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URL: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4777

⇱ RFC 4777 - IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements



Network Working Group T. Murphy, Jr.
Request for Comments: 4777 P. Rieth
Obsoletes: 2877 J. Stevens
Category: Informational IBM
 November 2006


 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements

Status of This Memo

 This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
 not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
 memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2006).

IESG Note

 This RFC is not a candidate for any level of Internet Standard. The
 IETF disclaims any knowledge of the fitness of this RFC for any
 purpose and in particular notes that the decision to publish is not
 based on IETF review for such things as security, congestion control,
 or inappropriate interaction with deployed protocols. The RFC Editor
 has chosen to publish this document at its discretion. Readers of
 this document should exercise caution in evaluating its value for
 implementation and deployment. See RFC 3932 for more information.

Abstract

 This document describes the interface to the Telnet server on IBM's
 iSeries line of midrange business computers. This interface allows
 Telnet clients to request a Telnet terminal or printer session using
 specific session attributes related to device names, encryption,
 language support, auto-sign-on, response codes, session association,
 etc.

 These support functions are implemented primarily using the Telnet
 Environment option negotiation RFC 1572 to define new USERVAR
 variables that will be recognized by iSeries Telnet server.









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Table of Contents

 1. Introduction ....................................................2
 2. Standard Telnet Option Negotiation ..............................3
 3. Enhanced Telnet Option Negotiation ..............................4
 4. Enhanced Display Emulation Support ..............................7
 5. Enhanced Display Auto-Sign-On and Password Encryption ...........9
 5.1. Data Encryption Standard (DES) Password Substitutes .......13
 5.2. Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) Password Substitutes ..........16
 6. Kerberos Services Ticket Automatic Sign-On Support .............18
 7. Device Name Collision Processing ...............................21
 8. Enhanced Printer Emulation Support .............................22
 9. Telnet Printer Terminal Types ..................................23
 10. Startup Response Record for Printer and Display Devices .......25
 10.1. Example of a Success Response Record .....................26
 10.2. Example of an Error Response Record ......................27
 10.3. Example of a Response Record with Device Name Retry ......28
 10.4. Response Codes ...........................................31
 11. Printer Steady-State Pass-Through Interface ...................33
 11.1. Example of a Print Record ................................35
 11.2. Example of a Print Complete Record .......................37
 11.3. Example of a Null Print Record ...........................37
 12. End-to-End Print Example ......................................39
 13. Security Considerations .......................................44
 14. IANA Considerations ...........................................44
 15. Normative References ..........................................44
 16. Informative References ........................................44
 17. Relation to Other RFCs ........................................45

1. Introduction

 The iSeries Telnet server enables clients to negotiate both terminal
 and printer device names through Telnet Environment Options
 Negotiations [RFC1572].

 This allows Telnet servers and clients to exchange environment
 information using a set of standard or custom variables. By using a
 combination of both standard VARs and custom USERVARs, the iSeries
 Telnet server allows client Telnet to request a pre-defined specific
 device by name.

 If no pre-defined device exists, then the device will be created,
 with client Telnet having the option to negotiate device attributes,
 such as the code page, character set, keyboard type, etc.

 Since printers can now be negotiated as a device name, new terminal
 types have been defined to request printers. For example, you can




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 now negotiate "IBM-3812-1" and "IBM-5553-B01" as valid TERMINAL-TYPE
 options [RFC1091].

 Finally, the iSeries Telnet server will allow exchange of user
 profile and password information, where the password may be in either
 plain text or encrypted form. If a valid combination of profile and
 password is received, then the client is allowed to bypass the sign-
 on panel. The local server setting of the QRMTSIGN system value must
 be either *VERIFY or *SAMEPRF for the bypass of the sign-on panel to
 succeed.

2. Standard Telnet Option Negotiation

 Telnet server option negotiation [RFC855] typically begins with the
 issuance, by the server, of an invitation to engage in terminal type
 negotiation with the Telnet client (DO TERMINAL-TYPE) [RFC1091]. The
 client and server then enter into a series of sub-negotiations to
 determine the level of terminal support that will be used. After the
 terminal type is agreed upon, the client and server will normally
 negotiate a required set of additional options (EOR [RFC885], BINARY
 [RFC856], SGA [RFC858]) that are required to support "transparent
 mode" or full screen 5250/3270 block mode support. As soon as the
 required options have been negotiated, the server will suspend
 further negotiations and begin with initializing the actual virtual
 device on the iSeries. A typical exchange might start as follows:

 iSeries Telnet server Enhanced Telnet client
 -------------------------- -------------------------
 IAC DO TERMINAL-TYPE -->
 <-- IAC WILL TERMINAL-TYPE
 IAC SB TERMINAL-TYPE SEND
 IAC SE -->
 IAC SB TERMINAL-TYPE IS
 <-- IBM-5555-C01 IAC SE
 IAC DO EOR -->
 <-- IAC WILL EOR
 <-- IAC DO EOR
 IAC WILL EOR -->
 .
 .
 (other negotiations) .










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 Actual bytes transmitted in the above example are shown in hex below.

 iSeries Telnet server Enhanced Telnet client
 -------------------------- -------------------------
 FF FD 18 -->
 <-- FF FB 18
 FF FA 18 01 FF F0 -->
 FF FA 18 00 49 42 4D 2D
 35 35 35 35 2D 43 30 31
 <-- FF F0
 FF FD 19 -->
 <-- FF FB 19
 <-- FF FD 19
 FF FB 19 -->
 .
 .
 (other negotiations) .

 Some negotiations are symmetrical between client and server, and some
 are negotiated in one direction only. Also, it is permissible and
 common practice to bundle more than one response or request, or to
 combine a request with a response, so in practice the actual exchange
 may look different from what is shown above.

3. Enhanced Telnet Option Negotiation

 In order to accommodate the new environment option negotiations, the
 server will bundle an environment option invitation along with the
 standard terminal type invitation request to the client.

 A client should either send a negative acknowledgment (WONT NEW-
 ENVIRON), or at some point after completing terminal-type
 negotiations, but before completing the full set of negotiations
 required for 5250 transparent mode, engage in environment option
 sub-negotiation with the server. A maximum of 1024 bytes of
 environment strings may be sent to the server. A recommended
 sequence might look like the following:














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 iSeries Telnet server Enhanced Telnet client
 -------------------------- -------------------------
 IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON
 IAC DO TERMINAL-TYPE -->
 (2 requests bundled)
 <-- IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON
 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND
 VAR IAC SE -->
 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS
 VAR "USER" VALUE "JONES"
 USERVAR "DEVNAME"
 VALUE "MYDEVICE07"
 <-- IAC SE
 <-- IAC WILL TERMINAL-TYPE
 (do the terminal type
 sequence first)
 IAC SB TERMINAL-TYPE SEND
 IAC SE -->
 IAC SB TERMINAL-TYPE IS
 <-- IBM-5555-C01 IAC SE
 (terminal type negotiations
 completed)
 IAC DO EOR -->
 (server will continue
 with normal transparent
 mode negotiations)
 <-- IAC WILL EOR
 .
 .
 (other negotiations) .





















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 Actual bytes transmitted in the above example are shown in hex below.

 iSeries Telnet server Enhanced Telnet client
 -------------------------- -------------------------
 FF FD 27
 FF FD 18 -->
 (2 requests bundled)
 <-- FF FB 27
 FF FA 27 01 00 FF F0 -->
 FF FA 27 00 00 55 53 45
 52 01 4A 4F 4E 45 53 03
 44 45 56 4E 41 4D 45 01
 4D 59 44 45 56 49 43 45
 <-- 30 37 FF F0
 <-- FF FB 18
 (do the terminal type
 sequence first)
 FF FA 18 01 FF F0 -->
 FF FA 18 00 49 42 4D 2D
 35 35 35 35 2D 43 30 31
 <-- FF F0
 FF FD 19 -->
 (server will continue
 with normal transparent
 mode negotiations)
 <-- FF FB 19
 .
 .
 (other negotiations) .

 Telnet environment options defines 6 standard VARs: USER, JOB, ACCT,
 PRINTER, SYSTEMTYPE, and DISPLAY. The USER standard VAR will hold
 the value of the iSeries user profile name to be used in auto-sign-on
 requests. The Telnet server will make no direct use of the
 additional 5 VARs, nor are any of them required to be sent. All
 standard VARs and their values that are received by the Telnet server
 will be placed in a buffer, along with any USERVARs received
 (described below), and made available to a registered initialization
 exit program to be used for any purpose desired.

 There are some reasons you may want to send NEW-ENVIRON negotiations
 prior to TERMINAL-TYPE negotiations. With an iSeries Telnet server,
 several virtual device modes can be negotiated: 1) VTxxx device, 2)
 3270 device, and 3) 5250 device (includes Network Station). The
 virtual device mode selected depends on the TERMINAL-TYPE negotiated
 plus any other Telnet option negotiations necessary to support those
 modes. The iSeries Telnet server will create the desired virtual
 device at the first opportunity it thinks it has all the requested



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 attributes needed to create the device. This can be as early as
 completion of the TERMINAL-TYPE negotiations.

 For the case of Transparent mode (5250 device), the moment TERMINAL-
 TYPE, BINARY, and EOR options are negotiated, the Telnet server will
 go create the virtual device. Receiving any NEW-ENVIRON negotiations
 after these option negotiations are complete will result in the NEW-
 ENVIRON negotiations having no effect on device attributes, as the
 virtual device will have already been created.

 So, for Transparent mode, NEW-ENVIRON negotiations are effectively
 closed once EOR is negotiated, since EOR is generally the last option
 done.

 For other devices modes (such as VTxxx or 3270), you cannot be sure
 when the iSeries Telnet server thinks it has all the attributes to
 create the device. Recall that NEW-ENVIRON negotiations are
 optional, and therefore the iSeries Telnet server need not wait for
 any NEW-ENVIRON options prior to creating the virtual device. It is
 in the clients' best interest to send NEW-ENVIRON negotiations as
 soon as possible, preferably before TERMINAL-TYPE is negotiated.
 That way, the client can be sure that the requested attributes were
 received before the virtual device is created.

4. Enhanced Display Emulation Support

 Telnet environment option USERVARs have been defined to allow a
 compliant Telnet client more control over the Telnet server virtual
 device on the iSeries and to provide information to the Telnet server
 about the client. These USERVARs allow the client Telnet to create
 or select a previously created virtual device. If the virtual device
 does not exist and must be created, then the USERVAR variables are
 used to create and initialize the device attributes. If the virtual
 device already exists, the device attributes are modified.

















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 The USERVARs defined to accomplish this are:

 USERVAR VALUE EXAMPLE DESCRIPTION
 -------- ---------------- -------------- -------------------
 DEVNAME us-ascii char(x) MYDEVICE07 Display device name
 KBDTYPE us-ascii char(3) USB Keyboard type
 CODEPAGE us-ascii char(y) 437 Code page
 CHARSET us-ascii char(y) 1212 Character set
 IBMSENDCONFREC us-ascii char(3) YES | NO Startup Response
 Record desired
 IBMASSOCPRT us_ascii char(x) RFCPRT Printer associated
 with display
 device

 x - up to a maximum of 10 characters
 y - up to a maximum of 5 characters

 For a description of the KBDTYPE, CODEPAGE, and CHARSET parameters
 and their permissible values, refer to Chapter 8 in the
 Communications Configuration Reference [COMM-CONFIG] and also to
 Appendix C in National Language Support [NLS-SUPPORT].

 The CODEPAGE and CHARSET USERVARs must be associated with a KBDTYPE
 USERVAR. If either CODEPAGE or CHARSET are sent without KBDTYPE,
 they will default to system values. A default value for KBDTYPE can
 be sent to force CODEPAGE and CHARSET values to be used.

 iSeries system objects such as device names, user profiles, plain
 text passwords, programs, libraries, etc., are required to be
 specified in English uppercase. This includes:

 any letter (A-Z), any number (0-9), special characters (# $ _ @)

 Therefore, where us-ascii is specified for VAR or USERVAR values, it
 is recommended that uppercase ASCII values be sent, which will be
 converted to Extended Binary Coded Decimal Interchange Code (EBCDIC)
 by the Telnet server.

 A special case occurs for encrypted passwords (described in the next
 section), where both the initial password and user profile used to
 build the encrypted password must be EBCDIC English uppercase, in
 order to be properly authenticated by the Telnet server.

 The IBMASSOCPRT USERVAR is used to provide the device name of a
 printer that will be associated with the display device that is
 created. The device description of the printer name provided must
 currently exist on the Telnet server system. The IBMSENDCONFREC
 USERVAR is used by the enhanced Telnet client to inform the Telnet



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 server that a display Startup Response Record should be sent to the
 client. This record communicates the name of the actual display
 device acquired. If the attempt is unsuccessful, the reason code
 will be set to provide additional information on why the attempt
 failed. In addition to the device name and reason code, the Startup
 Response Record will contain the name of the Telnet server system.

 For more details on the Startup Response Record, see Section 11 of
 this document.

5. Enhanced Display Auto-Sign-On and Password Encryption

 To allow password encryption, new IBMRSEED and IBMSUBSPW USERVARs
 will be used to exchange seed and substitute passwords information.
 IBMRSEED will carry a random seed to be used in both the Data
 Encryption Standard (DES) and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) password
 encryption, and IBMSUBSPW will carry the encrypted copy of the
 password.

 The DES encryption would use the same 7-step DES-based password
 substitution scheme as APPC and Client Access. For a description of

 DES encryption, refer to Federal Information Processing Standards
 Publications (FIPS) 46-2 [FIPS-46-2] and 81 [FIPS-81].

 The SHA encryption is described in Federal Information Processing
 Standards Publication 180-1 [FIPS-180-1].

 The FIPS documents can be found at the Federal Information Processing
 Standards Publications link:

 http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/by-num.htm

 If encrypted password exchange is not required, plain text password
 exchange is permitted using the same USERVARs defined for encryption.
 For this case, the random client seed should be set either to an
 empty value (preferred method) or to hexadecimal zeros to indicate
 the password is not encrypted, but is plain text.

 It should be noted that security of plain text password exchange
 cannot be guaranteed unless the network is physically protected or a
 trusted network (such as an intranet). If your network is vulnerable
 to IP address spoofing or directly connected to the Internet, you
 should engage in encrypted password exchange to validate a client's
 identity.

 Additional VARs and USERVARs have also been defined to allow an
 auto-sign-on user greater control over their startup environment,



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 similar to what is supported using the Open Virtual Terminal
 (QTVOPNVT) API [SYSTEM-API].

 The standard VARs supported to accomplish this are:

 VAR VALUE EXAMPLE DESCRIPTION
 -------- ---------------- ---------------- -------------------
 USER us-ascii char(x) USERXYZ User profile name

 x - up to a maximum of 10 characters

 The custom USERVARs defined to accomplish this are:

 USERVAR VALUE EXAMPLE DESCRIPTION
 -------- ---------------- ---------------- -----------------
 IBMRSEED binary(8) 8-byte hex field Random client
 seed
 IBMSUBSPW binary(128) 128-byte hex field Substitute
 password
 IBMCURLIB us-ascii char(x) QGPL Current library
 IBMIMENU us-ascii char(x) MAIN Initial menu
 IBMPROGRAM us-ascii char(x) QCMD Program to call

 x - up to a maximum of 10 characters

 In order to communicate the server random seed value to the client,
 the server will request a USERVAR name made up of a fixed part (the 8
 characters "IBMRSEED") immediately followed by an 8-byte hexadecimal
 variable part, which is the server random seed. The client generates
 its own 8-byte random seed value and uses both seeds to encrypt the
 password. Both the encrypted password and the client random seed
 value are then sent to the server for authentication. Telnet
 environment option rules will need to be adhered to when transmitting
 the client random seed and substituted password values to the server.
 Specifically, since a typical environment string is a variable length
 hexadecimal field, the hexadecimal fields are required to be escaped
 and/or byte stuffed according to the RFC 854 [RFC854], where any
 single byte could be misconstrued as a Telnet IAC or other Telnet
 option negotiation control character. The client must escape and/or
 byte stuff any bytes that could be seen as a Telnet environment
 option, specifically VAR, VALUE, ESC, and USERVAR.

 If you use the IBMSENDCONFREC USERVAR, as described in Section 5 of
 this document, with a value of YES along with the automatic sign-on
 USERVARs described above, you will receive a Startup Response Record
 that will contain a response code informing your Telnet client of the
 success or failure of the automatic sign-on attempt. See Section 11
 of this document for details on the Startup Response Record.



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 The following illustrates the encrypted case:

 iSeries Telnet server Enhanced Telnet client
 -------------------------- -------------------------------
 IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON -->
 <-- IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON
 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND
 USERVAR "IBMRSEEDxxxxxxxx"
 USERVAR "IBMSUBSPW"
 VAR USERVAR IAC SE -->
 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS
 VAR "USER" VALUE "DUMMYUSR"
 USERVAR "IBMRSEED" VALUE "yyyyyyyy"
 USERVAR "IBMSUBSPW" VALUE "zzzzzzzz"
 <-- IAC SE
 .
 .
 (other negotiations) .

 In this example, "xxxxxxxx" is an 8-byte hexadecimal random server
 seed, "yyyyyyyy" is an 8-byte hexadecimal random client seed, and
 "zzzzzzzz" is an 8-byte hexadecimal encrypted password (if the DES
 encryption algorithm was used) or a 20-byte hexadecimal encrypted
 password (if the SHA encryption algorithm was used). If the password
 is not valid, then the sign-on panel is not bypassed. If the
 password is expired, then the sign-on panel is not bypassed.

 Actual bytes transmitted in the above example are shown in hex below,
 where the server seed is "7D3E488F18080404", the client seed is
 "4E4142334E414233", and the DES encrypted password is
 "DFB0402F22ABA3BA". The user profile used to generate the encrypted
 password is "44554D4D59555352" (DUMMYUSR), with a plain text password
 of "44554D4D595057" (DUMMYPW).


















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 iSeries Telnet server Enhanced Telnet client
 -------------------------- -------------------------
 FF FD 27 -->
 <-- FF FB 27
 FF FA 27 01 03 49 42 4D
 52 53 45 45 44 7D 3E 48
 8F 18 08 04 04 03 49 42
 4D 53 55 42 53 50 57 03
 00 FF F0 -->
 FF FA 27 00 00 55 53 45
 52 01 44 55 4D 4D 59 55
 53 52 03 49 42 4D 52 53
 45 45 44 01 4E 41 42 33
 4E 41 42 33 03 49 42 4D
 53 55 42 53 50 57 01 DF
 B0 40 2F 22 AB A3 BA FF
 <-- F0

 The following illustrates the plain text case:

 iSeries Telnet server Enhanced Telnet client
 -------------------------- -------------------------
 IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON -->
 <-- IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON
 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND
 USERVAR "IBMRSEEDxxxxxxxx"
 USERVAR "IBMSUBSPW"
 VAR USERVAR IAC SE -->
 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS
 VAR "USER" VALUE "DUMMYUSR"
 USERVAR "IBMRSEED" VALUE
 USERVAR "IBMSUBSPW" VALUE "yyyyyyyy"
 <-- IAC SE
 .
 .
 (other negotiations) .

 In this example, "xxxxxxxx" is an 8-byte hexadecimal random server
 seed, and "yyyyyyyyyy" is a 128-byte us-ascii client plain text
 password. If the password has expired, then the sign-on panel is not
 bypassed.

 Actual bytes transmitted in the above example are shown in hex below,
 where the server seed is "7D3E488F18080404", the client seed is
 empty, and the plain text password is "44554D4D595057" (DUMMYPW).
 The user profile used is "44554D4D59555352" (DUMMYUSR).





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 iSeries Telnet server Enhanced Telnet client
 -------------------------- -------------------------
 FF FD 27 -->
 <-- FF FB 27
 FF FA 27 01 03 49 42 4D
 52 53 45 45 44 7D 3E 48
 8F 18 08 04 04 03 49 42
 4D 53 55 42 53 50 57 03
 00 FF F0 -->
 FF FA 27 00 00 55 53 45
 52 01 44 55 4D 4D 59 55
 53 52 03 49 42 4D 52 53
 45 45 44 01 03 49 42 4D
 53 55 42 53 50 57 01 44
 <-- 55 4D 4D 59 50 57 FF F0

5.1. Data Encryption Standard (DES) Password Substitutes

 Both APPC and Client Access use well-known DES encryption algorithms
 to create encrypted passwords. A Network Station or Enhanced Client
 can generate compatible encrypted passwords if it follows these
 steps, details of which can be found in the Federal Information
 Processing Standards 46-2 [FIPS-46-2].

 1) Padded_PW = Left justified user password padded to the right with
 '40'X to 8 bytes.

 The user's password must be left justified in an 8-byte variable
 and padded to the right with '40'X up to an 8-byte length. If the
 user's password is 8 bytes in length, no padding will occur. For
 computing password substitutes for passwords of length 9 and 10,
 see "Handling passwords of length 9 and 10" below. Passwords less
 than 1 byte or greater than 10 bytes in length are not valid.
 Please note that if password is not in EBCDIC, it must be
 converted to EBCDIC uppercase.

 2) XOR_PW = Padded_PW xor '5555555555555555'X

 The padded password is Exclusive OR'ed with 8 bytes of '55'X.

 3) SHIFT_RESULT = XOR_PW << 1

 The entire 8-byte result is shifted 1 bit to the left; the left-
 most bit value is discarded, and the rightmost bit value is
 cleared to 0.

 4) PW_TOKEN = DES_ECB_mode(SHIFT_RESULT, /* key */
 userID_in_EBCDIC_uppercase /* data */ )



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 This shifted result is used as key to the Data Encryption Standard
 (Federal Information Processing Standards 46-2 [FIPS-46-2]) to
 encipher the user identifier. When the user identifier is less
 than 8 bytes, it is left justified in an 8-byte variable and
 padded to the right with '40'X. When the user identifier is 9 or
 10 bytes, it is first padded to the right with '40'X to a length
 of 10 bytes. Then bytes 9 and 10 are "folded" into bytes 1-8
 using the following algorithm:

 Bit 0 is the high-order bit (i.e., has value of '80'X).

 Byte 1, bits 0 and 1 are replaced with byte 1, bits 0 and 1
 Exclusive OR'ed with byte 9, bits 0 and 1.
 Byte 2, bits 0 and 1 are replaced with byte 2, bits 0 and 1
 Exclusive OR'ed with byte 9, bits 2 and 3.
 Byte 3, bits 0 and 1 are replaced with byte 3, bits 0 and 1
 Exclusive OR'ed with byte 9, bits 4 and 5.
 Byte 4, bits 0 and 1 are replaced with byte 4, bits 0 and 1
 Exclusive OR'ed with byte 9, bits 6 and 7.
 Byte 5, bits 0 and 1 are replaced with byte 5, bits 0 and 1
 Exclusive OR'ed with byte 10, bits 0 and 1.
 Byte 6, bits 0 and 1 are replaced with byte 6, bits 0 and 1
 Exclusive OR'ed with byte 10, bits 2 and 3.
 Byte 7, bits 0 and 1 are replaced with byte 7, bits 0 and 1
 Exclusive OR'ed with byte 10, bits 4 and 5.
 Byte 8, bits 0 and 1 are replaced with byte 8, bits 0 and 1
 Exclusive OR'ed with byte 10, bits 6 and 7.

 User identifiers greater than 10 bytes or less than 1 byte are not
 the result of this encryption ID, known as PW_TOKEN in the paper.

 5) Increment PWSEQs and store it.

 Each LU must maintain a pair of sequence numbers for ATTACHs sent
 and received on each session. Each time an ATTACH is generated,
 (and password substitutes are in use on the session) the sending
 sequence number, PWSEQs, is incremented and saved for the next
 time. Both values are set to zero at BIND time. So the first use
 of PWSEQs has the value of 1 and increases by one with each use.
 A new field is added to the ATTACH to carry this sequence number.
 However, in certain error conditions, it is possible for the
 sending side to increment the sequence number, and the receiver
 may not increment it. When the sender sends a subsequent ATTACH,
 the receiver will detect a missing sequence. This is allowed.
 However the sequence number received must always be larger than
 the previous one, even if some are missing.





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 The maximum number of consecutive missing sequence numbers allowed
 is 16. If this is exceeded, the session is unbound with a
 protocol violation.

 Note: The sequence number must be incremented for every ATTACH
 sent. However, the sequence number field is only required to be
 included in the FMH5 if a password substitute is sent (byte 4, bit
 3 on).

 6) RDrSEQ = RDr + PWSEQs /* RDr is server seed. */

 The current value of PWSEQs is added to RDr, the random value
 received from the partner LU on this session, yielding RDrSEQ,
 essentially a predictably modified value of the random value
 received from the partner LU at BIND time.

 7) PW_SUB = DES_CBC_mode(PW_TOKEN, /* key */
 (RDrSEQ, /* 8 bytes */
 RDs, /* 8 bytes */
 ID xor RDrSEQ, /* 16 bytes */
 PWSEQs, /* 8 bytes */
 ) /* data */
 )

 The PW_TOKEN is used as a key to the DES function to generate an
 8-byte value for the following string of inputs. The DES CBC
 mode Initialization Vector (IV) used is 8 bytes of '00'X.

 RDrSEQ: the random data value received from the partner LU
 plus the sequence number.

 RDs: the random data value sent to the partner LU on BIND
 for this session.

 A 16-byte value created by:

 - padding the user identifier with '40'X to a length
 of 16 bytes.

 - Exclusive OR'ing the two 8-byte halves of the padded
 user identifier with the RDrSEQ value.

 Note: User ID must first be converted to EBCDIC
 uppercase.

 PWSEQs: the sequence number.





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 This is similar to the process used on LU-LU verification as
 described in the Enhanced LU-LU Bind Security. The resulting
 enciphered random data is the 'password substitute'.

 8) Handling passwords of length 9 and 10

 1. Generate PW_TOKENa by using characters 1 to 8 of the password
 and steps 1-4 from the previous section.

 2. Generate PW_TOKENb by using characters 9 and 10 and steps 1-4
 from the previous section. In this case, Padded_PW from step 1
 will be characters 9 and 10 padded to the right with '40'X, for
 a total length of 8.

 3. PW_TOKEN = PW_TOKENa xor PW_TOKENb

 4. Now compute PW_SUB by performing steps 5-7 from the previous
 section.

 9) Example DES Password Substitute Calculation

 ID: USER123
 Password: ABCDEFG
 Server seed: '7D4C2319F28004B2'X
 Client seed: '08BEF662D851F4B1'X
 PWSEQs: 1 (PWSEQs is a sequence number needed in the
 7-step encryption, and it is always one)

 DES Encrypted Password should be: '5A58BD50E4DD9B5F'X

5.2. Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) Password Substitutes

 A Network Station or Enhanced Client can generate SHA encrypted
 passwords if it follows these steps.

 1) Convert the user identifier to uppercase UNICODE format (if it is
 not already in this format).

 The user identifier must be left justified in a 10-byte variable
 and padded to the right with '40'X up to a 10-byte length prior to
 converting it to UNICODE. If the user's password is 10 bytes in
 length, no padding will occur. User identifiers of less than 1
 byte or greater than 10 bytes in length are not valid. The user
 identifier will be 20 bytes in length after conversion to UNICODE,
 so the variable that will hold the UNICODE user identifier should
 have a length of 20 bytes.





Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 16]

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 2) Ensure the password is in UNICODE format (if it is not already in
 this format).

 The user's password must be left justified in a 128-byte variable.
 It does not need to be padded to the right with '40'X up to a
 128-byte length. Passwords less than 1 byte or greater than 128
 bytes in length are not valid. The password will be 2 times its
 original length after conversion to UNICODE, so the maximum length
 of the variable that will hold the UNICODE password is 256 bytes.

 3) Create a 20-byte password token as follows:

 PW_token = SHA-1(uppercase_unicode_userid, /* 20 bytes */
 unicode_password) /* from 2 to 256 bytes */

 The actual routine to be used to perform the SHA-1 processing is
 dependent on the programming language being used. For example, if
 using the Java language, then use the java.security class to
 perform the actual SHA-1 processing.

 The PW_token will be used in subsequent step to actually generate
 the final substitute password.

 4) Increment PWSEQs and store it.

 5) Create the 20-byte substitute password as follows:

 PW_SUB = SHA-1(PW_token, /* 20 bytes */
 serverseed, /* 8 bytes */
 clientseed, /* 8 bytes */
 uppercase_unicode_userid, /* 20 bytes */
 PWSEQ) /* 8 bytes */

 The actual routine to be used to perform the SHA-1 processing is
 dependent on the programming language being used. For example, if
 using the Java language, then use the java.security class to
 perform the actual SHA-1 processing.

 6) Example SHA Password Substitute Calculation

 ID: USER123
 Password: AbCdEfGh123?+
 Server seed: '3E3A71C78795E5F5'X
 Client seed: 'B1C806D5D377D994'X
 PWSEQs: 1 (PWSEQs is a sequence number needed in the
 SHA encryption, and it is always one)





Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 17]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 SHA Encrypted Password should be:

 'E7FAB5F034BEDA42E91F439DD07532A24140E3DD'X

6. Kerberos Services Ticket Automatic Sign-On Support

 An iSeries Telnet server specific USERVAR defined below will contain
 the complete Generic Security Services (GSS) token for use on the
 iSeries. Enhanced Telnet clients will need to obtain the Kerberos
 services ticket from a Key Distribution Center (KDC). Implementation
 steps for acquiring the Kerberos services ticket will be limited to
 the Microsoft Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI) example
 below. For information on Kerberos services tickets, refer to your
 Network Authentication Service (NAS) documentation.

 The custom USERVAR defined is:

 USERVAR VALUE EXAMPLE DESCRIPTION
 --------- ------------- -------------------- -------------------
 IBMTICKET binary(16384) 16384-byte hex field Kerberos services token

 Several other USERVARs, as defined in Section 6, can be used along
 with the IBMTICKET USERVAR to allow a user greater control over their
 startup environment.

 The custom USERVARs defined to accomplish this are:

 USERVAR VALUE EXAMPLE DESCRIPTION
 -------- ---------------- ---------------- -----------------
 IBMCURLIB us-ascii char(x) QGPL Current library
 IBMIMENU us-ascii char(x) MAIN Initial menu
 IBMPROGRAM us-ascii char(x) QCMD Program to call

 x - up to a maximum of 10 characters

 If you use the IBMSENDCONFREC USERVAR, as described in Section 5,
 with a value of YES along with the Kerberos ticket USERVARs described
 above, you will receive a Startup Response Record that will contain a
 response code informing your Telnet client of the success or failure
 of the Kerberos validation attempt. See Section 11 for details on
 the Startup Response Record.

 The following Microsoft SSPI example illustrates how to get the
 client security token, which contains the Kerberos services ticket.







Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 18]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 1) Get a handle to the user's credentials:

 PSecurityFunctionTable pSSPI_;
 CredHandle credHandle;
 TimeStamp timeStamp;

 ss = pSSPI_->AcquireCredentialsHandle(
 NULL, // Principal
 "Kerberos", // PackageName
 SECPKG_CRED_OUTBOUND, // CredentialUse
 NULL, // LogonID
 NULL, // AuthData
 NULL, // GetKeyFnc
 NULL, // GetKeyArg
 &credHandle, // CredHandle
 &timeStamp); // ExpireTime

 2) Initialize security context to "request delegation". Mutual
 authentication is also requested, although it is not required and
 may not be performed.

 CtxtHandle newContext;
 unsigned long contextAttr;
 unsigned char token[16384] ;
 unsigned long tokenLen = sizeof(token);
 SecBuffer sbo = {tokenLen, SECBUFFER_TOKEN, token};
 SecBufferDesc sbdo = {SECBUFFER_VERSION, 1, &sbo}

 pSSPI_->InitializeSecurityContext(
 &credHandle, // CredHandle
 NULL, // Context
 "krbsrv400/fullyqualifiedLowerCaseSystemName",
 // ServicePrincipalName
 ISC_REQ_CONNECTION|ISC_REQ_DELEGATE|ISC_REQ_MUTUAL_AUTH,
 // ContextRequest
 NULL, // Reserved
 SECURITY_NATIVE_DREP, // DataRep
 NULL, // Input
 NULL, // Reserved
 &newContext, // NewContext
 &sbdo, // Output
 &contextAttr, // ContextAttr
 &timeStamp); // ExpireTime

 3) Free the user credentials handle with FreeCredentialsHandle().

 4) Send security token to Telnet Server (padded with escape
 characters).



Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 19]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 The following illustrates the Kerberos Token Negotiation:

 iSeries Telnet server Enhanced Telnet client
 -------------------------- -------------------------------
 IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON -->
 <-- IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON
 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND
 USERVAR "IBMRSEEDxxxxxxxx"
 VAR USERVAR IAC SE -->
 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS
 USERVAR "IBMTICKET" VALUE
 "zzzzzzzz..."
 <-- IAC SE
 .
 .
 (other negotiations) .

 In this example, "xxxxxxxx" is an 8-byte hexadecimal random server
 seed, and "zzzzzzzz..." is the complete Kerberos services token. If
 the Kerberos services token is not valid, then the sign-on panel is
 not bypassed. It should be noted that for the Kerberos token a
 random server seed is not needed, although it will be sent by the
 Telnet Server.

 Actual bytes transmitted in the above example are shown in hex below,
 where the server seed is "7D3E488F18080404", and the Kerberos
 services token starts with "DFB0402F22ABA3BA...". The complete
 Kerberos services token is not shown here, as the length of the token
 could be 16384 bytes and would make this document extremely large.
 As described in Section 6, the client must escape and/or byte stuff
 any Kerberos token bytes, which could be seen as a Telnet environment
 option [RFC1572], specifically VAR, VALUE, ESC, and USERVAR.

 iSeries Telnet server Enhanced Telnet client
 -------------------------- -------------------------
 FF FD 27 -->
 <-- FF FB 27
 FF FA 27 01 03 49 42 4D
 52 53 45 45 44 7D 3E 48
 8F 18 08 04 04 00 03 FF
 F0 -->
 FF FA 27 00 03 49 42 4D
 54 49 43 48 45 54 01 DF
 B0 40 2F 22 AB A3 BA...
 <-- FF F0






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7. Device Name Collision Processing

 Device name collision occurs when a Telnet client sends the Telnet
 server a virtual device name that it wants to use, but that device is
 already in use on the server. When this occurs, the Telnet server
 sends a request to the client asking it to try another device name.
 The environment option negotiation uses the USERVAR name of DEVNAME
 to communicate the virtual device name. The following shows how the
 Telnet server will request the Telnet client to send a different
 DEVNAME when device name collision occurs.

 iSeries Telnet server Enhanced Telnet client
 -------------------------- -------------------------
 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND
 VAR USERVAR IAC SE -->

 Server requests all environment variables be sent.

 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS USERVAR
 "DEVNAME" VALUE "MYDEVICE1"
 USERVAR "xxxxx" VALUE "xxx"
 ...
 <-- IAC SE

 Client sends all environment variables, including DEVNAME. Server
 tries to select device MYDEVICE1. If the device is already in use,
 server requests DEVNAME be sent again.

 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND
 USERVAR "DEVNAME" IAC SE -->

 Server sends a request for a single environment variable: DEVNAME

 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS USERVAR
 <-- "DEVNAME" VALUE "MYDEVICE2" IAC SE

 Client sends one environment variable, calculating a new value of
 MYDEVICE2. If MYDEVICE2 is different from the last request, then
 server tries to select device MYDEVICE2, else server disconnects
 client. If MYDEVICE2 is also in use, server will send DEVNAME
 request again and keep doing so until it receives a device that is
 not in use, or the same device name twice in row.









Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 21]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


8. Enhanced Printer Emulation Support

 Telnet environment option USERVARs have been defined to allow a
 compliant Telnet client more control over the Telnet server virtual
 device on the iSeries. These USERVARs allow the client Telnet to
 select a previously created virtual device or auto-create a new
 virtual device with requested attributes.

 This makes the enhancements available to any Telnet client that
 chooses to support the new negotiations.

 The USERVARs defined to accomplish this are:

 USERVAR VALUE EXAMPLE DESCRIPTION
 ------------- ---------------- ---------------- -------------------
 DEVNAME us-ascii char(x) PRINTER1 Printer device name
 IBMIGCFEAT us-ascii char(6) 2424J0 IGC feature (DBCS)
 IBMMSGQNAME us-ascii char(x) QSYSOPR *MSGQ name
 IBMMSGQLIB us-ascii char(x) QSYS *MSGQ library
 IBMFONT us-ascii char(x) 12 Font
 IBMFORMFEED us-ascii char(1) C | U | A Formfeed
 IBMTRANSFORM us-ascii char(1) 1 | 0 Transform
 IBMMFRTYPMDL us-ascii char(x) *IBM42023 Mfg. type and model
 IBMPPRSRC1 binary(1) 1-byte hex field Paper source 1
 IBMPPRSRC2 binary(1) 1-byte hex field Paper source 2
 IBMENVELOPE binary(1) 1-byte hex field Envelope hopper
 IBMASCII899 us-ascii char(1) 1 | 0 ASCII 899 support
 IBMWSCSTNAME us-ascii char(x) *NONE WSCST name
 IBMWSCSTLIB us-ascii char(x) *LIBL WSCST library

 x - up to a maximum of 10 characters

 The "IBM" prefix on the USERVARs denotes iSeries-specific attributes.

 The DEVNAME USERVAR is used for both displays and printers. The
 IBMFONT and IBMASCII899 are used only for SBCS environments.

 For a description of most of these parameters (drop the "IBM" from
 the USERVAR) and their permissible values, refer to Chapter 8 in the
 Communications Configuration Reference [COMM-CONFIG].

 The IBMIGCFEAT supports the following variable DBCS language
 identifiers in position 5 (positions 1-4 must be '2424'; position 6
 must be '0'):

 'J' = Japanese 'K' = Korean
 'C' = Traditional Chinese 'S' = Simplified Chinese




Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 22]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 The IBMTRANSFORM and IBMASCII899 values correspond to:

 '1' = Yes '0' = No

 The IBMFORMFEED values correspond to:

 'C' = Continuous 'U' = Cut 'A' = Autocut

 The IBMPPRSRC1, IBMPPRSRC2, and IBMENVELOPE custom USERVARs do not
 map directly to their descriptions in Chapter 8 in the Communications
 Configuration Reference [COMM-CONFIG]. To map these, use the index
 listed here:

 IBMPPRSRC1 HEX IBMPPRSRC2 HEX IBMENVELOPE HEX
 ---------- ----- ---------- ----- ----------- -----
 *NONE 'FF'X *NONE 'FF'X *NONE 'FF'X
 *MFRTYPMDL '00'X *MFRTYPMDL '00'X *MFRTYPMDL '00'X
 *LETTER '01'X *LETTER '01'X *B5 '06'X
 *LEGAL '02'X *LEGAL '02'X *MONARCH '09'X
 *EXECUTIVE '03'X *EXECUTIVE '03'X *NUMBER9 '0A'X
 *A4 '04'X *A4 '04'X *NUMBER10 '0B'X
 *A5 '05'X *A5 '05'X *C5 '0C'X
 *B5 '06'X *B5 '06'X *DL '0D'X
 *CONT80 '07'X *CONT80 '07'X
 *CONT132 '08'X *CONT132 '08'X
 *A3 '0E'X *A3 '0E'X
 *B4 '0F'X *B4 '0F'X
 *LEDGER '10'X *LEDGER '10'X

9. Telnet Printer Terminal Types

 New Telnet options are defined for the printer pass-through mode of
 operation. To enable printer pass-through mode, both the client and
 server must agree to support at least the Transmit-Binary, End-Of-
 Record, and Terminal-Type Telnet options. The following are new
 terminal types for printers:

 TERMINAL-TYPE DESCRIPTION
 ------------- -------------------
 IBM-5553-B01 Double-Byte printer
 IBM-3812-1 Single-Byte printer

 Specific characteristics of the IBM-5553-B01 or IBM-3812-1 printers
 are specified through the USERVAR IBMMFRTYPMDL, which specifies the
 manufacturer type and model.






Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 23]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 An example of a typical negotiation process to establish printer
 pass-through mode of operation is shown below. In this example, the
 server initiates the negotiation by sending the DO TERMINAL-TYPE
 request.

 For DBCS environments, if IBMTRANSFORM is set to 1 (use Host Print
 Transform), then the virtual device created is 3812, not 5553.
 Therefore, IBM-3812-1 (and not IBM-5553-B01) should be negotiated for
 TERMINAL-TYPE.

 iSeries Telnet server Enhanced Telnet client
 -------------------------- --------------------------
 IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON -->
 <-- IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON
 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND
 VAR USERVAR IAC SE -->
 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS
 USERVAR "DEVNAME" VALUE "PCPRINTER"
 USERVAR "IBMMSGQNAME" VALUE "QSYSOPR"
 USERVAR "IBMMSGQLIB" VALUE "*LIBL"
 USERVAR "IBMTRANSFORM" VALUE "0"
 USERVAR "IBMFONT" VALUE "12"
 USERVAR "IBMFORMFEED" VALUE "C"
 USERVAR "IBMPPRSRC1" VALUE ESC '01'X
 USERVAR "IBMPPRSRC2" VALUE '04'X
 USERVAR "IBMENVELOPE" VALUE IAC 'FF'X

 <-- IAC SE
 IAC DO TERMINAL-TYPE -->
 <-- IAC WILL TERMINAL-TYPE
 IAC SB TERMINAL-TYPE SEND

 IAC SE -->
 IAC SB TERMINAL-TYPE IS IBM-3812-1
 <-- IAC SE
 IAC DO BINARY -->
 <-- IAC WILL BINARY
 IAC DO EOR -->
 <-- IAC WILL EOR

 Some points about the above example. The IBMPPRSRC1 value requires
 escaping the value using ESC according to Telnet environment options
 [RFC1572]. The IBMPPRSRC2 does not require an ESC character since
 '04'X has no conflict with environment options. Finally, to send
 'FF'X for the IBMENVELOPE value, escape the 'FF'X value by using
 another 'FF'X (called "doubling"), so as not to have the value
 interpreted as a Telnet character per the Telnet protocol
 specification [RFC854].



Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 24]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 Actual bytes transmitted in the above example are shown in hex below.

 iSeries Telnet server Enhanced Telnet client
 -------------------------- --------------------------
 FF FD 27 -->
 <-- FF FB 27
 FF FA 27 01 00 03 FF F0 -->
 FF FA 27 00 03 44 45 56
 4E 41 4D 45 01 50 43 50
 52 49 4E 54 45 52 03 49
 42 4D 4D 53 47 51 4E 41
 4D 45 01 51 53 59 53 4F
 50 52 03 49 42 4D 4D 53
 47 51 4C 49 42 01 2A 4C
 49 42 4C 03 49 42 4D 54
 52 41 4E 53 46 4F 52 4D
 01 30 03 49 42 4D 46 4F
 4E 54 01 31 32 03 49 42
 4D 46 4F 52 4D 46 45 45
 44 01 43 03 49 42 4D 50
 50 52 53 52 43 31 01 02
 01 03 49 42 4D 50 50 52
 53 52 43 32 01 04 03 49
 42 4D 45 4E 56 45 4C 4F
 <-- 50 45 01 FF FF FF F0
 FF FD 18 -->
 <-- FF FB 18
 FF FA 18 01 FF F0 -->
 FF FA 18 00 49 42 4D 2D
 <-- 33 38 31 32 2D 31 FF F0
 FF FD 00 -->
 <-- FF FB 00
 FF FD 19 -->
 FF FB 19

10. Startup Response Record for Printer and Display Devices

 Once Telnet negotiation for a 5250 pass-through mode is completed,
 the iSeries Telnet server will initiate a virtual device (printer or
 display) power-on sequence on behalf of the Telnet client. The
 Telnet server will supply a Startup Response Record to the Telnet
 client with the status of the device power-on sequence, indicating
 success or failure of the virtual device power-on sequence.

 This section shows an example of two Startup Response Records. The
 source device is a type 3812 model 01 printer with the name
 "PCPRINTER" on the target system "TARGET".




Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 25]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 Figure 1 shows an example of a successful response; Figure 2 shows an
 example of an error response.

10.1. Example of a Success Response Record

 The response record in Figure 1 was sent by an iSeries at Release
 V4R2. It is an example of the target sending back a successful
 Startup Response Record.

 +------------------------------------------------------------------+
 | +----- Pass-Through header |
 | | +--- Response data |
 | | | +---- Start diagnostic information|
 | | | | |
 | +----------++----------++--------------------------------------- |
 | | || || |
 | 004912A090000560060020C0003D0000C9F9F0F2E3C1D9C7C5E34040D7C3D7D9 |
 | | | T A R G E T P C P R |
 | +------+ |
 | Response Code (I902) |
 | |
 | ---------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | |
 | C9D5E3C5D9400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |
 | I N T E R |
 | |
 | +------- End of diagnostic information |
 | | |
 | -----------------+ |
 | | |
 | 000000000000000000 |
 +------------------------------------------------------------------+

 Figure 1. Example of a success response record

 - '0049'X = Length pass-through data, including this length field
 - '12A0'X = GDS LU6.2 header
 - '90000560060020C0003D0000'X = Fixed value fields
 - 'C9F9F0F2'X = Response Code (I902)
 - 'E3C1D9C7C5E34040'X = System Name (TARGET)
 - 'D7C3D7D9C9D5E3C5D940'X = Object Name (PCPRINTER)










Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 26]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


10.2. Example of an Error Response Record

 The response record in Figure 2 is one that reports an error. The
 virtual device named "PCPRINTER" is not available on the target
 system "TARGET" because the device is not available. You would
 normally see this error if the printer were already assigned to
 another Telnet session.

 +------------------------------------------------------------------+
 | +----- Pass-Through header |
 | | +--- Response data |
 | | | +---- Start diagnostic information|
 | | | | |
 | +----------++----------++--------------------------------------- |
 | | || || |
 | 004912A09000056006008200003D0000F8F9F0F2E3C1D9C7C5E34040D7C3D7D9 |
 | | | T A R G E T P C P R |
 | +------+ |
 | Response Code (8902) |
 | |
 | ---------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | |
 | C9D5E3C5D9400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |
 | I N T E R |
 | |
 | +------- End of diagnostic information |
 | | |
 | -----------------+ |
 | | |
 | 000000000000000000 |
 +------------------------------------------------------------------+

 Figure 2. Example of an error response record

 - '0049'X = Length pass-through data, including this length field
 - '12A0'X = GDS LU6.2 header
 - '90000560060020C0003D0000'X = Fixed value fields
 - 'F8F9F0F2'X = Response Code (8902)
 - 'E3C1D9C7C5E34040'X = System Name (TARGET)
 - 'D7C3D7D9C9D5E3C5D940'X = Object Name (PCPRINTER)











Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 27]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


10.3. Example of a Response Record with Device Name Retry

 The Response Record can be used in conjunction with the DEVNAME
 Environment variable to allow client emulators to inform users of
 connection failures. In addition, this combination could be used by
 client emulators that accept multiple device names to try on session
 connections. The client would be able to walk through a list of
 possible device names and provide feedback based on the response
 code(s) received for each device name that was rejected.

 The following sequence shows a negotiation between the client and the
 server in which a named device "RFCTEST" is requested by the client.
 The device name is already assigned to an existing condition. The
 server responds with the Response Record showing an 8902 response
 code. The client could use this information to inform the user that
 the device name just tried was already in use. Following the
 Response Record the server would then invite the client to try
 another device name. Because the same device name was used again by
 the client, the server closed the session.
































Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 28]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 iSeries Telnet server Enhanced Telnet client
 -------------------------- -------------------------
 IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON -->
 <-- IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON
 IAC DO TERMINAL-TYPE -->
 <-- IAC WILL TERMINAL-TYPE
 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND
 USERVAR "IBMRSEEDxxxxxxxx"
 VAR USERVAR IAC SE -->
 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS
 USERVAR "DEVNAME"
 VALUE "RFCTEST"
 USERVAR "IBMSENDCONFREC"
 VALUE "YES"
 <-- IAC SE
 IAC SB TERMINAL-TYPE SEND
 IAC SE -->
 IAC SB TERMINAL-TYPE IS
 <-- IBM-3180-2 IAC SE
 (terminal type negotiations
 completed)
 IAC DO EOR -->
 <-- IAC WILL EOR
 IAC WILL EOR -->
 <-- IAC DO EOR
 IAC DO BINARY -->
 <-- IAC WILL BINARY
 IAC WILL BINARY -->
 <-- IAC DO BINARY
 (73 BYTE RFC 1205 RECORD
 WITH 8902 ERROR CODE) -->
 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND
 USERVAR "DEVNAME"
 IAC SE -->
 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS
 USERVAR "DEVNAME"
 VALUE "RFCTEST"
 USERVAR "IBMSENDCONFREC"
 VALUE "YES"
 <-- IAC SE
 (server closes connection)










Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 29]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 Actual bytes transmitted in the above example are shown in hex below.

 iSeries Telnet server Enhanced Telnet client
 -------------------------- --------------------------
 FF FD 27 -->
 <-- FF FB 27
 FF FD 18 -->
 <-- FF FB 18
 FF FA 27 01 03 49 42 4D
 52 53 45 45 44 C4 96 67
 76 9A 23 E3 34 00 03 FF
 F0 -->
 FF FA 27 00 03 44 45 56
 4E 41 4D 45 01 52 46 43
 54 45 53 54 03 49 42 4D
 53 45 4E 44 43 4F 4E 46
 52 45 43 01 59 45 53 FF
 <-- F0
 FF FA 18 01 FF F0 -->
 <-- FF FA 18 00 49 42 4D 2D
 33 31 38 30 2D 32 FF F0
 FF FD 19 -->
 <-- FF FB 19
 FF FB 19 -->
 <-- FF FD 19
 FF FD 00 -->
 <-- FF FB 00
 FF FB 00 -->
 <-- FF FD 00
 00 49 12 A0 90 00 05 60
 06 00 20 C0 00 3D 00 00
 F8 F9 F0 F2 D9 E2 F0 F3
 F5 40 40 40 00 00 00 00
 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 00 FF EF -->
 FF FA 27 01 03 44 45 56
 4E 41 4D 45 FF F0 -->
 <-- FF FA 27 00 03 44 45 56
 4E 41 4D 45 01 52 46 43
 54 45 53 54 03 49 42 4D
 53 45 4E 44 43 4F 4E 46
 52 45 43 01 59 45 53 FF
 F0




Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 30]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


10.4. Response Codes

 The Start-Up Response Record success response codes:

 CODE DESCRIPTION
 ---- ------------------------------------------------------
 I901 Virtual device has less function than source device.
 I902 Session successfully started.
 I906 Automatic sign-on requested, but not allowed.
 Session still allowed; a sign-on screen will be
 coming.

 The Start-Up Response Record error response codes:

 CODE DESCRIPTION
 ---- ------------------------------------------------------
 2702 Device description not found.
 2703 Controller description not found.
 2777 Damaged device description.
 8901 Device not varied on.
 8902 Device not available.
 8903 Device not valid for session.
 8906 Session initiation failed.
 8907 Session failure.
 8910 Controller not valid for session.
 8916 No matching device found.
 8917 Not authorized to object.
 8918 Job canceled.
 8920 Object partially damaged.
 8921 Communications error.
 8922 Negative response received.
 8923 Start-up record built incorrectly.
 8925 Creation of device failed.
 8928 Change of device failed.
 8929 Vary on or vary off failed.
 8930 Message queue does not exist.
 8934 Start-up for S/36 WSF received.
 8935 Session rejected.
 8936 Security failure on session attempt.
 8937 Automatic sign-on rejected.
 8940 Automatic configuration failed or not allowed.
 I904 Source system at incompatible release.









Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 31]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 The Start-Up Response Record error response codes for non-Kerberos
 Services Token automatic sign-on:

 CODE DESCRIPTION
 ---- ------------------------------------------------------
 0001 System error.
 0002 Userid unknown.
 0003 Userid disabled.
 0004 Invalid password/passphrase/token.
 0005 Password/passphrase/token is expired.
 0006 Pre-V2R2 password.
 0008 Next invalid password/passphrase/token will revoke userid.

 The Start-Up Response Record error response codes for Kerberos
 Services Token automatic sign-on support:

 CODE DESCRIPTION
 ---- ------------------------------------------------------
 0001 User profile is disabled.
 0002 Kerberos principal maps to a system user profile.
 0003 Enterprise Identity Map (EIM) configuration error.
 0004 EIM does not map Kerberos principal to user profile.
 0005 EIM maps Kerberos principal to multiple user profiles.
 0006 EIM maps Kerberos principal to user profile not found on
 system.
 1000 None of the requested mechanisms are supported by the
 local system.
 2000 The input name is not formatted properly or is not valid.
 6000 The received input token contains an incorrect signature.
 7000 No credentials available or credentials valid for context
 init only.
 9000 Consistency checks performed on the input token failed.
 A000 Consistency checks on the cred structure failed.
 B000 Credentials are no longer valid.
 D000 The runtime failed for reasons that are not defined at the
 GSS level.

 In the case where the USERVAR, DEVNAME USERVAR, IBMSENDCONFREC
 USERVAR, IBMSUBSPW USERVAR, and IBMRSEED USERVAR are all used
 together, any device errors will take precedence over automatic
 sign-on errors. That is:

 1) If the requested named device is not available or an error occurs
 when attempting to create the device on the server system, a
 device related return code (i.e., 8902) will be sent to the client
 system in the display confirmation record.





Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 32]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 2) If the requested named device is available or no errors occur when
 attempting to create the device on the server system, an automatic
 sign-on return code (i.e., 0002) will be sent to the client system
 in the display confirmation record.

11. Printer Steady-State Pass-Through Interface

 The information in this section applies to the pass-through session
 after the receipt of startup confirmation records is complete.

 Following is the printer header interface used by Telnet.

 +------------------------------------------------------------------+
 | +-- Length of structure (LLLL) |
 | | |
 | | +-- GDS identifier |
 | | | |
 | | | +-- Data flow record |
 | | | | |
 | | | | +-- Length of pass-through specific header (LL) |
 | | | | | |
 | | | | | +-- Flags |
 | | | | | | |
 | | | | | | +-- Printer operation code |
 | | | | | | | |
 | | | | | | | +-- Diagnostic field - zero pad to|
 | | | | | | | | LL specified |
 | | | | | | | | |
 | | | | | | | | +-- Printer data |
 | | | | | | | | | |
 | +--+ +--+ +--+ ++ +--+ ++ +----------+ +----------------+ |
 | | | | | | | || | | || | | | | |
 | xxxx 12A0 xxxx xx xxxx xx xxxxxxxxxxxx ... print data ... |
 | |
 +------------------------------------------------------------------+

 Figure 3. Layout of the printer pass-through header

 BYTES 0-1: Length of structure including this field (LLLL)

 BYTES 2-3: GDS Identifier ('12A0'X)

 BYTE 4-5: Data flow record

 This field contains flags that describe what type of
 data pass-through should be expected to be found
 following this header. Generally, bits 0-2 in the first
 byte are mutually exclusive (that is, if one of them is



Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 33]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 set to '1'B, the rest will be set to '0'B.) The bits and
 their meanings follow.

 BIT DESCRIPTION

 0 Start-Up confirmation
 1 Termination record
 2 Start-Up Record
 3 Diagnostic information included
 4 - 5 Reserved
 6 Reserved
 7 Printer record
 8 - 13 Reserved
 14 Client-originated (inbound) printer record
 15 Server-originated (outbound) printer record

 BYTE 6: Length printer pass-through header including this field
 (LL)

 BYTES 7-8: Flags

 BYTE 7 BITS: xxxx x111 --> Reserved
 xxxx 1xxx --> Last of chain
 xxx1 xxxx --> First of chain
 xx1x xxxx --> Printer now ready
 x1xx xxxx --> Intervention Required
 1xxx xxxx --> Error Indicator

 BYTE 8 BITS: xxxx xxxx --> Reserved

 BYTE 9: Printer operation code

 '01'X Print/Print complete
 '02'X Clear Print Buffers

 BYTE 10-LL: Diagnostic information (Note 1)

 If BYTE 7 = xx1x xxxx, then bytes 10-LL may contain:
 Printer ready C9 00 00 00 02

 If BYTE 7 = x1xx xxxx, then bytes 10-LL may contain: (Note 2)
 Command/parameter not valid C9 00 03 02 2x
 Print check C9 00 03 02 3x
 Forms check C9 00 03 02 4x
 Normal periodic condition C9 00 03 02 5x
 Data stream error C9 00 03 02 6x
 Machine/print/ribbon check C9 00 03 02 8x




Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 34]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 If BYTE 7 = 1xxx xxxx, then bytes 10-LL may contain: (Note 3)
 Cancel 08 11 02 00
 Invalid print parameter 08 11 02 29
 Invalid print command 08 11 02 28

 Diagnostic information notes:

 1. LL is the length of the structure defined in Byte 6. If no
 additional data is present, the remainder of the structure must
 be padded with zeroes.

 2. These are printer SIGNAL commands. Further information on these
 commands may be obtained from the 5494 Remote Control Unit
 Functions Reference guide [5494-CU]. Refer to your iSeries
 printer documentation for more specific information on these data
 stream exceptions. The following are some 3812 and 5553 errors
 that may be seen:

 Machine check C9 00 03 02 11
 Graphics check C9 00 03 02 26
 Print check C9 00 03 02 31
 Form jam C9 00 03 02 41
 Paper jam C9 00 03 02 47
 End of forms C9 00 03 02 50
 Printer not ready C9 00 03 02 51
 Data stream - class 1 C9 00 03 02 66 loss of text
 Data stream - class 2 C9 00 03 02 67 text appearance
 Data stream - class 3 C9 00 03 02 68 multibyte control error
 Data stream - class 4 C9 00 03 02 69 multibyte control parm
 Cover unexpectedly open C9 00 03 02 81
 Machine check C9 00 03 02 86
 Machine check C9 00 03 02 87
 Ribbon check C9 00 03 02 88

 3. These are printer negative responses. Further information on
 these commands may be obtained from the 5494 Remote Control Unit
 Functions Reference guide [5494-CU].

 The print data will start in byte LL+1.

11.1. Example of a Print Record

 Figure 4 shows the server sending the client data with a print
 record. This is normally seen following receipt of a Success
 Response Record, such as the example in Figure 1.






Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 35]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 +--------------------------------------------------------------------+
 | +-- Length of structure (LLLL) |
 | | +-- GDS identifier |
 | | | +-- Data flow record |
 | | | | +-- Length of pass-through specific header (LL) |
 | | | | | +-- Flags |
 | | | | | | +-- Printer operation code |
 | | | | | | | +-- Zero pad to LL specified (0A) |
 | | | | | | | | +-- Printer data |
 | | | | | | | | | |
 | +--+ +--+ +--+ ++ +--+ ++ +----------+ +---------------------------|
 | | | | | | | || | | || | | | |
 | 0085 12A0 0101 0A 1800 01 000000000000 34C4012BD20345FF2BD2044C0002|
 | |
 | ------------------------------------------------------------ |
 | |
 | 2BD2040D00002BD20A8501010201030204022BD20309022BD2061100014A |
 | |
 | ------------------------------------------------------------ |
 | |
 | 402BD20601010000012BD306F60000FFFF2BD20A48000001000000010100 |
 | |
 | ------------------------------------------------------------ |
 | |
 | 2BD10705000B0090012BD2044900F02BD206404A403DE02BD2041500F034 |
 | |
 | end of printer data |
 | -------------------------+ |
 | | |
 | C4012BD10381FF002BC8034001 |
 +--------------------------------------------------------------------+

 Figure 4. Server sending client data with a print record

 - '0085'X = Logical record length, including this byte (LLLL)
 - '12A0'X = GDS LU6.2 header
 - '0101'X = Data flow record (server to client)
 - '0A'X = Length of pass-through specific header (LL)
 - '1800'X = First of chain / Last of chain indicators
 - '01'X = Print
 - '000000000000'X = Zero pad header to LL specified
 - '34C401'X = First piece of data for spooled data
 - Remainder is printer data/commands/orders








Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 36]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


11.2. Example of a Print Complete Record

 Figure 5 shows the client sending the server a print complete record.
 This would normally follow receipt of a print record, such as the
 example in Figure 4. This indicates successful completion of a print
 request.

 +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
 | +-- Length of structure (LLLL) |
 | | +-- GDS identifier |
 | | | +-- Data flow record |
 | | | | +-- Length of pass-through specific header (LL) |
 | | | | | +-- Flags |
 | | | | | | +-- Printer operation code |
 | | | | | | | |
 | +--+ +--+ +--+ ++ +--+ ++ |
 | | | | | | | || | | || |
 | 000A 12A0 0102 04 0000 01 |
 +-------------------------------------------------------------------+

 Figure 5. Client sending server a print complete record

 - '000A'X = Logical record length, including this byte (LLLL)
 - '12A0'X = GDS LU6.2 header
 - '0102'X = Data flow response record (client to server)
 - '04'X = Length of pass-through specific header (LL)
 - '0000'X = Good Response
 - '01'X = Print Complete

11.3. Example of a Null Print Record

 Figure 6 shows the server sending the client a null print record.
 The null print record is the last print command the server sends to
 the client for a print job, and it indicates to the printer that
 there is no more data. The null data byte '00'X is optional and in
 some cases may be omitted (in particular, this scenario occurs in
 DBCS print streams).

 This example would normally follow any number of print records, such
 as the example in Figure 4. This indicates successful completion of
 a print job. The client normally responds to this null print record
 with another print complete record, such as in Figure 5.









Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 37]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 +------------------------------------------------------------------+
 | +-- Length of structure (LLLL) |
 | | +-- GDS identifier |
 | | | +-- Data flow record |
 | | | | +-- Length of pass-through specific header (LL) |
 | | | | | +-- Flags |
 | | | | | | +-- Printer operation code |
 | | | | | | | +-- Zero pad to LL specified (0A) |
 | | | | | | | | +-- Printer data |
 | | | | | | | | | |
 | +--+ +--+ +--+ ++ +--+ ++ +----------+ ++ |
 | | | | | | | || | | || | | || |
 | 0011 12A0 0101 0A 0800 01 000000000000 00 |
 +------------------------------------------------------------------+

 Figure 6. Server sending client a null print record

 - '0011'X = Logical record length, including this byte
 - '12A0'X = GDS LU6.2 header
 - '0101'X = Data flow record
 - '0A'X = Length of pass-through specific header (LL)
 - '0800'X = Last of Chain
 - '01'X = Print
 - '000000000000'X = Zero pad header to LL specified
 - '00'X = Null data byte


























Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 38]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


12. End-to-End Print Example

 The next example shows a full print exchange between a Telnet client
 and server for a 526 byte spooled file. Selective translation of the
 hexadecimal streams into 1) Telnet negotiations and 2) ASCII/EBCDIC
 characters is done to aid readability. Telnet negotiations are
 delimited by '(' and ')' parenthesis characters; ASCII/EBCDIC
 conversions are bracketed by '|' vertical bar characters.

 iSeries Telnet server Enhanced Telnet client
 ------------------------------- ---------------------------------
 FFFD27 -->

 (IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON)
 <-- FFFB27

 (IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON)

 FFFD18FFFA270103 49424D5253454544
 7EA5DFDDFD300404 0003FFF0 -->

 (IAC DO TERMINAL-TYPE
 IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND USERVAR
 IBMRSEED xxxxxxxx VAR USERVAR
 IAC SE)

 <-- FFFB18

 (IAC WILL TERMINAL-TYPE)

 FFFA1801FFF0 -->

 (IAC SB TERMINAL-TYPE SEND IAC
 SE)

 FFFA27000349424D 52534545447EA5DF
 DDFD300404000344 45564E414D450144
 554D4D5950525403 49424D4D5347514E
 414D450151535953 4F50520349424D4D
 5347514C4942012A 4C49424C0349424D
 464F4E5401313103 49424D5452414E53
 464F524D01310349 424D4D4652545950
 4D444C012A485049 490349424D505052
 5352433101020103 49424D5050525352
 433201040349424D 454E56454C4F5045
 01FFFF0349424D41 5343494938393901
 <-- 30FFF0




Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 39]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 (IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS USERVAR
 IBMRSEED xxxxxxxx VAR
 USERVAR DEVNAME VALUE DUMMYPRT
 USERVAR IBMMSGQNAME VALUE
 QSYSOPR
 USERVAR IBMMSGQLIB VALUE *LIBL
 USERVAR IBMFONT VALUE 11
 USERVAR IBMTRANSFORM VALUE 1
 USERVAR IBMMFRTYPMDL VALUE *HPII
 USERVAR IBMPPRSRC1 VALUE
 ESC '01'X
 USERVAR IBMPPRSRC2 VALUE '04'X
 USERVAR IBMENVELOPE VALUE IAC
 USERVAR IBMASCII899 VALUE 0
 IAC SE)

 <-- FFFA180049424D2D 333831322D31FFF0

 (IAC SB TERMINAL-TYPE IS
 IBM-3812-1 IAC SE)
 FFFD19 -->

 (IAC DO EOR)
 <-- FFFB19

 (IAC WILL EOR)

 FFFB19 -->

 (IAC WILL EOR)
 <-- FFFD19

 (IAC DO EOR)
 FFFD00 -->

 (IAC DO BINARY)
 <-- FFFB00

 (IAC WILL BINARY)
 FFFB00 -->

 (IAC WILL BINARY)
 <-- FFFD00

 (IAC DO BINARY)






Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 40]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 004912A090000560 060020C0003D0000 | - { |
 C9F9F0F2C5D3C3D9 E3D7F0F6C4E4D4D4 |I902ELCRTP06DUMM| (EBCDIC)
 E8D7D9E340400000 0000000000000000 |YPRT |
 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 | |
 0000000000000000 00FFEF --> | |

 (73-byte startup success response
 record ... IAC EOR)
 00DF12A001010A18 0001000000000000 | |
 03CD1B451B283130 551B287330703130 | E (10U (s0p10| (ASCII)
 2E30306831327630 733062303033541B |.00h12v0s0b003T |
 287330421B266440 1B266C304F1B266C |(s0B &d@ &l0O &l|
 303038431B266C30 3035431B28733070 |008C &l005C (s0p|
 31372E3130683130 7630733062303030 |17.10h10v0s0b000|
 541B283130551B28 73307031372E3130 |T (10U (s0p17.10|
 6831307630733062 303030541B287330 |h10v0s0b000T (s0|
 421B2664401B266C 314F1B266C303035 |B &d@ &l1O &l005|
 431B287330703137 2E31306831307630 |C (s0p17.10h10v0|
 733062303030541B 266C314F1B287330 |s0b000T &l1O (s0|
 7031372E31306831 3076307330623030 |p17.10h10v0s0b00|
 30541B2873307031 372E313068313076 |0T (s0p17.10h10v|
 3073306230303054 1B266C30303543FF |0s0b000T &l005C |
 EF --> | |

 (... 223-byte print record ...
 ... first of chain ...
 ... last of chain ... IAC EOR)
 <-- 000A12A001020400 0001FFEF

 (10-byte print complete header)
 031012A001010A10 0001000000000000 | |
 03FFFF1B451B2831 30551B2873307031 | E (10U (s0p1| (ASCII)
 372E313068313076 3073306230303054 |7.10h10v0s0b000T|
 1B287330421B2664 401B266C314F1B26 | (s0B &d@ &l1O &|
 6C303035431B266C 31481B266C314F1B |l005C &l1H &l1O |
 266C3032411B266C 31431B266C303030 |&l02A &l1C &l000|
 38451B266C303038 431B266C30303439 |8E &l008C &l0049|
 461B266130521B26 6C303035430A0A0A |F &a0R &l005C |
 0A0A0A0A1B26612B 3030303130561B26 | &a+00010V &|
 6C303035431B2661 2B30303231364820 |l005C &a+00216H |
 2020202020202020 2020202020202020 | |
 2020202020205072 696E74204B657920 | Print Key |
 4F75747075742020 2020202020202020 |Output |
 2020202020202020 2020202020202020 | |
 2020202020205061 6765202020310D0A | Page 1 |
 1B26612B30303231 3648202020203537 | &a+00216H 57|
 3639535331205634 52334D3020393830 |69SS1 V4R3M0 980|
 373203FFFF392020 2020202020202020 |72 9 |



Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 41]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 202020202020454C 4352545030362020 | ELCRTP06 |
 2020202020202020 202030332F33312F | 03/31/|
 3939202031363A33 303A34350D0A1B26 |99 16:30:45 &|
 612B303032313648 0D0A1B26612B3030 |a+00216H &a+00|
 3231364820202020 446973706C617920 |216H Display |
 4465766963652020 2E202E202E202E20 |Device . . . . |
 2E203A2020515041 444556303033510D |. : QPADEV003Q |
 0A1B26612B303032 3136482020202055 | &a+00216H U|
 73657220202E202E 202E202E202E202E |ser . . . . . .|
 202E202E202E202E 203A202052434153 | . . . . : RCAS|
 54524F0D0A1B2661 2B3030323136480D |TRO &a+00216H |
 0A1B26612B303032 313648204D41494E | &a+00216H MAIN|
 2020202020202020 2020202020202020 | |
 2020202020202020 20202041532F3430 | AS/40|
 30204D61696E204D 656E750D0A1B2661 |0 Main Menu &a|
 2B30303203FFFF31 3648202020202020 |+002 16H |
 2020202020202020 2020202020202020 | |
 2020202020202020 2020202020202020 | |
 2020202020202020 2020202020202020 | |
 2020202020202053 797374656D3A2020 | System: |
 20454C4352545030 360D0A1B26612B30 | ELCRTP06 &a+0|
 3032313648205365 6C656374206F6E65 |0216H Select one|
 206F662074686520 666F6C6C6F77696E | of the followin|
 673A0D0A1B26612B 3030323136480D0A |g: &a+00216H |
 1B26612B30303231 3648202020202020 | &a+00216H |
 312E205573657220 7461736B730D0A1B |1. User tasks |
 26612B3030323136 4820202020202032 |&a+00216H 2|
 2E204F6666696365 207461736B730D0A |. Office tasks |
 1B26612B30303231 36480D0A1B26612B | &a+00216H &a+|
 3030323136482020 20202020342E2046 |00216H 4. F|
 696C65732C206C69 627261726965732C |iles, libraries,|
 20616EFFEF | an |

 (... 784-byte print record ...
 ... first of chain ... IAC EOR)
 <-- 000A12A001020400 0001FFEF

 (10-byte print complete header)

 020312A001010A00 0001000000000000 | |
 64206603FFFF6F6C 646572730D0A1B26 |d f olders &| (ASCII)
 612B303032313648 0D0A1B26612B3030 |a+00216H &a+00|
 3231364820202020 2020362E20436F6D |216H 6. Com|
 6D756E6963617469 6F6E730D0A1B2661 |munications &a|
 2B3030323136480D 0A1B26612B303032 |+00216H &a+002|
 3136482020202020 20382E2050726F62 |16H 8. Prob|
 6C656D2068616E64 6C696E670D0A1B26 |lem handling &|
 612B303032313648 202020202020392E |a+00216H 9.|



Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 42]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 20446973706C6179 2061206D656E750D | Display a menu |
 0A1B26612B303032 3136482020202020 | &a+00216H |
 31302E20496E666F 726D6174696F6E20 |10. Information |
 417373697374616E 74206F7074696F6E |Assistant option|
 730D0A1B26612B30 3032313648202020 |s &a+00216H |
 202031312E20436C 69656E7420416363 | 11. Client Acc|
 6573732F34303020 7461736B730D0A1B |ess/400 tasks |
 26612B3030323136 480D0A1B26612B30 |&a+00216H &a+0|
 303231364803ED20 2020202039302E20 |0216H 90. |
 5369676E206F6666 0D0A1B26612B3030 |Sign off &a+00|
 323136480D0A1B26 612B303032313648 |216H &a+00216H|
 2053656C65637469 6F6E206F7220636F | Selection or co|
 6D6D616E640D0A1B 26612B3030323136 |mmand &a+00216|
 48203D3D3D3E0D0A 1B26612B30303231 |H ===> &a+0021|
 36480D0A1B26612B 3030323136482046 |6H &a+00216H F|
 333D457869742020 2046343D50726F6D |3=Exit F4=Prom|
 707420202046393D 5265747269657665 |pt F9=Retrieve|
 2020204631323D43 616E63656C202020 | F12=Cancel |
 4631333D496E666F 726D6174696F6E20 |F13=Information |
 417373697374616E 740D0A1B26612B30 |Assistant &a+0|
 3032313648204632 333D53657420696E |0216H F23=Set in|
 697469616C206D65 6E750D0A1B26612B |itial menu &a+|
 3030323136480D0A 1B26612B30303231 |00216H &a+0021|
 36480D0CFFEF |6H |

 (... 515-byte print record ...
 IAC EOR)
 <-- 000A12A001020400 0001FFEF

 (10-byte print complete header)
 001412A001010A00 0001000000000000 | |
 03021B45FFEF | E | (ASCII)

 (... 20-byte print record ...
 IAC EOR)
 <-- 000A12A001020400 0001FFEF

 (10-byte print complete header)
 001112A001010A08 0001000000000000
 00FFEF -->

 (... 17-byte NULL print record ...
 ... last of chain ... IAC EOR)
 <-- 000A12A001020400 0001FFEF

 (10-byte print complete header)





Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 43]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


13. Security Considerations

 The auto-sign-on feature provided by this RFC describes a way to
 encrypt your login password. However, while passwords can now be
 encrypted by using the IBMRSEED and IBMSUBSPW USERVAR negotiations,
 users should understand that only the login passwords are encrypted
 and not the entire Telnet session. Encryption of the Telnet session
 requires that another protocol layer, such as SSL, be added.

 The auto-sign-on feature supports plain text passwords, encrypted
 passwords, and Kerberos tokens. However, using plain text passwords
 is strongly discouraged. iSeries system administrators may want to
 configure their systems to reject plain text passwords.

14. IANA Considerations

 IANA registered the terminal types "IBM-3812-1" and "IBM-5553-B01" as
 a terminal type [RFC1091]. They are used when communicating with
 iSeries Telnet servers.

15. Normative References

 [] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Protocol
 Specification", STD 8, RFC 854, May 1983.

 [] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Option
 Specifications", STD 8, RFC 855, May 1983.

 [] VanBokkelen, J., "Telnet terminal-type option", RFC
 1091, February 1989.

 [] Chmielewski, P., "5250 Telnet Interface", RFC 1205,
 February 1991.

 [] Alexander, S., "Telnet Environment Option", RFC 1572,
 January 1994.

 [] Murphy, T., Jr., Rieth, P., and J. Stevens, "5250
 Telnet Enhancements", RFC 2877, July 2000.

16. Informative References

 [] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Binary
 Transmission", STD 27, RFC 856, May 1983.

 [] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Supress Go Ahead
 Option", STD 29, RFC 858, May 1983.




Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 44]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


 [] Postel, J., "Telnet end of record option", RFC 885,
 December 1983.

 [] IBM, "5494 Remote Control Unit, Functions Reference",
 SC30-3533-04, August 1995.

 [] IBM, "AS/400 System API Reference", SC41-5801-01,
 February 1998.

 [] IBM, "AS/400 Communications Configuration",
 SC41-5401-00, August 1997.

 [] IBM, "AS/400 National Language Support", SC41-5101-01,
 February 1998.

 [] Data Encryption Standard (DES), Federal Information
 Processing Standards Publication 46-2, January 22,
 1988.

 [] DES Modes of Operation, Federal Information Processing
 Standards Publication 81, December 1980.

 [] Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information Processing
 Standards Publication 180-1, May 11, 1993.

17. Relation to Other RFCs

 This RFC relies on the 5250 Telnet Interface [RFC1205] in all
 examples.

 This RFC replaces 5250 Telnet Enhancements [RFC2877], adding new
 sections for Kerberos, SHA-1, security and IANA considerations.
 Minor corrections and additional examples were also added.

 Informative references have been removed.
















Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 45]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


Authors' Addresses

 Thomas E. Murphy, Jr.
 IBM Corporation
 2455 South Road
 Poughkeepsie, NY 12601

 Phone: (845) 435-7063
 Fax: (845) 432-9414
 EMail: murphyte@us.ibm.com


 Paul F. Rieth
 IBM Corporation
 3605 Highway 52 North
 Rochester, MN 55901

 Phone: (507) 253-5218
 Fax: (507) 253-5156
 EMail: rieth@us.ibm.com


 Jeffrey S. Stevens
 IBM Corporation
 3605 Highway 52 North
 Rochester, MN 55901

 Phone: (507) 253-5337
 Fax: (507) 253-5156
 EMail: jssteven@us.ibm.com





















Murphy, et al. Informational [Page 46]

RFC 4777 IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements November 2006


Full Copyright Statement

 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2006).

 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
 contained in BCP 78 and at www.rfc-editor.org/copyright.html, and
 except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.

 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST,
 AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES,
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 might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
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