:49 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44189 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [52] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 43523 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-03-16 10:45:56 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-03-16 10:45:56 [post_content] =>On 11 March 2021, the Chinese government ratified its 14th Five Year Plan and long-term targets for 2035. Since this is the first Five Year Plan (FYP) published following China’s announcement in September 2020 that it would aim to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2060, it was expected to be a strong indicator of China’s commitment to this pledge and a first concrete step toward it, although viewing it as a bellwether of China’s ambitions may be misguided. This comment discusses some of the key statements from the Plan regarding energy and the environment, as well as five themes that will be important to watch over the next few years.
The overarching Plan seems weak in terms of its climate ambition and heavy on self-sufficiency, but these are early days, as more details will emerge with sectoral and provincial plans in the coming months. Still, there are a number of inherent policy tensions that will plague the upcoming plan. It will be important to watch whether these are addressed (although they are unlikely to be resolved) in sectoral plans; whether or not the political framework evolves in support of a stronger climate agenda, either through stronger ministries, leading groups, or improved coordination. The development of the emissions trading scheme will also be important, although we argue that even though it is a significant step for China, its near term impact on emissions in the power sector will be limited. Finally, we argue that despite slower oil demand growth, refining additions will continue in the near term, and that even though the decarbonisation agenda may weaken gas demand in the long-term, liberalisation efforts (and potentially some coal to gas switching) will be a boon for gas demand in the near-term.
[post_title] => Key issues for China’s 14th Five Year Plan [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => key-issues-for-chinas-14th-five-year-plan [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-03-16 10:45:56 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-03-16 10:45:56 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=43523 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [53] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 43398 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-02-08 11:29:58 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-02-08 11:29:58 [post_content] => Gathering momentum for the energy transition has sparked debate on what the energy map will look like in 30 years. For more than half a century now, access to oil and natural gas has been at the heart of the geopolitics of energy; but with renewable technologies set to dominate energy supply systems, relations between states will change, while economies and societies will undergo structural transformations. This issue of the Oxford Energy Forum discusses the drivers and main features of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ geopolitics of energy. It assesses the power shifts that are unfolding, the winners and losers—both countries and technologies—that are likely to emerge from this process, and the potential implications for global governance regimes. Our authors ask whether the prospects of peak oil demand will dim the geopolitical forces shaping producer–consumer relations and upend geopolitical arrangements which have been defining elements of regional power systems. They ask: who will lead the race for new technologies and supply chains? And how will US–China competition and coordination impact global efforts to meet the Paris climate goals? A thread running through this Forum is a warning against intellectual complacency. One key theme is that assumptions about the future geopolitical outlook of countries, regions, and trade relationships will hardly be guided by history, given the size and scope of the transformation. Demand-side policy and capital allocation shifts will create both challenges and opportunities for fossil fuel incumbents—a stark reminder that while some regions are moving more slowly, no region is standing still as the energy transition gathers pace. Similarly, identifying winners and losers is not as clear-cut as it seems, especially in light of concerns that the US is losing out in the race with the EU and China. The third theme serves as a stark reminder that the pathways to net zero will be neither linear nor uniform, especially in light of the falling costs of technologies. But the race for technological leadership and for control of the supply chains of new materials will become a key factor in the geopolitics of new energies. [post_title] => Oxford Energy Forum - The Geopolitics of Energy: Out with the Old and in with the New? - Issue 126 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => oxford-energy-forum-the-geopolitics-of-energy-out-with-the-old-and-in-with-the-new-issue-126 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-04-04 10:37:14 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-04-04 09:37:14 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=43398 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [54] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 43226 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-12-07 12:24:35 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-07 12:24:35 [post_content] => In almost every oil cycle, the market is confronted with the problem of ‘missing barrels’, the gap between the change in inventory implied by global supply-demand balances on the one hand and the observed change in inventory levels by commercial and government entities (adjusted for floating storage and oil in transit) on the other hand. Based on IEA global oil balances, the surplus in the first half of 2020 reaching a record level of 7.6 mb/d. Out of the total stockbuild in the first half of the year, total OECD stocks accounted for 344.3 mbbls or 25% of the total increase, floating storage and oil in transit accounted for 105.3 mbbls or 8% of the total increase and the remaining 940.4 mbbls or 68% of the total increase to balance is essentially unaccounted for including changes in non-reported stocks in OECD and non-OECD areas. The volume of missing barrels in H1 2020, is the largest ever recorded gap between observed and implied stocks since at least 1990, being three times larger than previous historical downcycles such as in H1 1998 and more recently the H2 2018 downturn and nearly 10 times larger than the imbalance of H2 2008 in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The issue of missing barrels is not incidental. Given the severity of the oil shock in 2020, the focus has been on supply-demand balances. But once the dust settles, the focus will shift to the size of available stocks and OPEC+ efforts in drawing down these stocks to ‘reasonable’ levels. If the missing barrels are ‘artificial’, the result of imprecise measuring of supply and demand, then the buffers in the system are thinner than currently estimated and OPEC+ task in reducing stocks is less of a challenge. If the missing barrels are ‘real’, then most of these barrels are to be found in non-OECD particularly in China given its large storage capacity. This may reveal the fact that while Chinese demand has been strong, the country’s high level of imports reflects mainly stockpiling and stocks are already at an elevated level and thus crude import flows may ease representing a bearish factor. We argue that large accumulation of barrels has occurred in China which suggests that ‘artificial’ or ‘imaginary’ barrels, as a result of imprecise measurement of global oil supply-demand balances, are not the only explanation to the missing barrels question. Indeed, even though China’s crude balances are riddled with inconsistencies, the country has amassed large volumes of crude this year which have contributed both to the country’s strategic reserves and commercial forward cover. At the same time, Chinese demand may well be underestimated given refiners’ tax avoidance practices. The complexities of global crude balances highlight the ongoing challenges facing OPEC+ in estimating how long it will take to rebalance the market. Going forward, can OPEC+ afford ignoring non-OECD stocks? But if these stocks are being stored for strategic purposes and the bulk of these stocks will not be released back into the market, does targeting non-OECD stocks really matter for oil policy purposes? Should we exclude years of elevated stocks from the averages or have these become main features of the new cycles and the adjustment process? As we go into 2021, these questions will become more pressing. [post_title] => The COVID-19 Shock and the Curious Case of Missing Barrels [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-covid-19-shock-and-the-curious-case-of-missing-barrels [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-12-07 12:24:35 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-12-07 12:24:35 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=43226 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [55] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 43164 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-12-02 12:44:18 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-02 12:44:18 [post_content] => On 22 September 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) that China would aim to peak its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions before 2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2060. While taking on a global leadership role in the energy transition offers China economic and diplomatic opportunities, the challenges are equally tremendous. As the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions—with an energy system heavily reliant on coal—reaching carbon neutrality would require a fundamental change in China’s energy supply systems and in the way energy is consumed. This also implies a profound transformation in China’s economic structure and a shake-up of the fossil fuels industry, a politically powerful lobby, raising questions about the drivers behind this announcement and the next steps. Is the pledge a diplomatic ruse that China’s leadership has no intention to keep? If it is not, and Beijing is contemplating it in earnest, how will China reach carbon neutrality? Such a massive structural shift would require rapid action to get China onto this new trajectory and therefore raises the question of how will the upcoming 14th Five Year Plan (FYP, 2021-2025) reflect this new ambition. This comment draws on preliminary government drafts and proposals for the upcoming five-year plan as well as on some of the feasibility studies conducted by Chinese research institutions to offer pathways for the 2060 carbon neutrality pledge. It argues that while the net zero commitment has not yet been fleshed out into a clear policy pathway, it is by no means an empty pledge. But even with the long term direction of travel set, it would be unrealistic to expect the upcoming five-year plan to fully reflect the renewed level of ambition. Indeed, the path to carbon neutrality will likely play out in two speeds: a swift acceleration of renewable energy and an ambitious focus on technological innovation that will be visible in the upcoming five-year plan, alongside a longer buffer period until around 2030 to help fossil fuels adapt to the transition. [post_title] => Unpacking China's 2060 carbon neutrality pledge [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => unpacking-chinas-2060-carbon-neutrality-pledge [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-12-02 12:44:18 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-12-02 12:44:18 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=43164 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [56] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 42387 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-11-04 12:54:59 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-11-04 12:54:59 [post_content] => This document summarises the key takeaways from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies’ webinar on China's power, gas and oil markets in the wake of COVID-19 and ahead of the 14th Five Year Plan.At the end of February, the China Energy Research Programme at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies hosted its first ‘China Day’, bringing together programme sponsors alongside a number of experts to discuss some of the key trends in China and their implications for energy policies and markets. At the outset, discussions during the day were to revolve around the policy priorities for the final year of the 13th Five Year plan and drafting for the next plan, including questions such as environmental policies, reform and liberalisation, and to what extent US-China trade tensions would alter these priorities. The outbreak of COVID-19 changed both attendance and the focus of the day, as markets grapple with the uncertainty surrounding the global response to COVID-19. Despite this, discussions covered both the short-term challenges associated with COVID-19 and the medium-term policy priorities for China’s energy policy and markets. While the richness of the day’s discussions cannot be captured in a few pages, this comment covers some of the key points raised in the discussion.
Beijing’s efforts to contain the spread of the virus is set to take a massive toll on the economy and on energy demand in Q1 20, weighing on global supply chains and growth. As the virus spreads globally, China’s ability to lead a V-shaped recovery is increasingly uncertain. What is clear, though, is that already the focus on COVID-19 has slowed progress on other policy priorities including environmental policies and liberalisation, and a strong fossil-fuel heavy stimulus—which is not necessarily Beijing’s policy choice—would further delay them. A targeted stimulus through the state-owned economy would also complicate future negotiations between the US and China on the structural issues that were left out of the ‘phase one’ deal. The latter is also marred with uncertainty as markets struggle to see how trade flows can adjust to meet the lofty buying targets set out in the deal, and question whether they actually need to look at the details of what, in essence, is a political deal. At the same time, the need to tackle COVID-19 and reinvigorate the economy could reinforce the role of the state in the economy, delaying an already protracted liberalisation process. While in the gas market such delays could end up benefitting the incumbent state-owned majors, in the oil market their role continues to be challenged by both the Shandong independents and the new mega-refineries. The long-awaited consolidation in the oil downstream may not happen this year, but if it does, the Shandong teapots may not be the first to go.
[post_title] => Geopolitical shifts and China's energy policy priorities [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => geopolitical-shifts-and-chinas-energy-policy-priorities [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-03-17 11:53:47 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-03-17 11:53:47 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=36122 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [62] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 35912 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-03-09 13:57:20 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-03-09 13:57:20 [post_content] => In early February, as the Chinese government imposed quarantines and travel restrictions on large parts of the country to stem the spread of the coronavirus (COVID-19), China’s largest LNG importer, CNOOC invoked force majeure on cargoes. On 5 March 2020, PetroChina reportedly issued force majeure notices to some of its suppliers of piped gas and LNG. While the notices were prompted by logistical constraints (related to the quarantines and now plummeting demand), there is a growing concern in the industry that these notices are an attempt to renegotiate contracts. This comment discusses force majeure clauses in LNG sale and purchase agreements (SPAs), the consequences of buyers’ force majeure and explores the potential outcomes as well as the impact of force majeure declarations on the LNG industry. It argues that even though Chinese buyers have a number of reasons to seek contractual changes, they are unlikely to blatantly breach contracts in a way that would put supply security at risk. Such force majeure claims may, however, start a conversation about future revisions to contractual terms, even though sellers would at best agree to add more flexibility clauses and will resist outright price revisions. Over the coming years, the pressure from the Chinese government and buyers to move to more flexible prices will undoubtedly increase, but given uncertainty around domestic price reforms, any concrete steps toward renegotiation will likely wait until China has established some form of domestic pricing reference. Podcast [post_title] => Force majeure notices from Chinese LNG buyers: prelude to a renegotiation? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => force-majeure-notices-from-chinese-lng-buyers-prelude-to-a-renegotiation [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-03-17 11:49:38 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-03-17 11:49:38 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=35912 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [63] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 35131 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-02-07 15:32:06 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-02-07 15:32:06 [post_content] => 2020 looked to be off to a good start for China. But as the Year of the Pig ended, celebrations to welcome the Year of the Rat were marred by the outbreak of the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV). Beijing’s efforts to control the spread of the virus are set to weigh on economic activity as well as energy demand through H1 20. Assessing the economic, and therefore energy, impact of the coronavirus is no easy feat. Comparisons with the SARS outbreak in 2003 offer only limited insights as China’s economic structure and policy trajectory have changed dramatically and its global weight increased. Preliminary conclusions, however, suggest that China’s oil demand in Q1 20 could fall by 0.50-0.70 mb/d y/y, with the lost demand weighted toward jet and gasoline due to the heavy travel restrictions in place. Diesel and natural gas demand are also set to fall in Q1 20 but the medium-term impact will depend greatly on the length of the industrial shutdowns and the provinces that remain under quarantine. Moreover, the one-off hit to transportation demand during the holiday season cannot be recovered later, but industrial activity can make up for earlier losses. As China’s domestic end product demand plummets in the next month, refiners will need to export excess products, suggesting a strong uptick in outflows, especially given that they had stocked in preparation of the Lunar New Year. Moreover, refiners are set to cut runs by as much as 2 mb/d in February and March, suggesting that crude imports are also set to plummet, further complicating China’s pledges to increase imports for US crude. Natural gas demand will also be dented in the near term by the industrial outages just as travel restrictions are also making LNG trucking more complicated. Moreover, given that inventories at the LNG import terminals tend to by high ahead of the Lunar New Year holiday, the reduced demand currently is leading buyers to defer cargoes. While both oil and gas demand are set to soften considerably in Q1 20, with some weakness persisting in Q2 20 (assuming that the outbreak is brought under control within weeks), the question will increasingly be: how strong will the H2 20 recovery be? The government’s pledged goal to double per capita incomes from 2010 levels would require a massive stimulus that could prove detrimental for China’s medium-term growth. [post_title] => When China sneezes... [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => when-china-sneezes [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-02-07 15:35:18 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-02-07 15:35:18 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=35131 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [64] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 34928 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-01-30 14:11:31 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-01-30 14:11:31 [post_content] => The OIES Natural Gas Quarterly aims to provide a regular insight into the thoughts of Research Fellows on topical issues as well as providing a different angle on trends in global gas pricing. In the pricing section, the Quarterly reviews the LNG Tightness measure, looks at the Russian gas export price to Europe versus the marginal cost of US LNG and also reviews prices on Gazprom’s Electronic Sales Platform (ESP). In Asia we compare the Japanese LNG import price with the LNG spot price and also look at Chinese domestic prices compared with JKM. The Quarterly also outline our views on the Key Themes for 2020, including thoughts from Mike Fulwood on LNG project FIDs and how developers may need to accelerate plans if they are not going to miss the next window of opportunity in the mid-2020s. Mike Fulwood and Jack Sharples then question the availability of LNG for Europe and ask whether sufficient storage will be available to take all the possible supply. Anouk Honore then looks at a possible cause for optimism for European gas demand, highlighting key legislation that should be passed in 2020 concerning coal phase out in Germany. Continuing the European theme, Marshall Hall discusses likely further progress this year in the transformation of the Dutch gas market, while James Henderson considers the increasing diversity of Russian gas export flows via pipeline and LNG. Jack Sharples develops the theme of Russian gas exports further, suggesting that the Gazprom ESP can provide further evidence concerning the company’s export strategy in 2020. On a different, but still European, theme Anouk Honoré considers the potential impact of the new EU Green Deal and considers how it could be developed further during the year with potentially long-lasting consequences for the energy system. Martin Lambert then suggests that 2020 could be the year when we start to see more active progress in decarbonisation outside Europe, with Australia, Japan and even the US highlighted as possible sources of technology development and practical action in the decarbonisation of the gas sector. Michal Median then outlines her view on the outlook for the Chinese gas sector in 2020, suggesting that coal to gas switching could regain some momentum and that LNG could benefit as a result. Finally, Patrick Heather looks at the emergence of the JKM price marker as a benchmark for gas prices in Asia and suggests that further progress could be made this year towards it becoming the pre-eminent pricing tool in the region. [post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review - Issue 8 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-issue-8 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-01-30 14:11:31 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-01-30 14:11:31 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=34928 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [65] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 34775 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-01-24 10:33:04 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-01-24 10:33:04 [post_content] =>Joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran, which began on 28 February, are quickly turning into a regional conflict and an energy shock. US and Israeli strikes have hit numerous targets across Iran. In retaliation, Iran has launched missile and drone strikes on US bases and Gulf states hosting them, hitting ports and at least two oil […]
By: Michal Meidan
Each issue of the China Energy Monthly includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends.
In 2025, estimates for China’s implied crude stock builds ranged from 0.4 mb/d to 1.1 mb/d. Estimates also place the country’s total crude stocks to anywhere between 1.1-1.3 billion barrels, which would be equivalent to 110-140 days of import cover. The limited data and opacity surrounding the reserve build up has kept oil markets supported […]
By: Michal Meidan
Each issue of the China Energy Monthly includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends.
US action in Venezuela is sending shockwaves across the globe. Initially, headlines surrounding Venezuela were viewed as bearish for oil market balances, particularly given the Trump administration’s focus on oil as a strategic prize. This was reinforced by the size of Venezuela’s reserve base, the potential for a sharp production increase due to its appeal […]
By: Bassam Fattouh Michal Meidan Andreas Economou Orlando Ochoa
Each issue of the China Energy Monthly includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends. To purchase your copy of this issue please click here
Each issue of the China Energy Monthly includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends. To purchase your copy of this issue please click here
Each issue of the China Energy Monthly includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends. To purchase your copy of this issue please click here
Each issue of the China Energy Monthly includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends. To purchase your copy of this issue please click here
Each issue of the China Energy Monthly includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends. To purchase your copy of this issue please click here
Offshore wind is an important component of Europe’s energy and climate targets, but the EU and UK are falling short of their 2030 installation goals amid regulatory delays and rising costs. Meanwhile, Chinese original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are competing in European tenders and considering local production, raising strategic questions for policymakers. While Chinese participation could […]
The long-expected wave of LNG supply is now almost upon us, and is expected to outstrip the rise in demand for LNG. Spot prices, in European and Asian markets, may respond to the overhang of supply by moving to more short-run pricing – as was seen in 2019 and 2020 – and, as a result, […]
By: Mike Fulwood Anouk Honoré Michal Meidan Parul Bakshi Graeme Bethune Ieda Gomes Mostefa Ouki
A succession of headlines on additional volumes of Russian gas to China since late August have been heralded as a reshaping of global gas flows to the detriment of US (and non-Russian) LNG. But while the geopolitical aspect of the tightening China-Russia gas relationship is hugely significant, the near term market implications are more limited. […]
The 2022 energy crisis triggered a permanent paradigm shift for Europe, elevating energy security and industrial competitiveness in the hierarchy of the energy trilemma. An analysis of high-level discussions held jointly by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies and the Hanns Seidel Foundation UK reveals a new strategic landscape defined by three fundamental challenges: A […]
Each issue of the China Energy Monthly includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends. To purchase your copy of this issue please click here
China’s energy ecosystem has been undergoing significant transformation. In this testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Michal Meidan discusses three changes: first, China’s rising electricity demand and rapid electrification. Second, and related to the rapid electrification of transport, a decline in gasoline and diesel consumption due to fuel switching. Finally, the rapid […]
By: Michal Meidan
Each issue of the China Energy Monthly includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends. To purchase your copy of this issue please click here Contents: Key Insights: He said, Xi said Since our last edition, […]
This new OIES Presentation reviews the role of China in the global petrochemical landscape and analyzes how the tariffs escalation between US and China is reshaping China’s petrochemicals scene in terms of trade flows, refining and investments, with focus on the evolution of China-GCC oil relations. Key points: Since 2020, China’s oil demand growth has […]
China is the world’s largest oil importing country, and over the last two decades has accounted for roughly half of global oil demand growth. Within that, between 2005-2015, gasoline contributed one-third of China’s product demand growth, effectively displacing diesel as the biggest driver of domestic product demand. The country’s strong economic growth, rising disposable incomes […]
Each issue of the China Energy Monthly includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends. To purchase your copy of this issue please click here Contents: Key Insights: The Art of the Deal The US-China […]
Each issue of the China Energy Monthly includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends. To purchase your copy of this issue please click here Contents: Key Insights: The Year of the Snake: Adaptation and […]
Each issue of the China Energy Monthly includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends. To purchase your copy of this issue please click here
As tensions between the West and China deepen, critical minerals and materials for strategic technologies, including for low-carbon energy, have become one of the battlegrounds. China’s centrality to the supply of some of these critical minerals and materials has prompted Western governments to put in place countermeasures to ease their dependence on China. But as […]
We are delighted to share with you the next edition of the China Energy Monthly. It includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends.
We are delighted to share with you the next edition of the China Energy Monthly. It includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends.
We are delighted to share with you the next edition of the China Energy Monthly. It includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends.
We are delighted to share with you the next edition of the China Energy Monthly. It includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends.
We are delighted to share with you the next edition of the China Energy Monthly. It includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends.
This is the second edition of the OIES China Energy Monthly. It includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends.
This is the first edition of the new China Energy Monthly. It includes a selection of the most recent macro and energy data for China including a number of proprietary data sets as well as a brief commentary about short-term trends.
All eyes have been on the “Two Sessions”, an important annual political gathering which ended on 11 March, for clues into macroeconomic policy and energy policy this year. But the guidance suggests a status quo of mixed messages. The government is emphasising support for new industries to achieve its “around 5%” GDP growth target again, […]
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has focused attention on energy supply chains and contributed to growing unease in the West about the fact that supply chains for the commodities necessary for the global energy transition are highly concentrated in China (or are under Chinese control). Concerns range from cyber security through to security of energy supply […]
Since the end of 2023, policy documents in China have increasingly highlighted environmental protection and have either set tighter and more specific targets or called out the need for faster progress towards existing goals. 2024 also brings three important catalysts for accelerated environmental policy. First, the 14th Five Year Plan (FYP) interim report, published in […]
2023, as the mid-point of the 14th Five Year Plan is also when assessments begin ahead of planning for the next Plan in 2024. Yet the general direction of China’s energy and environmental policies and priorities has been confusing: Despite a weak macroeconomic picture, energy and commodity demand has grown strongly in 2023. And despite a […]
China has a huge and growing influence on the global politics and economics of energy. The topic of China’s role in the new geopolitics of energy is hardly new, but the supply chain crisis following Covid and then the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have combined to further elevate the topic. Decarbonization and the […]
China is currently the world’s largest oil importer and is on track to becoming the biggest consumer of liquefied natural gas (LNG). This dependency is viewed as a strategic vulnerability, especially as China’s ties with the USA are worsening and Beijing has growing concerns about Washington’s use of sanctions. As China pursues its low carbon […]
By: Michal Meidan
China’s all important “Two Sessions” wrapped up in Beijing on 13 March 2023, setting out the key macroeconomic priorities for the year and suggesting a cautious growth outlook. While Beijing set to deliver its “around 5%” GDP growth target—leading to a recovery in energy consumption—the nature nature of the economic rebound matters: Whether it is […]
In this latest edition of the Gas Quarterly we review the first quarter of 2023 against the signposts that we outlined at the start of the year. The overarching theme is that the outturn for Europe has been much more benign than could have been expected at the start of winter. A combination of warm […]
China’s reversal of its zero-COVID policy in December 2022 and macro policies aimed at reinvigorating economic activity point to a strong outlook for energy demand. But the sharp policy U-turns are also leading to volatility and uncertainty in the domestic market: Oil product stocks have drawn down while gas shortages have emerged in northern China. With […]
The 20th National Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) started on 16 October 2022, with President Xi Jinping delivering the Party’s work report and ending with the unveiling of the new line-up of the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee and other top Party leadership bodies. Not only was Xi Jinping appointed for an unprecedented […]
China is the world’s leading emitter of heat-trapping gases by a wide margin. Its policies for limiting emissions will have a significant impact on the global climate for decades to come. This Guide to Chinese Climate Policy provides information on China’s emissions, the impacts of climate change in China, the history of China’s climate change […]
By: David Sandalow Michal Meidan Philip Andrews-Speed Anders Hove Sally Qiu Edmund Downie
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues to strongly impact international energy markets, posing severe challenges for energy importing countries. Much of the commentary and analysis has been focused on the consequences for, and reactions of, European nations and the European Union. Despite the fact that each region has its own specific dynamics, the global nature of […]
By: Michal Meidan Mohua Mukherjee Philip Andrews-Speed Yan Qin Mike Fulwood Andreas Economou
The second quarter of 2022 has been a dramatic one for the European gas market. On the supply side, relatively modest increases in European production and pipeline imports from Norway and Azerbaijan have been overshadowed by two significant shifts: the decline in pipeline flows from Russia and the high level of LNG, both of which […]
Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, global energy markets have tightened with prices of oil and gas surging. At the same time, Chinese oil and gas demand has been relatively weak, raising questions about the impact of high prices on China’s appetite for imported oil and gas. This comment argues that China’s weakening economy, due […]
By: Michal Meidan
On February 4 2022 China’s President Xi Jinping and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin signed a series of new oil and gas contracts including an additional 10 bcma gas pipeline deal. This comment reviews how the new gas deal between Russia and China fits into their strategies, highlights the key implications of expanded gas cooperation between […]
On 17 March, Michal Meidan testified before the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission on China’s Energy Plans and Practices. In her testimony, Michal discussed the outlook for China’s fossil fuel demand in China, the successes and challenges associated with fossil fuel supply and how this fits into the country’s low carbon energy transition. Michal […]
By: Michal Meidan
In late 2021, China experienced a severe electricity supply crisis that affected 20 provinces. Industrial activity was curtailed, and even households suffered prolonged outages in some areas. The country is no stranger to periodic energy supply shortages and in many outages in the past, the principal causes involved either poor policy coordination or a clash […]
By: OIES Michal Meidan
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, energy markets are in turmoil. Oil and gas prices are rising and exhibiting high volatility as the markets grapple with the impact of sanctions and the prospect of reduced flows from Russia . China is heavily exposed to Russian commodity exports and to global markets. The […]
By: Michal Meidan
The global low-carbon energy transition will require major changes to institutional practices and energy industry paradigms with implications for society writ large. A country’s existing institutional pattern inevitably shapes the transition, and helps or hinders its progress. This is perhaps especially so in state-dominated systems such as China, which have historically considered energy as a […]
The global low-carbon energy transition will require major changes to institutional practices and energy industry paradigms with implications for society writ large. A country’s existing institutional pattern inevitably shapes the transition, and helps or hinders its progress. This is perhaps especially so in state-dominated systems such as China, which have historically considered energy as a […]
Power outages in China were widely expected this year after the country experienced some rationing in December 2020 and then again over the summer. In early September a handful of localities were seeing shortages, but by October over 20 Chinese provinces were curbing or rationing power supplies, not only for industrial, but also residential users, […]
China’s announcement that it will release oil from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), a first such announcement and release, is hugely significant. But its importance stems from the institutionalization of China’s SPR programme rather than the near-term impact on markets and flows. Indeed, the decision to release crude from the SPR follows similar releases of […]
By: Michal Meidan
On 11 March 2021, the Chinese government ratified its 14th Five Year Plan and long-term targets for 2035. Since this is the first Five Year Plan (FYP) published following China’s announcement in September 2020 that it would aim to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2060, it was expected to be […]
Gathering momentum for the energy transition has sparked debate on what the energy map will look like in 30 years. For more than half a century now, access to oil and natural gas has been at the heart of the geopolitics of energy; but with renewable technologies set to dominate energy supply systems, relations between […]
In almost every oil cycle, the market is confronted with the problem of ‘missing barrels’, the gap between the change in inventory implied by global supply-demand balances on the one hand and the observed change in inventory levels by commercial and government entities (adjusted for floating storage and oil in transit) on the other hand. […]
On 22 September 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) that China would aim to peak its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions before 2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2060. While taking on a global leadership role in the energy transition offers China economic and diplomatic opportunities, the challenges are equally […]
By: Michal Meidan
This document summarises the key takeaways from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies’ webinar on China’s power, gas and oil markets in the wake of COVID-19 and ahead of the 14th Five Year Plan. The first session, on power sector reform, explored the short and medium term implications of China’s reliance on coal, its plans […]
By: Michal Meidan
China’s oil demand has almost tripled over the past two decades, accounting on average for one-third of global oil demand growth every year. China is set to dominate future growth as well, as it will overtake the US as the world’s largest economy. But the pace of the country’s oil consumption is slowing while the […]
By: Michal Meidan
The global oil demand shock due to the COVID-19 pandemic has sent markets and benchmarks into turmoil. In the height of the demand shock, WTI traded at negative values while the divergence in Middle Eastern benchmarks was laid bare. Excess supply of oil naturally gravitated to China, the biggest oil importing country in the world, […]
By: Michal Meidan
After a two-and-a-half-month delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, China opened its ‘Two Sessions’ on 21 May. This year, the meetings were particularly important as they marked a turning point in China from epidemic control to economic recovery, highlighted by the government work report, which outlined the government’s blueprint for the country’s future development. Stability, […]
By: Michal Meidan
After almost two months of a government-mandated lockdown to stem the spread of COVID-19, China is now gradually returning to work. With expectations of a looming government stimulus, all eyes are on China to support the recovery in oil markets. But China’s crude buying or oil demand may not be as strong as some are […]
By: Michal Meidan
At the end of February, the China Energy Research Programme at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies hosted its first ‘China Day’, bringing together programme sponsors alongside a number of experts to discuss some of the key trends in China and their implications for energy policies and markets. At the outset, discussions during the day […]
By: Michal Meidan
In early February, as the Chinese government imposed quarantines and travel restrictions on large parts of the country to stem the spread of the coronavirus (COVID-19), China’s largest LNG importer, CNOOC invoked force majeure on cargoes. On 5 March 2020, PetroChina reportedly issued force majeure notices to some of its suppliers of piped gas and […]
2020 looked to be off to a good start for China. But as the Year of the Pig ended, celebrations to welcome the Year of the Rat were marred by the outbreak of the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV). Beijing’s efforts to control the spread of the virus are set to weigh on economic activity as well […]
By: Michal Meidan
The OIES Natural Gas Quarterly aims to provide a regular insight into the thoughts of Research Fellows on topical issues as well as providing a different angle on trends in global gas pricing. In the pricing section, the Quarterly reviews the LNG Tightness measure, looks at the Russian gas export price to Europe versus the […]
By: Mike Fulwood Jack Sharples Anouk Honoré Marshall Hall Martin Lambert James Henderson Michal Meidan Patrick Heather
In 2019, markets focused on China’s slowing GDP growth and on the trade war with the US. In the meantime, bilateral relations soured, highlighting the structural nature of competition between the US and China with the Trump administration working, for example, to limit Huawei’s role in Western telecom networks. Washington’s ‘zero tolerance’ campaign on Iran […]
By: Michal Meidan
Shippers and refiners have been actively preparing for the IMO transition and engaged in a lively debate on how it would play out, and since the second half of 2019, making active preparations for it. Chinese refiners, however, seem to have been less preoccupied with it than their Western peers. This may seem surprising given […]
By: Michal Meidan
In 2019, markets were bracing for a slowdown in China’s oil product demand growth, but grappling to quantify it given the uncertainty surrounding the US-China trade negotiations. At the same time, with the start of two new mega-refineries, markets were expecting strong crude demand, alongside a deluge of product output and exports. In this comment, […]
By: Michal Meidan
In just over a week, the theoretical cost of taking a barrel of oil from the Gulf to Asia, in the cheapest possible way, rose by $6 per barrel. At a time when refinery margins are in single digits, this is a major blow to refinery profitability. The US administration’s decision to sanction two subsidiaries […]
By: Michal Meidan
As China celebrated the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 2019, it seems to have gone full circle back to its 1949 assessments of the US: “a greedy and violent nation, struggling to remain the wealthiest and strongest on earth”. For the first two decades of […]
By: Michal Meidan
China’s largest oil and gas major, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), released its 2050 outlook in late August. This coincides with preliminary work currently being undertaken by domestic think tanks, state-owned enterprises, and ministries ahead of the 14th Five-Year Plan (FYP, which will run from 2021 to 2025). While the CNPC report is by no […]
By: Michal Meidan
On 22 July, 2019, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced the US’s decision to impose sanctions on a Chinese trader, Zhuhai Zhenrong, and its chief executive for ‘knowingly purchasing or acquiring oil from Iran, contrary to US sanctions’. While the US State Department’s decision to designate a Chinese entity may be seen as a sign […]
By: Michal Meidan
The brief reprieve in the US-China tariff tit-for-tat seems to be coming to an end following Donald Trump’s tweet on 1 August, threatening to impose 10 per cent tariffs on $300 billion-worth of Chinese imports effective 1 September 2019. The announcement led to a steep fall in oil prices, as markets fear that the escalating […]
By: Michal Meidan
Markets have been watching with bated breath the ups and downs in bilateral negotiations between the US and China as the two sides seek to resolve a tariff tit-for-tat that has escalated into a trade war. But what many observers may have failed to notice is that the negotiating process has also laid bare a […]
By: Michal Meidan
From 2000-2015, while OECD countries’ oil demand decreased by roughly 3 million barrels per day (mb/d), demand in non-OECD countries grew by around 21 mb/d. This represents an ongoing structural shift in oil demand dynamics that is characterised by two key developments: first, the rapid growth in China’s oil consumption from 2000-13, and second, the […]
Global oil demand is undergoing a structural shift. This is broadly reflected in changing demand dynamics over the last 15 years. While OECD demand decreased by 3 million barrels per day (mb/d) from 2000-15, demand in non-OECD countries grew by 21 mb/d (IEA, 2015). This shift is characterised by two developments: first, the rapid growth […]
China’s independent refiners account for roughly one third of the country’s downstream, yet for years, these private companies, nicknamed ‘teapots’ for their simple refining configuration, were virtually unknown to global crude markets. The independent refiners processed fuel oil as feedstock and, running at low utilisation rates, their retail market share in China was limited mainly […]
By: Michal Meidan
China’s leaders have long been concerned with the strategic vulnerabilities associated with rising oil imports. In their efforts to hedge against these, Chinese policy banks have handed out loans that are repaid with oil. By 2015, repayment for these loans generated 1.4-1.6 mb/d of crude and fuel oil deliveries from Venezuela, Russia, Brazil, and Ecuador […]
By: Michal Meidan
China’s 13th Five Year Plan (13FYP) outlines the country’s economic transformation for the coming five years and beyond. As the main blueprint for China’s ‘rebalancing’, it will impact economic growth and energy demand patterns. China’s economic growth is slowing, and the economy is now clearly shifting from an export oriented growth path to a more […]
By: Michal Meidan
China’s oil sector has been dominated by three large state-owned oil companies in charge of developing the country’s domestic reserves, building and operating pipelines, managing China’s increasingly sophisticated downstream, and filling its strategic petroleum reserves (SPR). Over the years, as China’s demand has outstripped production, they have also become major investors in the global upstream […]
By: Michal Meidan
Over the past decade, China has become a key driver of global oil demand growth. As China’s GDP growth increased at double-digit rates, oil demand growth increased by an average 0.5 mb/d between 2003 and 2012. Over the same period, China accounted for two-thirds of global oil demand growth. Thus, any changes in China’s energy […]
China has developed a leading presence in new energy supply chains: from mining the ores and metals through their refining and processing all the way down to component manufacturing, Chinese companies are now global leaders. Many of them have benefitted from state subsidies and both central- and local government support, even though many of them […]
By: Michal Meidan
China’s gas demand has seen dramatic swings since 2020: A very strong 2021 was followed by a fall in 2022 and then a recovery in 2023. These swings were due to a combination of a volatile macroeconomic outlook, high prices, inconsistent policy signals and higher installations of both renewables and coal. This paper considers these […]
By: Michal Meidan
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