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⇱ CWE - CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm (4.20)

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Home > CWE List > CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm (4.20)  
CWE Glossary Definition
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CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm

Weakness ID: 327
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
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Description
The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
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Extended Description

Cryptographic algorithms are the methods by which data is scrambled to prevent observation or influence by unauthorized actors. Insecure cryptography can be exploited to expose sensitive information, modify data in unexpected ways, spoof identities of other users or devices, or other impacts.

It is very difficult to produce a secure algorithm, and even high-profile algorithms by accomplished cryptographic experts have been broken. Well-known techniques exist to break or weaken various kinds of cryptography. Accordingly, there are a small number of well-understood and heavily studied algorithms that should be used by most products. Using a non-standard or known-insecure algorithm is dangerous because a determined adversary may be able to break the algorithm and compromise whatever data has been protected.

Since the state of cryptography advances so rapidly, it is common for an algorithm to be considered "unsafe" even if it was once thought to be strong. This can happen when new attacks are discovered, or if computing power increases so much that the cryptographic algorithm no longer provides the amount of protection that was originally thought.

For a number of reasons, this weakness is even more challenging to manage with hardware deployment of cryptographic algorithms as opposed to software implementation. First, if a flaw is discovered with hardware-implemented cryptography, the flaw cannot be fixed in most cases without a recall of the product, because hardware is not easily replaceable like software. Second, because the hardware product is expected to work for years, the adversary's computing power will only increase over time.

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Common Consequences
👁 Section Help
This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Read Application Data

Scope: Confidentiality
The confidentiality of sensitive data may be compromised by the use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm.

Modify Application Data

Scope: Integrity
The integrity of sensitive data may be compromised by the use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm.

Hide Activities

Scope: Accountability, Non-Repudiation
If the cryptographic algorithm is used to ensure the identity of the source of the data (such as digital signatures), then a broken algorithm will compromise this scheme and the source of the data cannot be proven.
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Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis.

For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification [REF-1192].

Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers. Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially weak.

Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete. Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong. [REF-267]

Architecture and Design
Ensure that the design allows one cryptographic algorithm to be replaced with another in the next generation or version. Where possible, use wrappers to make the interfaces uniform. This will make it easier to upgrade to stronger algorithms. With hardware, design the product at the Intellectual Property (IP) level so that one cryptographic algorithm can be replaced with another in the next generation of the hardware product.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Architecture and Design
Carefully manage and protect cryptographic keys (see CWE-320). If the keys can be guessed or stolen, then the strength of the cryptography itself is irrelevant.

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].

Industry-standard implementations will save development time and may be more likely to avoid errors that can occur during implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Consider the ESAPI Encryption feature.

Implementation; Architecture and Design
When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.
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 Relationships
👁 Section Help
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
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Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf 👁 Pillar
Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 		693 Protection Mechanism Failure
ParentOf 👁 Base
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 		328 Use of Weak Hash
ParentOf 👁 Variant
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 		780 Use of RSA Algorithm without OAEP
ParentOf 👁 Base
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 		1240 Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky Implementation
PeerOf 👁 Base
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 		301 Reflection Attack in an Authentication Protocol
PeerOf 👁 Class
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 		311 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
CanFollow 👁 Base
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 		208 Observable Timing Discrepancy
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Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf 👁 View
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 		1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
ParentOf 👁 Base
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 		916 Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort
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Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf 👁 Category
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 		1013 Encrypt Data
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Modes Of Introduction
👁 Section Help
The different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.
Implementation With hardware, the Architecture or Design Phase might start with compliant cryptography, but it is replaced with a non-compliant crypto during the later Implementation phase due to implementation constraints (e.g., not enough entropy to make it function properly, or not enough silicon real estate available to implement). Or, in rare cases (especially for long projects that span over years), the Architecture specifications might start with cryptography that was originally compliant at the time the Architectural specs were written, but over the time it became non-compliant due to progress made in attacking the crypto.
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Applicable Platforms
👁 Section Help
This listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Verilog (Undetermined Prevalence)

VHDL (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

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Likelihood Of Exploit
High
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Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


These code examples use the Data Encryption Standard (DES).

(bad code)
Example Language: C 
EVP_des_ecb();
(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
Cipher des=Cipher.getInstance("DES...");
des.initEncrypt(key2);
(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
function encryptPassword($password){
$iv_size = mcrypt_get_iv_size(MCRYPT_DES, MCRYPT_MODE_ECB);
$iv = mcrypt_create_iv($iv_size, MCRYPT_RAND);
$key = "This is a password encryption key";
$encryptedPassword = mcrypt_encrypt(MCRYPT_DES, $key, $password, MCRYPT_MODE_ECB, $iv);
return $encryptedPassword;
}

Once considered a strong algorithm, DES now regarded as insufficient for many applications. It has been replaced by Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).



Example 2


Suppose a chip manufacturer decides to implement a hashing scheme for verifying integrity property of certain bitstream, and it chooses to implement a SHA1 hardware accelerator for to implement the scheme.

(bad code)
Example Language: Other 
The manufacturer chooses a SHA1 hardware accelerator for to implement the scheme because it already has a working SHA1 Intellectual Property (IP) that the manufacturer had created and used earlier, so this reuse of IP saves design cost.

However, SHA1 was theoretically broken in 2005 and practically broken in 2017 at a cost of $110K. This means an attacker with access to cloud-rented computing power will now be able to provide a malicious bitstream with the same hash value, thereby defeating the purpose for which the hash was used.

This issue could have been avoided with better design.

(good code)
Example Language: Other 
The manufacturer could have chosen a cryptographic solution that is recommended by the wide security community (including standard-setting bodies like NIST) and is not expected to be broken (or even better, weakened) within the reasonable life expectancy of the hardware product. In this case, the architects could have used SHA-2 or SHA-3, even if it meant that such choice would cost extra.


Example 3


In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

Multiple OT products used weak cryptography.



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Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference Description
SCADA-based protocol supports a legacy encryption mode that uses Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) in ECB mode, which leaks patterns in messages and cannot protect integrity
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) uses a protocol with a cryptographically insecure hashing algorithm for passwords.
Product uses "ROT-25" to obfuscate the password in the registry.
product only uses "XOR" to obfuscate sensitive data
product only uses "XOR" and a fixed key to obfuscate sensitive data
Product substitutes characters with other characters in a fixed way, and also leaves certain input characters unchanged.
Attackers can infer private IP addresses by dividing each octet by the MD5 hash of '20'.
Product uses DES when MD5 has been specified in the configuration, resulting in weaker-than-expected password hashes.
Default configuration of product uses MD5 instead of stronger algorithms that are available, simplifying forgery of certificates.
Product uses the hash of a hash for authentication, allowing attackers to gain privileges if they can obtain the original hash.
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Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
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Detection Methods
Method Details

Automated Analysis
Automated methods may be useful for recognizing commonly-used libraries or features that have become obsolete.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:False negatives may occur if the tool is not aware of the cryptographic libraries in use, or if custom cryptography is being used.

Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Note:These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary / Bytecode simple extractor - strings, ELF readers, etc.

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Web Application Scanner
  • Web Services Scanner
  • Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Man-in-the-middle attack tool
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Framework-based Fuzzer
  • Automated Monitored Execution
  • Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Configuration Checker

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High
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Memberships
👁 Section Help
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf 👁 Category
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.		 729 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage
MemberOf 👁 Category
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.		 753 2009 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf 👁 Category
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.		 803 2010 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf 👁 Category
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.		 816 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A7 - Insecure Cryptographic Storage
MemberOf 👁 Category
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.		 866 2011 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf 👁 Category
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.		 883 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 49 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf 👁 View
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).		 884 CWE Cross-section
MemberOf 👁 Category
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.		 934 OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf 👁 Category
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.		 958 SFP Secondary Cluster: Broken Cryptography
MemberOf 👁 Category
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.		 1029 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A3 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf 👁 Category
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.		 1131 CISQ Quality Measures (2016) - Security
MemberOf 👁 Category
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.		 1152 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 49. Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf 👁 Category
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.		 1170 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 48. Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf 👁 Category
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.		 1346 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
MemberOf 👁 Category
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.		 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf 👁 Category
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.		 1402 Comprehensive Categorization: Encryption
MemberOf 👁 Category
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.		 1439 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A04:2025 - Cryptographic Failures
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Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
Reason Abstraction

Rationale

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
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Notes

Maintenance

Since CWE 4.4, various cryptography-related entries, including CWE-327 and CWE-1240, have been slated for extensive research, analysis, and community consultation to define consistent terminology, improve relationships, and reduce overlap or duplication. As of CWE 4.6, this work is still ongoing.
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Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Using a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A8 CWE More Specific Insecure Storage
CERT C Secure Coding MSC30-C CWE More Abstract Do not use the rand() function for generating pseudorandom numbers
CERT C Secure Coding MSC32-C CWE More Abstract Properly seed pseudorandom number generators
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) MSC02-J Generate strong random numbers
OMG ASCSM ASCSM-CWE-327
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 4.3
ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 4.3
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References
[REF-280] Bruce Schneier. "Applied Cryptography". John Wiley & Sons. 1996.
<https://www.schneier.com/books/applied-cryptography>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-281] Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot and Scott A. Vanstone. "Handbook of Applied Cryptography". 1996-10.
<https://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/hac/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-282] C Matthew Curtin. "Avoiding bogus encryption products: Snake Oil FAQ". 1998-04-10.
<http://www.faqs.org/faqs/cryptography-faq/snake-oil/>.
[REF-267] Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology. "FIPS PUB 140-2: SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES". 2001-05-25.
<https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/fips/140-2/upd2/final/docs/fips1402.pdf>. (URL validated: 2025-05-21)
[REF-284] Paul F. Roberts. "Microsoft Scraps Old Encryption in New Code". 2005-09-15.
<https://www.eweek.com/security/microsoft-scraps-old-encryption-in-new-code/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 8, "Cryptographic Foibles" Page 259. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 21: Using the Wrong Cryptography." Page 315. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-287] Johannes Ullrich. "Top 25 Series - Rank 24 - Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-25.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-use-of-a-broken-or-risky-cryptographic-algorithm/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 2, "Insufficient or Obsolete Encryption", Page 44. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-962] Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Security Measure (ASCSM)". ASCSM-CWE-327. 2016-01.
<http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCSM/1.0/>.
[REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
[REF-1192] Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology. "FIPS PUB 140-3: SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES". 2019-03-22.
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/3/final>.
[REF-1283] Forescout Vedere Labs. "OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management". 2022-06-20.
<https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/>.
[REF-1479] Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler and Rama S. Moorthy. "State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation". 2014-07.
<https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx>. (URL validated: 2025-09-05)
[REF-1482] D3FEND. "D3FEND: D3-TL Trusted Library".
<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:TrustedLibrary/>. (URL validated: 2025-09-06)
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Content History
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Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) 		CLASP
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Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2019-12-10 Parbati K. Manna Intel Corporation
Provide a hardware-specific submission whose contents were integrated into this entry, affecting extended description, applicable platforms, demonstrative examples, and mitigations
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Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
2025-09-09
(CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-01-31
(CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Background_Details, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings, Time_of_Introduction
2022-10-13
(CWE 4.9, 2022-10-13) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References
2022-04-28
(CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-10-28
(CWE 4.6, 2021-10-28) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2021-03-15
(CWE 4.4, 2021-03-15) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2020-02-24
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Relationships
2019-06-20
(CWE 3.3, 2019-06-20) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
2019-01-03
(CWE 3.2, 2019-01-03) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27
(CWE 3.1, 2018-03-27) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2017-11-08
(CWE 3.0, 2017-11-08) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2017-01-19
(CWE 2.10, 2017-01-19) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2015-12-07
(CWE 2.9, 2015-12-07) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30
(CWE 2.8, 2014-07-31) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Relationships
2014-06-23
(CWE 2.7, 2014-06-23) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-02-18
(CWE 2.6, 2014-02-19) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2013-02-21
(CWE 2.4, 2013-02-21) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2012-10-30
(CWE 2.3, 2012-10-30) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11
(CWE 2.2, 2012-05-15) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-09-13
(CWE 2.1, 2011-09-13) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27
(CWE 2.0, 2011-06-27) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-06-01
(CWE 1.13, 2011-06-01) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-03-29
(CWE 1.12, 2011-03-30) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description
2010-09-27
(CWE 1.10, 2010-09-27) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2010-06-21
(CWE 1.9, 2010-06-21) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2010-04-05
(CWE 1.8.1, 2010-04-05) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16
(CWE 1.8, 2010-02-16) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2009-12-28
(CWE 1.7, 2009-12-28) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2009-10-29
(CWE 1.6, 2009-10-29) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-07-27
(CWE 1.5, 2009-07-27) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationships
2009-03-10
(CWE 1.3, 2009-03-10) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12
(CWE 1.2, 2009-01-12) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2008-09-08
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Description, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-08-15
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09) 		Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
👁 +
Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Using a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
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